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I. INTRODUCTION: BuRMA, SouTH AFRICA & CoNSUMER SoVEREIGNlY 
In june 2000, the Supreme Court held in Crosby v. National Foreign 
Trade Council (NFTC) 1 that federal sanctions against Burma pre-
empted the Massachusetts Burma law. With its "Burma Law," Massa-
chusetts sought to replicate the anti-Apartheid boycott, one of the 
most successful human rights campaigns in history. Massachusetts' 
Burma law authorized state agencies to exercise a strong purchasing 
preference in favor of companies that do not conduct business in 
Burma unless the preference would irripair essential purchases or 
result in inadequate competition.2 
In Crosby, the Court held that Congress preempted the Massachu-
setts Burma law when it adopted federal sanctions on Burma. While 
the state law applied to purchasing by state agencies, the federal law 
. imposed a limited range of sanctions, including a ban on future 
private investment, and gave the President discretion regarding the 
imposition of some of these sanctions. 3 However, the Court declined 
to rule that the Massachusetts Burma law was unconstitutional 
under the federal foreign affairs power or the dormant Commerce 
Clause, as the First Circuit Court of Appeals had in National Foreign 
Trade Council v. Natsios. 4 The Crosby decision provides no fuel for a 
constitutional claim, but neither does it blunt the impact of the First 
Circuit's holding that the state law is unconstitutional. 5 
As the First Circuit acknowledged, there are volumes of analysis, 
pro and con, regarding the constitutional theories that the First 
Circuit used to invalidate Massachusetts' Burma law in NFTC v. 
1. Crosbyv. National Foreign Trade Council, 120 S. Ct. 2288 (2000). 
2. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 7, §§ 22 G-M (West 2000 Supp.). 
3. 120 S. Ct. at 2289, 2302. 
4. Id. at 2294 n.8. The lower court cases contain different names because the defendant 
Massachusetts office holders changed. The federal trial court decision of Judge Joseph Tauro is 
National Fureign Trade Council v. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d 287 (D. Mass. 1998). Judge Tauro ruled 
against Massachusetts on grounds of the federal foreign affairs power. Id. at 291-92. The appeals 
court decision of Judge Sandra Lynch is National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38 (1" 
Cir. 1999). The First Circuit ruled against the Massachusetts Burma law on three separate 
grounds. It first ruled that the law conflicted with the federal foreign affairs power. Id. at 49-61. 
The court also relied on the dormant Commerce Clause. /d. at 61-71. Finally, the court held that 
the Massachusetts Burma law was preempted under federal law. /d. at 71-77. 
5. Federal district courts have already cited Natsios as authority to support injunctions against 
the Miami-Dade boycott of Cuba and a California insurance law that regulates insurance 
companies with Holocaust-era policies. See Miami Light Project v. Miami-Dade County, 97 F. Supp. 
2d 1174 (S.D. Fla. 2000); Gerling Global Reinsurance Corp. v. Quackenbush, No. Civ. S-00-
0506WBSJFM, 2000 WL 777978 (E.D. Cal. 2000). 
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Natsios. 6 Much of this scholarship argues that absent a clear conflict 
or statement of congressional intent to preempt state or local law, 
the federal foreign affairs power alone does not render a state or 
local law unconstitutional. 7 With the extensive published work 
on each side of the anti-Apartheid boycotts8 as well as the Burma 
laws,9 there is little need to revisit such well-plowed fields. 
6. 181 F.3d at 58 n.13. 
7. See, e.g., LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 149-65 
(2d ed. 1996); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, The Abiding Relevance of Federalism to U.S. 
Foreign Relations, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 675 (1998); Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, 
Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position ,110 HAR.v. 
L.REv. 815 ( 1997); Gordon A. Christenson, Federal Courts and World Civil Society, 6 J. TRANSNAT'L 
L. & PoL'Y 405 (1997); Matthew C. Porterfield, State and Local Foreign Policy Initiatives and Free 
Speech: The First Amendment as an Instrument of Federalism, 35 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1 (1999); A.M. 
Weisburd, State Courts, Federal Courts, and International Coses, 20 YALE J. INT'L L. (1995); Brenda 
S. Beerman, Comment, State Involvement in the Promotion of Export Trade: Is it Time to Rethink the 
Concept of Federalism as itPerlains to Foreign Relations?, 21 N.CJ. INT'L L. & CoM. REG. 187 (1995). 
For a perspective that stresses judicial deference to the Executive Branch more than Congress, 
see Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 HAR.v. L. REv. 1824 (1998). 
8. For articles defending state and local authority, see, e.g., lAtJRENCE TRmE, MEMoRANDUM ON THE 
NONPREEMPllVE EfFEcr OF THE CoMPREHENSIVE AN'n-APARIHEID Acr OF 1986 UPON STATE AND LocAi.. 
MEAsuREs, 132 CoNG. REc. 23,292 (1986); Lynn Berat, Undoing and Redoing Business in South Africa: 7he 
Lifting of the Onnprehensiue AnD-ApartheidAa of 1986 and the Continuing Validity of State and l.ncolA'TIIMpartlu!id 
Legislation. 6 CoNN.j.INr'L L 7 (1990); Kevin P. Lewis, Dt!almgwith South Africa: 7he Omstitmiuna/ity of State 
and Load Divestment Legislation. 61 TuL. L REv. 469 (1987); Andrea L McArdle, In Defense of State and Locol 
Government AnD-Apartheid Measures: Infusing Democratic Values into Foreign~ 62 TEMP. L REv. 813 
(1989); Anne R Bowden, Note, Nurth Carolina's South Africa Divestment Statute, 67 N.C. L REv. 949 (1989); 
Grace A Jubinsky, Note, State and Load GovemmenJ.s Rma Against South African Apr.atheid: An Assessment of the 
ConstituJiona/j of the Divestment Campaign. 54 U. ON. L REv. 543 (1985); Michael Shuman, Dateline Main 
StrPd: Courls v. Local Foreign Policies, 86 FoR. POL 'y 158 (1992). 
For articles challenging state and local authority, see, e.g., John H. Chettle, The Law and Policy 
of Divestment of South African Stock, 15l.Aw & PoL'Y lNT'L Bus. 445 (1983); Howard N. Fenton, III, 
The Fallacy of Federalism in Foreign Affairs: State and Local Foreign Policy Trade Restrictions, 13 Nw. 
J. INT'L L. & Bus. 563 (1993); Peter Spiro, Note, State and Local Anti-South African Action as an 
Intrusion Upon the Federal Power in Foreign Affairs, 72 VA. L. REv. 813 ( 1986). 
9. Symposium, States'Rightsvs. Int£mational Trade: The Massachusetts Burma Law, 19 N.Y.L Sa-I.j.ll'o'T'I. 
& CoMP. L 347 (2000). For articles defending state and local authority, see, e.g., Steven R Jenkins, National 
Foreign Trade Council v. 7he Communwea/Jh of Massachusetts: A StateAainga.s a "Market Participant" Should Trump 
the Fedeml Government's Right to Regulate Foreign Affairs Unless Congress Expressly Declares Otherwise, 14 CoNN. 
j.INr'L L 593 (1999); Douglas W. Kmiec, May States Expr-ess Their Moral Standards by OwosingtheNatiuns with 
lWiich They Trader, 6 PREviEw U.S. SUP. Cr. CAs. 298 (2000); Lynn Loschin & Jennifer Anderson, 
M.assachusetl.s Owi1enges the Bumzese Dictators: 7he OmstitutiunaJit of &lective Pu:rchasing Laws, 39 SANTA OARA 
L REv. 373 ( 1999); Matthew C. Porterfield, rupronote 7; Lily Batchelder, Note, The Costs of Uniformity: Fedeml 
Foreign~ State Sovereignty, and the Massachusetts BU1TIUl Law, 18 YAu: L & PoL 'y REv. 485 (2000); 
AhgandraCan'ahal, Note, State and Load "FneBurma" Laws: 7heCaseforSuh-NationalTradeSanctions, 291Aw 
& PoL 'viNT'I. Bus. 257 (1998);Jay A Christoffen;on, Comment, 7he OmstiJmiunality ofState Laws Prohibiting 
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Instead, this Article seeks to derive some guidance from the Crosby 
decision for state and local legislatures, as many of these bodies want to 
play more than the very limited role that the Court, during oral 
argument, suggested was appropriate. Justice Souter, who wrote the 
Crosby opinion, suggested that states should be satisfied with simply 
expressing their views: 
[Perhaps] the proper way to draw the line is to allow States to 
express themselves, to express their views ... so long as they do 
not go beyond the point of verbalizing ... [condemnation of] 
the regime in Burma and, indeed, ... those who do business 
with it, but it would be left to the United States to go beyond the 
expression of views and to regulate actual relationships, includ-
ing economic relationships ... You would clear your con-
science, and any fault would lie, I suppose, at the door of the 
national Government that was either permitting or at least 
refusing to block this kind of trade. 10 
Mr. Thomas Bamico, Assistant Attorney General of Massachusetts, 
replied: 
I'm not sure it would clear our conscience, because our con-
science is based on so much history. To allow us to feel that we 
were indirectly supporting what's going on in Burma would be so 
ContractunlRelatiun.swithBurma: llpholdingFedemlism'sPurpose, 29 McGEORGEL REv. 351 (1998); Akhil Reed 
Amar, Opinion, A Stoie's Rjght, a Govemmeni's ffivng; WASH. Posr, Mar. 19, 2000, at B1; Robert Stumberg, 
Commentary, No Business in Burma., lLGAJ.. TIMEs, Mar. 20, 2000, at 58. 
For articles challenging state and local authority, see, e.g., Anne Q. Conaughton, Factoring U.S. 
ExpmtControlsandSanctionslntolnterruaional TradeDecisiuns, 27 Sn.ISON L. REv. 1211 (1998); Brannon 
P. Denning and Jack H. McCall, The Constitutionality of State and Local "Sanctions" Against Foreign 
Countries: Affairs of State, States' Affairs, or a Sorry State of Affairs?, 26 HAsTINGS CoNsr. L.Q. 307 (1999); 
Lucien J. Dhooge, The lfumg Way to Mandalay: The Massachusetts Selective Purchasing Ad and the 
Con.stitutiun, 37 AM. Bus. LJ. 387 (2000); Michael Wallace Gordon, The Conflict of United States Sanctions 
Laws with Obligations Under the North American Free Trade Agreement, 27 STETSON L. REv. 1259 (1998); 
David R Moran, No Panacea: Analyzing Sandions Before Impositwn, 27 STETSON L REv. 1403 (1998); 
Daniel M. Price & John P. Hannah, The Constitutionality of United States State and Local Sanctions, 39 
HARv.INT'L LJ. 443 (1998); David R Schmahmann &James Finch, The Unconstitutionality of State and 
Local Enactments in the United States Restricting Business Ties with Burma (Myanmar), 30 V AND. J. ThANSNAT'L 
L. 175 (1997);Jennifer Loeb-CedeiWall, Note, Restrictions on Trade with Burma: Bold Muues or Foolish 
Acts?, 32 NEW ENG. L. REv. 929 (1998); Brannon P. Denning &Jack H. McCall, States' Rights and Foreign 
Policy, 79 FOREIGN AFF.,Jan./Feb. 2000, at 9. 
10. Oral Argument Transcript at 12, Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 120 S. Ct. 
2288 (2000) (No. 99-474). 
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contrary to the principles that underlie our own State constitution, 
which refers to unalienable rights; the point of view of Massachu-
setts [is that] universal rights are at stake here. 11 
Justice Souter then asked, Olet's assume ... that the Massachusetts 
statute is preempted. What will Massachusetts do then? ... [W] ill you 
continue to find ways to express yourselves and your conscience, even if 
there is a preemption?"12Justice Souter's question will be very much on 
the minds of the state and local officials who remember the success of 
the South Mrica boycott, which taught them to consider both moral 
and economic consequences in making decisions as consumers in the 
global economy. If Massachusetts and other local governments with 
Burma laws want to continue expressing their consciences through 
laws, they will have to first consider what the Crosby decision preempts 
and which options still remain available. 
A global leader on matters of conscience, Archbisho[rEmeritus Des-
mond Tutu, defines Burma as the South Africa of today. 13 His analogy 
refers not only to the magnitude of human rights violations in Burma, as 
compared to South Mrica under Apartheid, but also to the nonviolent 
economic advocacy favored by campaigns to free-Burma, which are mod-
eled after the advocacy that helped bring down Apartheid.14 
Aung San Suu Kyi, the Nobel Laureate leader of the Burmese govern-
ment elected in 1990, called for U.S. citizens to "use your freedom to 
protect ours."15 Still the head of her party, the National League for 
11. Id. at 12-13. "For more than two hundred years, citizens of Massachusetts and other states 
have used boycotts to support the natural, essential and unalienable rights' of people around the 
world." Brieffor Massachusetts at 10, Crosby (No. 99-474). 
12. Oral Argument Transcript at 13, Crosby (No. 99-474). 
13. See Dennis Bernstein & Leslie Kean, Opinion, A Buycott for Burma, the South Africa of the 
'90s, S.F. EXAMINER, Apr. 26, 1996, at A-23; From South Africa to Burma, editorial, BosroN GLOBE, 
Oct. 18, 1993, at 12. 
14. See Kenneth A. Rodman, "Think GlobaUy, Punish LocaUy": Nonstate Actors, Multinational 
Ctnporation, and Human Rights Sanctions, 12 Ennes & INT'L AFF. 19, 22-31 (1998). The Massachu-
setts Burma law was conceived at a news conference on the end of sanctions against South Mrica. 
At that event, Simon Billenness suggested to Delegate Byron Rushing that the South Aftican 
measure that was being withdrawn would be just as appropriate if applied verbatim to Burma 
instead of South Aftica. See Carey Goldberg, After Difeat, Campaigner for "Free Burma • Begins Anew, 
N.Y. TIMES,june 24,2000, atA-6. 
15. The full context for her call was as follows: 
Part of our struggle is to make the international community understand that we are a 
poor country not because there is an insufficiency of resources and investment, but 
because we are deprived of the basic institutions and practices that make for good 
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Democracy ("NLD"), she encourages "people's boycotts" that deny the 
current military dictatorship the political legitimacy and foreign exchange 
it needs.16 She identifies state and local government participation not 
merely as an instrument of foreign policy, but as an exercise of "consumer 
power," adding that "in some ways it's better to have the people of the 
world on your side than the governments of the world, even if govern-
ments can be more effective in certain directions. "17 
The anti-Apartheid movement built momentum for its "people's 
boycott" by enlisting state and local governments in the United States 
government. There are multinational business concerns which have no inhibitions 
about dealing with repressive regimes. Their justification for economic involvement in 
Burma is that their presence will actually assist the process of democratization. 
Investment that only goes to enrich an already wealthy elite bent on monopolizing both 
economic and political power cannot contribute towards legality and justice, the 
foundation stones for a sound democracy. I would therefore like to call upon those who 
have an interest in expanding their capacity for promoting intellectual freedom and 
humanitarian ideals to take a principled stand against companies which are doing 
business with the military regime of Burma. Please use your liberty to promote ours. 
Aung San Suu Kyi, Commencement Address at American University 3 Uan. 26, 1997) (delivered 
on her behalf by her late husband, Dr. Michael Aris) (transcript on file with author). 
16. In a February 2000 interview, Aung San Suu Kyi stated that "[b]y investing now, business 
is supporting the military regime. The real benefits of investment now go to the military regime 
and their connections." Bernard Krisher, 'Start With Unity,' Democracy Leader Uyges Bunna; Q&A I 
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, Im'L HERALD TRIB., Feb. 17, 2000, at 2. In an August 2000 interview, she 
elaborated further: 
If you look at what happened in the Philippines under the Marcos dictatorship, there 
were no sanctions. People invested very freely there and the elite just got wealthier and 
wealthier while the rest of the people were kept scrambling around garbage piles. It's 
exactly the same here. And in South Mrica, sanctions were effective against the 
Apartheid regime. Burma is not different. 
Katherine Smyth, Face to Face with Suu Kyi, THE IRISH TIMES, Sept. 9, 2000, at 60. Daw Suu's defense 
of her boycott strategy parallels remarks by Archbishop Desmond Tutu, who argued that people 
who are already suffering need alternatives to violence. Tutu stated: 
You get all sorts of people saying all sorts of things about sanctions: Twiddle! It's 
baloney of the first order! Because you are speaking about people who are already 
suffering, and you are saying you are trying to find some way that is a nonviolent strategy 
for bringing about the change that everybody says they want. 
Seven Greenhouse, A Weapon for Consumers: the Boycott Returns, N.Y. nMES, Mar. 26, 2000, at 
§ 4, at4. 
17. Leslie Kean & Dennis Bernstein, Aung San Suu Ky, Interview, THE PROGRESSIVE, Mar. 1997, 
at28-29. 
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to JOin a campaign that had been organized by non-government-
organizations ("NGO"s). The movement grew to include twenty-five 
states and 164 local governments that adopted either a procurement 
(or "selective purchasing") boycott of companies doing business in 
South Mrica or a policy to divest the stock of those companies by public 
pension funds. 18 The participation of U.S. state and local governments 
in the South Mrica boycotts enabled the international campaign to 
reach critical mass, particularly in the financial services sector. When 
the free-Burma campaign started down the same track a decade later, it 
picked up the support of twenty-<>ne local governments. 19 While many 
of these were college towns, the cities of New York, San Francisco, and 
Los Angeles also joined the boycott. Fearing the consequences of a 
South Mrica-style boycott, the corporate community marshaled its 
forces and mounted a preemptive strike in U.S. federal court against 
Massachusetts, the first state to join the boycott. 20 
This challenge to Massachusetts's purchasing power pitted the corpo-
rate establishment against the state and local government establish-
ment. Joining the 600 members of plaintiff National Foreign Trade 
Council ("NFTC") were twelve business associations,21 twenty-seven 
former federal officials, twenty members of Congress, the European 
Union, and, in the final hour, the Clinton Administration. On the 
other side, Massachusetts was supported by the eight major associations 
18. Rodman, supra note 14, at 27; Kenneth P. Lewis, Dealing with South Africa: The Constitution-
ality of State and Local Divestment Legislatiun, 61 TuL. L. REv. 469,471-475 {Feb. 1987). 
19. The 21local govemments to adopt "Burma laws" included Alameda County, CA, and the 
cities of Ann Arbor, MI; Berkeley, CA; Boulder, CO; Brookline, MA; Carboro, NC; Chapel Hill, 
NC; Los Angeles, CA; Madison, WI; New York, NY; Newton, MA; Oakland, CA; Palo Alto, CA; 
Philadelphia, PA; Portland, OR; Quincy, MA; San Francisco, CA; Santa Cruz, CA; Santa Monica, 
CA; Somerville, MA; Takoma Park, MD; and West Hollywood, CA. INVESTOR REsPONSIBIU1Y 
REsEARCH CENTER, STATE & LocAL GoVERNMENTS WITH CoUNTRY-SPECIFIC SELECTIVE PuRCHASING 
LAws, app. F {chart) {1998) [hereinafter IRRC REPORT 1998]. 
20. See infra Part liD for a discussion of why a state purchasing law is more vulnerable than a 
city purchasing law to the charge that it is interfering with the President's ability to develop a 
multilateral Burma strategy. 
21. The following business associations supported the NFTC: Chamber of Commerce of the 
United States, the National Association of Manufacturers, the U.S. Council for Intemational 
Business, the Organization for Intemational Investment, the American Petroleum Institute, the 
American Insurance Association, the American Farm Bureau Federation, the Chemical Manufac-
turers Association, the Associated Industries of Massachusetts, the Connecticut Business and 
Industry Association, the Retailers Association of Massachusetts, and the Industry Coalition on 
Technology. Brief of Amici Curiae Council of Chamber of Commerce of the United States et al., 
Crosbyv. National Foreign Trade Council, 120 S. Ct. 2288 {2000) {No. 99-474). 
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of state and local governments,22 twenty-two state attorneys general,23 
sixteen local governments,24 seventy-eight members ofCongress,25 and 
sixty-four nonprofit organizations.26 
22. The following government associations supported Massachusetts: the Council of State 
Governments, the National Governors' Association, the National Conference of State Legisla-
tures, the National League of Cities, the National Association of Counties, the International 
City/County Management Association, the International Municipal Lawyers Association, and the 
U.S. Conference of Mayors. Brief of Amici Curiae The Council of State Governments et al., Crosby 
v. National Foreign Trade Council, 120 S. Ct. 2288 (2000) (No. 99474), (No. 99474). 
23. Joining the brief submitted by Heidi Heitcamp, Attorney General of North Dakota, in 
support of Massachusetts, were the attorneys general of the following states: Arkansas, California, 
Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Missouri, New Hamp-
shire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, 
Texas, Utah, Vermont and Washington. Brief of Amici Curiae the State of Arkansas et al., Crosby v. 
National Foreign Trade Council, 120 S. Ct. 2288 (2000) (No. 99474). 
24. Joining the brief submitted by Alan Hevesi, Comptroller of the City of New York, in 
support of Massachusetts, were the following local governments: Alameda County, CA; Amherst, 
MA; Berkeley, CA; Brookline, MA; Boulder, CO; Carrboro, NC; Los Angeles, CA; Newton, MA; 
North Olmstead, OH; Oakland, CA; Philadelphia, PA; Portland, OR; Quincy, MA; San Francisco, 
CA; and Santa Cruz, CA. Brief of Amici Curiae the New York City Comptroller et al., Crosby v. 
National Foreign Trade Council, 120 S. Ct. 2288 (2000) (No. 99474). 
25. The following members of Congress submitted the brief in support of Massachusetts: 
Senators Barbara Boxer (CA), Edward Kennedy (MA), John Kerry (MA), and Paul Wellstone 
(MN), and Representatives Neil Abercrombie (HI), Tammy Baldwin (WI), Howard Berman ( CA), 
David Bonior (MI) Sherrod Brown (OH), Michael Capuano (MA), Julia Carson (IN), William 
Clay (MO), Eva Clayton (NC),John Conyers (MI),Joseph Crowley (NY), Danny Davis (IL), Peter 
Defazio (OR), William Delahunt (MA), RosaDeLauro (CT),Julian Dixon (CA), Lane Evans (IL), 
Barney Frank (MA) ,Jim Gibbons (NV), Benjamin Gilman (NY), Luis Gutierrez (IL), Earl Hilliard 
(AL), Maurice Hinchey (NY) ,Jesse Jackson,Jr., (IL), Stephanie Tubbs Jones (OH), March Kaptur 
(OH), Sue Kelly (NY), Carolyn Kilpatrick (MI), Peter King (NY), Tom Lantos (CA), Barbara Lee 
(CA), Sheila Jackson Lee (TX),John Lewis (GA), Edward Markey (MA), Matthew Martinez (CA), 
James McGovern (MA), Martin Meehan (MA), Gregory Meeks (NY) ,Juanita Millender-McDonald 
(CA), George Miller (CA), Patsy Mink, (HI),Joseph Moakley (MA),Jerry Nadler (NY), Richard 
Neal (MA), Eleanor Holmes Norton (DC) ,James Oberstar (MN) ,John Olver (MA), Major Owens 
(NY), Bill Pascrell (NJ), Nancy Pelosi (CA), Thomas Petri (WI), Richard Pombo (CA), Dana 
Rohrabacher (CA), Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (FL), Lucille Roybali-Allard (CA), Bobby Rush (IL), 
Bernie Sanders (VT),Janice Schakowsky (IL), Christopher Smith (NJ), Mark Souder (IN), Pete 
Stark (CA), Ted Strickland (OH), Bennie Thompson (MS),John Tierney (MA), Edophus Towns 
(NY), James Traficant (OH), Mark Udall (CO), Tom Udall (AZ), Maxine Waters (CA), Melvin 
Watt (NC), Henry Waxman (CA), Lynn Woolsey (CA) and David Wu (OR). Brief of Amici Curiae 
Members of Congress, Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 120 S. Ct. 2288 (2000) (No. 
99474). 
26. The following nonprofit organizations joined the brief submitted by the Harvard 
Immigration and Refugee Clinic (with the Harvard Human Rights Program) in support of 
Massachusetts: Alliance for Democracy, American Lands Alliance, Arise Resource Center, As You 
Sow Foundation, Asia Pacific Center for Justice & Peace, Boston Mobilization for Survival, Burma 
Lifeline, Catholic Foreign Mission Society of America (Maryknoll Fathers & Brothers), Center for 
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As this convergence of interests suggests, the stakes were higher than 
the survival of a single procurement law. All of these parties were taking 
sides in a larger struggle over the role of government purchasing power 
in a global economy. In the words of Professor Akhil Amar, the states 
were defending their "consumer sovereignty" in a way that is "altruistic 
and noble. "27 In the words of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the 
corporate coalition was opposing the "substantial economic leverage" 
of state purchasing power, particularly the "especially powerful and 
controversial" use of secondary boycotts, which forces companies to 
choose between doing business in Burma and maintaining a presence 
in the domestic market of state and local governments. 28 The choice 
was a real one; state procurement totaled $730 billion in 1996, which 
was 79% of public procurement,29 as compared with federal procure-
ment of $199 billion.30 The stakes were heightened in this particular 
conflict because of the "universally repulsive behavior of the Burmese 
Constitutional Rights, Center for Economic and Policy Research, Center for Economic Justice, 
Center for International Environmental Law, Center for Labor & Community Research, Citizens 
Action Network, Consumers Choice Council, Coop America, Defenders of Wildlife, Delta County 
(CO) Alliance for Democracy, Dictator Watch, Dominican Sisters of Hope, EarthAction, Earth-
Rights International, East Timor Action Network/U.S., Edmonds Institute, Free Burma Coalition, 
Free Burma-No Petro Dollars, Global Exchange, Human Rights Watch, Humane Society 
International, Humane Society of the United States, Independent Voters of Dlinois--Indepen-
dent Precinct Organization, Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy, International Committee 
of Lawyers for Tibet, International Human Rights Clinic-University of California School of Law, 
International Human Rights Law Group, International Labor Rights Fund, International League 
for Human Rights, International Rivers Network, Jesse Smith Noyes Foundation, Jewish Labor 
Committee-NY, Langley United Church, Long Island Progressive Coalition, Los Angeles Burma 
Forum, Merrimack Valley People for Peace, Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights, National 
Lawyers Guild- MA Chapter, New England Burma Roundtable, Philadelphia Burma Round-
table, Physicians for Human Rights, Project Maje, Rainforest Relief, Reverend Frank Griswold-
Presiding Bishop of the Episcopal Church (USA), Rev. Thomas Shaw- Presiding Bishop of the 
Episcopal Diocese of Massachusetts, Ruckus Society, Seattle Burma Roundtable, Sierra Club, 
Sisters of St. Joseph- Office of Peace and Justice, Songbird Foundation, Sustainable America, 
Synapses, Unitarian Universalist Service Committee, United for a Fair Economy, Ursuline Sisters 
of Tildonk (NY), Ustawi, Washington Biotechnology Action Council, Women's Division of the 
General Board of Global Ministries -United Methodist Church, and the Women's International 
League for Peace & Freedom. Brief of Amici Curiae Non-profit Organizations, Crosby v. National 
Foreign Trade Council, I20 S. Ct. 2288 (2000) (No. 99-474). 
27. Amar, supra note 9. 
28. Brief of Amici Curiae Council of Chamber of Commerce of the United States et al. at 5, 
Crosby (No. 99-474). 
29. U.S. DEP'ToFCoMMERCE, STATISUCALAllsTRACfOFTiiEUNITEDSTATES (1999) 317, tbl. 512, 
available at http:/ /www.census.gov /prod/99pubs/99statab/sec09.pdf. 
30. U.S. GEN. SERV. ADMIN., FEDERAL PROCUREMENT REPoRT-FY 1999 2, FEDERAL CoNTRAcr 
AcnoNsANo DoLLARS (Jan. 2000). 
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govemment"31 and the complex web of economic relationships linking 
that behavior to multinational corporations and implicating the poli-
cies of the United States, Europe, andjapan.32 
After the corporate strategy ultimately proved successful in invalidat-
ing the Massachusetts Burma law, (but only on preemption grounds), 
Professor Jack Goldsmith concluded that the decision "has no implica-
tions for state foreign relations activities beyond state laws regulating 
transactions with Burma."33 However, this conclusion gives little solace 
to the state and local governments that now must decide whether and 
how to replace their selective purchasing laws that target companies 
doing business in Burma. 
Going beyond Burma, the Crosby decision may well have im-
plications for other selective purchasing laws. One reason is that 
the tension ·between a state boycott and federal sanctions could 
recur in the future. In addition to country-specific measures, such 
as the federal Burma sanctions and the Comprehensive Anti-
Apartheid Act, Congress has given the President the discretion to 
impose economic sanctions under the International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to deal with an "unusual and extraor-
dinary threat" to the "national security, foreign policy, or economy 
of the United States."34 IEEPA gives the President very broad 
discretion. Considering the vagueness of "obstacle preemption" as 
applied in Crosby, IEEPA could be used by multinational companies 
and trade associations to attack market participation policies of state 
and local governments if those policies affect companies that invest 
or trade within a country that becomes the subject of federal 
sanctions. 35 
To provide legal context for the Crosby decision, Part II explains how 
the Massachusetts law worked, how the federal Burma sanctions law 
worked, and how the Supreme Court framed its obstacle preemption 
analysis. Part III then addresses whether the remaining state and local 
31. Dhooge, supra note 9, at 479. 
32. I d. at 479-84. 
33. Jack Goldsmith, Commentary, State Foreign Policies After the Burma Case, WRIT, at http:/ I 
writ.findlaw.com/commentary/20000626_goldsmith.html Uune 2000). Frank Kittredge, Presi-
dent of the NFTC, was relatively cautious in claiming that the Crosby decision "should help put an 
end to state and local efforts to make foreign policy." USA*Engage, Supreme Courl Rules Massachu-
setts Burma Law Unconstitutional, judgment of First Circuit Courl Affirmed, at http:/ jwww. usaengage.org/ 
supremecourt.html Uune 19, 2000). 
34. 50 u.s.c. § 1701 (1994). 
35. See Brief of Amicus Curiae the United States at 4, Crosby v. National Foreign Trade 
Council, 120 S. Ct. 2288 (2000) (No. 99-474). 
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policy options can avoid preemption under the federal Burma sanc-
tions. Part IV addresses whether the options that are not preempted 
would retain significant power to promote human rights. 
II. PREEMPTION OF THE BURMA BOYCOTT 
A The Burma/South Africa Boycott Model in Massachusetts 
Adopted in June 1996, Massachusetts' Burma law prohibited 
agencies from contracting with businesses on a "restricted purchase 
list" of companies doing business in Burma. 36 Exempted from this 
list were businesses operating in Burma to report the news, provide 
international telecommunications,37 or provide medical supplies.38 
The state would accept a bid from a company on the restricted list 
under three circumstances: (1) when a company doing business in 
Burma was the only offer or its absence would result in inadequate 
competition;39 (2) when the state was purchasing certain medical 
supplies;40 and (3) when there was no comparable bid from a 
company not on the restricted list. 41 Comparable bids were defined 
as those within ten percent of the bid from a company on the 
restricted list. 42 Thus, the state characterized its law not as a com-
plete ban, but as a strong "preference" against companies that 
conducted business in Burma.43 
The law defined "doing business in Burma" broadly. The defini-
tion included: (1) having a principal place of business or opera-
tions in Burma; (2) providing financial services to the govern-
ment of Burma; (3) promoting imports or sale of gems, timber, oil, 
gas, or other products controlled by the government of Burma; or 
( 4) providing goods or services to the government of Burma. 
Delegate Byron Rushing, the sponsor of the legislation, explained 
that the law was predicated on the Massachusetts anti-Apartheid 
policy.44 
36. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 7, § 22H(a) (West 2000 Supp.). 
37. § 22H(e). 
38. § 221. 
39. § 22H(b) (1)-(2). 
40. § 221. 
41. § 22H(d). 
42. § 22G. 
43. Brieffor Massachusetts at 6, Crosby (No. 99-474). 
44. Byron Rushing, The People Have Spoken, BURMA DEBATE, Summer 1999, at 4, 5. 
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B. The Federal Burma Law Adopted Uy Congress 
As Massachusetts follow its previous anti-Apartheid boycott, the 
federal Burma law adopted by Congress parallels the federal Compre-
hensive Anti-Apartheid Act in most respects. The likely recurrence of 
this match-up between state and federal responses to a brutal dictator-
ship undoubtedly informed the NFfC's decision to litigate a "test case," 
which NFfC members claim had "nothing to do with Burma."45 
Congress adopted the federal Burma law in September, 1996, three 
months after Massachusetts adopted its law.46 The federal law included 
the most significant sanctions imposed against Burma by any nation. At 
the same time, the law's limited approach also reflects successful 
lobbying by the anti-sanctions coalition.47 
The federal Burma law imposed three sanctions on Burma and 
authorized the President to impose additional limited sanctions or to 
waive any sanctions under certain conditions. The three immediate 
sanctions included: (1) a ban on aid to the government of Burma 
except for humanitarian assistance, counter-narcotics efforts, and pro-
motion of human rights and democracy;48 (2) a mandate for U.S. 
representatives to international institutions to vote against loans and 
other financial assistance to the government of Burma;49 and (3) a 
prohibition on entry visas to officials of the Burmese government, 
except for those required to fulfill treaty obligations and United 
Nations missions. 5° The federal law will maintain these sanctions until 
the President determines that Burma has made "measurable and 
substantial progress in improving human rights practices and imple-
menting democratic government. "51 
The federal law also authorizes the President to prohibit "United States 
persons" from making "new investment" in Burma if the President deter-
mines that the government of Burma has ( 1) physically harmed, rear-
rested, or exiled Aung San Suu Kyi, or (2) committed large-scale repres-
45. Donna Smith, U.S. business group challenges state sanctions law, Reuters newswire (May 1, 
1998), availableathttp://www.usaengage.org/news/980501reut.html (last visited Nov. 30, 2000); 
Frank Kittredge, President of the NITC, Address at the Crosby v. National Fareign Trade Council 
Panel, Woodrow Wilson Center, Princeton University (June 28, 2000) (on file with author). 
46. See Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 
Pub. L.104-208, § 570, 110 Stat. 3009-166 (1997) [hereinafterfederal Burma law]. 
47. Rodman, supra note 14, at32. 
48. § 570(a)(1)(A), 110 Stat. 3009-166. 
49. § 570(a)(2). 
50. § 570(a)(3). 
51. § 570(a). 
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sion or violence against the Democratic opposition.52 The federal act 
defines "new investment" narrowly. It includes contracts or ownership 
interests in "economical development of resources located in Burma," but 
it does not include "entry into, performance of, or financing of a contract 
to sell or purchase goods, services, or technology."53 President Clinton 
invoked this authority on May 20, 1997, when he issued an Executive 
Order to ban new investment in Burma. 54 
The federal law also authorizes the President to waive any of the 
federal sanctions on Burma, either temporarily or permanently, if the 
President determines that the sanction is "contrary to the national 
security interests of the United States."55 It also directs the President to 
develop a "comprehensive, multilateral strategy to bring democracy to 
and improve human rights practices and the quality oflife in Burma."56 
The act's diplomatic instructions include cooperation with members of 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations ("ASEAN") and other 
countries that have major trade and investment interests in Burma. 
Finally, the act sets a diplomatic objective of fostering dialogue between 
the government of Burma and democratic opposition groups. 5 7 
C. Preemption Under Crosby 
Congress did not state that it intended to preempt the state and local 
Burma laws that predated the federal sanctions on Burma.58 In its Crosby 
decision, the Court explained that in cases where Congress has not 
expressed its intent to preempt state law, the Court can still find that a law 
is preempted if it interprets an implied congressional intent to do so. The 
Court has found implied preemption in cases where Congress intended to 
"occupy the field,"59 or where the state law conflicted with the federal law 
in question.60 A "conflict" occurs when a private party cannot comply with 
both the state law and the federal law at the same time.61 The Massachu-
52. § 570(b). 
53. § 570(f) (2). 
54. Executive Order, Exec. Order No. 13047, 3 C.F.R. 202 (1997). 
55. § 570(e). 
56. § 570(c). 
57. § 570(c). 
58. See generally§ 570. 
59. See, e.g., United Statesv. Locke, 120 S. Ct. 1135, 1151-52 (2000); Charleston & W. Carolina 
Ry. Co. v. Varnville Furniture Co., 237 U.S. 597, 597-98, 600, 604 (1915). 
60. See, e.g., California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 101-02 ( 1989); Florida Lime & Avocado 
Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963). 
61. See, e.g., Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc., 373 U.S. at 142-43. 
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setts Burma law, however, did not flunk this objective comparison. Rather, 
the NFTC persuaded the Court that the state law was an obstacle to 
achieving the. "intended purpose and 'natural effect'" of the Burma 
sanctions adopted by Congress.62 
The leading precedent for obstacle preemption is Hines v. Davidowitz., in 
which the Court applied a purpose-and-effect test looking at the state law 
"as a whole."63 This test is necessarily subjective; it requires the Court to 
resolve a policy conflict that Congress might resolve differently.64 In the 
words of the Fourth Circuit, "preemption under a frustration of federal 
purpose theory is more an exercise of policy choices by a court than strict 
statutory construction. "65 
In Crosby, Justice Souter wrote that the Massachusetts Burma law was 
an obstacle to accomplishing three objectives of the federal Burma law: 
to delegate discretion to the President to achieve a political result; to 
set limits on the range of permissible sanctions; and to give the 
President authority to speak for the United States in order to develop a 
multilateral Burma strategy.66 
First, the Court held that the Massachusetts law undermined congres-
sional delegation of discretion to the President to achieve a political 
result by adding or subtracting from the sanctions as necessary. The 
Court reasoned that if states adopt an inflexible sanction, they under-
mine the President's authority to use access to the "national economy" 
as either a carrot or a stick to promote the desired result of negotiations 
to set up elections in Burma.67 In addition to promoting a democratic 
62. Crosbyv. National Foreign Trade Council, 120 S. Ct. 2288,2294 (2000) (quoting Hines v. 
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52,67 n.20 (1941); Savage v.Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 533 (1912)). 
63. Hines, 312 U.S. at 66-67. 
64. The district court in this case felt that the preemption claim did not even merit 
argument. National Foreign Trade Council v. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d 287, 292 (D. Mass. 1998) 
("Plaintiff must show that Congress intended to exercise its authority to set aside a state law. 
Plaintiff's burden is particularly heavy because Plaintiff argues implied, rather than express, 
preemption. Plaintiff has failed to carry this burden." (citations omitted)). 
65. Abbot v. American Cyanamid Co., 844 F.2d 1108, 1113 (4th Cir. 1988). For a sampling of 
commentators who describe the subjectivity of obstacle preemption theory, see Paul E. McGreal, 
Some RUe With Your Chevron~: Presumption and Deference in Regulatory Preemption, 45 CAsE W. REs. L. 
REv. 823, 833 (1995) ("That [obstacle preemption] requires a largely ad hoc policy analysis is 
evidenced by the Court's minimally helpful guidance."); Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REv. 
225, 232 (2000) ("modern preemption jurisprudence is a muddle."). 
66. 120 S. Ct. at 2294. 
67. I d. at 2296. Justice Souter implied that the federal Burma law enabled the President to 
fully restrain or apply the "coercive power of the national economy," when the federal law limits 
the President to imposing a ban on future investment in developing resources in Burma, and it 
excludes from this ban all contracts for goods or services. Compare id., with Foreign Operations FY 
122 [Vol. 32 
LOCAL OPTIONS AFTER CROSBY v. NFFC 
result in Burma, the Court stressed that Congress also gave the Presi-
dent discretion to suspend sanctions for national security reasons. 68 
The elements of the Massachusetts Burma law that the Court cited as an 
obstacle to the President's flexibility included: ( 1) use of a methodol-
ogy that the President did not control; (2) use of a methodology that 
might undermine the President's bargaining position; and (3) the 
immediate and perpetual nature of the state measure.69 
Second, the Court held that the Massachusetts law interfered with 
the intent of Congress to steer a "middle path" with sanctions that are 
limited to "United States persons" only, that are limited to "new 
investment," and that exclude trade in goods and services.70 Massachu-
setts argued that the state law furthered the federal purpose, but the 
Court reasoned that a difference of methodology could be fatal even if 
the state and federal laws actually do share the same purpose. 71 The 
Court characterized the congressional definition of "new investment" 
as a "calibrated" policy, in part because Congress had considered and 
rejected tougher sanctions such as limits on imports or prohibitions on 
all investment. 72 In the Court's reading of the federal law, that calibra-
tion was designed to not only bar what the federal law prohibits, but 
also to allow what the federal law permits. 73 The Court cited several 
elements of the Massachusetts Burma law as obstacles to the congres-
sional calibration of force. The state law (1) was a secondary boycott, 
which involved third parties rather than direct "Burmese connections"; 
(2) reached beyond "U.S. persons" to include corporations based in 
other nations; (3) penalized companies that traded in goods and 
services, which reached beyond the definition of"new investment"; and 
( 4) penalized companies with pre-existing affiliates, which reached 
beyond the definition of "new investment. "74 
1997 Appropriations, Pub. L. 104-208, § 570(f) (2), 110 Stat. 3009-166 (1997). The coercive power 
of the national economy is not available to the President under the federal Burma law. 
§ 570(f) (2). 
68. Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 120 S. Ct. 2288, 2295 (2000). 
69. !d. at 2296. 
70. ld. at 2297-98. 
71. ld. at 2298 n.14 ("Identity of ends does not end our analysis of preemption.") (citing 
Wisconsin Dep't. oflndus. v. Gould, 475 U.S. 282,286 (1986)). 
72. ld. at 2296-97 n.13. 
73. ld. at 2298. The federal Burma law does not actually state what it intends to permit; it only 
defines what the President may prohibit. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related 
Programs Appropriations Act, Pub. L.1 04-208, § 5 70, 110 Stat. 3009-166 ( 1997). 
74. Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 120 S. Ct. 2288,2297 (2000). 
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Third, the Court held that the Massachusetts Burma law interfered 
with the President's ability to speak for the United States in developing 
a multilateral Burma strategy, as intended by Congress. The Court 
described the President's diplomatic role as a "clear mandate" under 
Article II of the Constitution 75 and reiterated that "the President's 
maximum power to persuade rests on his capacity to bargain for the 
benefits of access to the entire national economy without exception for 
enclaves fenced offwilly-nilly by inconsistent political tactics."76 
This assertion of the President's power of persuasion based on access 
to the national market is particularly interesting in the context of 
preemption. The federal Burma law gives the President only the power 
to bargain over future U.S. investment in Burma, not the capacity to 
bargain for access to the "entire national economy.'m Additionally, the 
evidence cited by the Court that the Massachusetts law was an obstacle 
to the President's capacity to bargain had nothing to do with Burma. 
The Court echoed the leading argument in the NFTC's complaint, that 
the Massachusetts law created a rift between the United States and the 
European Uniori, not regarding Burma strategy, but about compliance 
with trade agreements: 
In early 1997, European Union Ambassador Hugo Paeman 
wrote a letter ... warning that the Massachusetts Burma law is a 
"breach of U.S. international obligations and as such could 
have a damaging effect on EU-US relations." Onjune 20 1997, 
the EU formally noted its position that the Massachusetts 
Burma law violated the WTO Government Procurement Agree-
ment.78 
All three federal courts have cited the diplomatic tension over compli-
ance with trade agreements as justification for overturning the state law, 
either on constitutional grounds by the district court79 and the First 
Circuit,80 or on preemption grounds by the Supreme Court. 81 Massachu-
75. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (authorizing the President to make treaties and appoint 
ambassadors); § 3 (granting the President the power to receive ambassadors and other public 
ministers). 
76. 120 S. Ct. at 2298-99. 
77. See§ 570(f)(2). 
78. Amended Complaint at 5, National Foreign Trade Council v. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d 287 
(D. Mass.1998) (CANo. 98-10757). 
79. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d at 291 (D. Mass 1998). 
80. National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38,54 (1st Cir. 1999). 
81. Crosbyv. National Foreign Trade Council, 120 S. Ct. 2288, 2299-230_1 (2000). 
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setts and its seventy-eight congressional amici argued, however, that in the 
WTO implementing legislation, Congress explicitly foreclosed use of trade 
conflicts as evidence of an encroachment on federal powers.82 The WTO 
legislation "occupies the field" and prohibits all private rights of action "in 
connection with" WTO agreements,83 including "indirect" claims such as 
one based on Congress' Commerce Clause authority.84 In addition, under 
the WTO legislation, only the U.S. government can challenge a state law 
based on a conflict with a WTO agreement,85 which Massachusetts argued 
was the legislated channel for handling a federal/state disagreement over 
its Burma law.86 At the very least, Massachusetts (joined by members of 
Congress) argued, where Congress had not expressed its intent to pre-
empt state law, the WTO legislation presumes that state law is not implic-
itly preempted in the event of a conflict (or an alleged conflict) with trade 
agreements.87 
Like the First Circuit, the Supreme Court dismissed this argument by 
observing that the Massachusetts Burma law was preempted by the 
federal Burma law, not the WTO agreement, and. the federal govern-
ment's failure to challenge the state law as required under the WTO 
legislation was irrelevant to the "preemptive effect of the federal 
sanctions against Burma."88 In other words, the Court was not daunted 
by the fact that the WTO legislation precludes indirect causes of action, 
like the NFTC complaint in this case, that rely upon mere allegations of 
conflict between WTO agreements and state law. 
In the long run, the Supreme Court's acceptance of this bootstrap 
formula may be more significant than its decision to strike down one 
state law. The line of reasoning in Crosby enables the Executive Branch 
to avoid suing states directly, which it lacked the political will to do in 
this case, and enables private parties to use WTO arguments to demon-
strate a conflict with the President's "power to persuade" under an-
other statute, even though Congress denied standing to make the same 
arguments directly. 
Previous cases have raised the question of whether the need for "one 
voice" in foreign affairs should preempt a state law in the absence of an 
82. Brief for Massachusetts at 20, Crosby (No. 99-474); Brief of Amici Curiae Members of 
Congress at 11-13, Crosby (No. 99-474). 
83. Uruguay Round Agreements Act,§ 102(c)(2), 19 U.S.C. § 3512(c)(2) (1994). 
84. /d. (approving H.R. Doc. No, 103-316, at 676 (1994)). 
85. /d.§ 102(c)(l), § 3512(c)(1). 
86. See Brieffor Massachusetts at 20, Crosby (No. 99-474). 
87. /d. at 20-21; Brief of Amici Curiae Members of Congress at 11-13, Crosby (No. 99-474). 
88. Crosbyv. National Foreign Trade Council, 120 S. Ct. 2288,2301 n.24 (2000). 
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express statement of congressional intent to preempt. The Supreme 
Court has defined the "one voice" as that of Congress: did Congress 
consider, and implicitly accept, the overlap between federal law and a state 
law that has foreign policy implications?89 In this case, the Court con-
cluded that neither the earlier date of the state law, 90 nor the prior history 
of congressional acceptance of the anti-Apartheid laws,91 nor the congres-
sional anticipation of indirect challenges to state laws in connection with 
WTO agreements92 were enough to establish that Congress had consid-
ered and accepted selective purchasing as the status quo ante for the federal 
Burma sanctions. The Court stressed again that Congress' direction to the 
President to develop a multilateral strategy, combined with the President's 
own constitutional powers in foreign affairs, invested the President with 
the "maximum authority of the National Govemment."93 
In summary, this third aspect of preemption under Crosby, holding 
that the state law was an obstacle to President's ability to speak for the 
United States, the Court cited the following factors: (1) the federal 
Burma law's direction to the President to develop a multilateral strat-
egy; (2) complaints from Executive Branch officials that the state law 
interfered with the ability of the Executive Branch to speak as the "one 
voice" of the United States; and (3) allegations by the European Union 
and other nations that the Massachusetts law did not comply with the 
WTO Agreement on Procurement. 
The most far-reaching aspect of preemption analysis under Crosby is the 
application of obstacle preemption doctrine, per Hines v. Davidawitz, to the 
need for "presidential voice." While the Court declined to comment on 
the First Circuit's broad reading of federal foreign affairs power or 
dormant Commerce Clause power, it nonetheless leaned on dicta from its 
most expansive interpretations of federal power limitations on state 
power.94 At the same time, the Court did not reach as far as its more recent 
conservative interpretations of federal power such as Barclays Bank.95 
89. See Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Board, 512 U.S. 298, 324,326, 329 (1994). 
90. See 120 S. Ct. at 2291. 
91. See id. at 2301-{)2. 
92. See id. at 2301 n.24. 
93. !d. at 2298. 
94. !d. at 2299 n.16 (citing Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 449 
(1979) (discussing a dormant Commerce Clause claim, not a preemption claim); THE F'EoERAUsr 
No. 80, at 536 (Alexander Hamilton) Gacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) ( "[t]he union will undoubtedly 
be answerable to foreign powers for the conduct of its members."). 
95. In discussing Barclays, the Court said that Congress had taken specific actions rejecting 
the positions of both foreign governments and the Executive, which compared to "nothing" in the 
history of the federal Burma law, even though Massachusetts and congressional amici presented 
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Justice Souter, who dissented in Barclay's, felt compelled to acknowledge 
that case's holding, which stated that there is a presumption against 
finding an implied preemption of state law in a traditional area of state 
sovereignty like procurement. He noted that, assuming for purposes of 
argument that there is a presumption against implied preemption of a 
procurement law, the Massachusetts law nonetheless presented a suffi-
cient obstacle to overcome that presumption.96 
In this light, Professor Goldsmith's conclusion about the limited 
significance of Crosby seems to be overly optimistic as far as states are 
concerned. While the Court presented its obstacle preemption test in 
neutral terms, the Court's application of that test dismissed evidence 
that Congress did not intend to preempt state and local law. It would be 
prudent forJocal drafters to interpret the Court's non-presumption as 
a presumption-in-fact, at least in the context of a federal law that 
delegates diplomatic discretion and "voice" to the President. 
At the same time, it would be overly pessimistic to ignore the 
contextually specific nature of the Crosby analysis. The obstacle is in the 
eye of the beholder, and the next court to hear an obstacle preemption 
challenge will have to weigh a much different combination of statutory 
elements. The Crosby decision creates a statutory framework of three 
distinct elements with no less than eleven discrete arguments for 
preemption. This degree of specificity makes the doctrinal rationale in 
Crosby a flexible one: the eleven obstacles can be outlined and manipu-
lated to identify a number of new legislative options. These new options 
may allow states to draft laws that avoid rulings of preemption under 
the federal Burma law- depending on a finding by the reviewing 
courts that the laws contain none of the obstacle-elements of the 
Massachusetts Burma law, and also comport with the spirit of the Crosby 
analysis. The grounds for preemption cited by the Crosby Court are 
summarized below. 
D. Potential Ways to Avoid Preemption 
Each of the individual grounds for preemption can be avoided. This 
is not to suggest that state and local governments must avoid each and 
every ground in order to preclude preemption. Mter all, the Court 
emphasized that its preemption analysis considered the Massachusetts 
the history of congressional action on both selective purchasing and the potential for conflict 
under WfO agreements. ld. at 230()..()1 (discussing Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., 
512 u.s. 298, 327-29 (1994)). 
96. 120 S. Ct. at 2294 n.S. 
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Grounds for Preemption Under Crosby v. NFTC 
1. Obstacles to Presidential discretion. The state law addressed the same purpose as the 
federal law, but the state law: 
a. used a methodology that the President did not control; 
b. used a different methodology that might undermine the President's 
bargaining position; 
c. had an immediate economic impact; and 
d. had a perpetual legal existence. 
2. Obstacles to the Umited natpre of federal sanctions. The state law: 
a. was a secondary boycott. which involved third parties rather than the 
congressional focus on "direct Burmese connections": 
b. reached beyond •u.s. persons• to include corporations based in other nations; 
c. penalized companies that traded in goods and services, which reached beyond the 
defmition of ~new investment"; and 
d. penalized companies with pre-existing affiliates, which reached beyond the 
definition of "new investment. • 
3. Obstacles to the President's role in developing a multilateral strategy. These 
included: 
a. the federal· Burma law's direction to the President to develop a multilateral 
strategy; 
b. the complaints from Executive Branch officials that the state law interfered with 
the ability of the Executive Branch to speak as the "one voice• of the United 
States; and 
c. the allegations by the European Union and other nations that the state law did not 
comply with the WTO Agreement on Procurement. 
~urma law as a whole. The purpose and effect of the "whole" can be 
significantly transformed by changing its parts, as the following poten-
tial changes reveal. 
• Narrow the purpose and scope to be "primary" rather than "secondary. " 
Instead of seeking to influence a country, such as Burma, the local 
purpose could be to abstain from doing business with individual 
companies connected with violations of human rights, regardless 
ofwhere those companies operate. For example, instead of affect-
ing over 300 companies doing business in Burma, the law might 
affect only a few companies.97 In keeping with the Court's analysis, 
this approach would be: (1) neutral with respect to Burma; and (2) 
focused on primary business relationships, not a secondary. boy-
cott. 
• Avoid conflicts with trade aweements. Following the model of federal 
procurement policy, a state could avoid the multilateral conflicts 
produced by the Massachusetts Burma law by exempting products 
97. See infra Part IV-B. 
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or services from countries that are members of the WTO procure-
ment agreement. Alternatively, conflict under the WTO agree-
ment could be avoided by adopting the law at the local level, which 
the WTO agreement does not cover. 
• Limit duration of the law. In addition to the preceding choices, the 
law can provide for its own suspension based upon actions of the 
federal government. This option may not affect preemption analy-
sis on the face of a statute, but it may help to avoid a lawsuit that 
challenges the statute. This option also could provide a way for 
state and local policies to interact with federal policy in order to 
strengthen both levels. 
• Use non-procurement methods. State or local governments can avoid 
procurement altogether in favor of using disclosure, divestment, 
shareholder resolutions, or political speech. Because they do not have 
a direct economic effect, non-procurement methods can have a broad 
"secondary" scope that covers all companies doing business in Burma. 
Alternatively, they can have a narrow "primary" scope in order to 
reduce administrative burdens or political opposition. 
The remainder of this Article addresses two questions. Part III 
addresses whether state and local policies that use some combination 
of these approaches can avoid preemption by the federal Burma 
sanctions. Part IV addresses whether such policies would retain signifi-
cant power to promote human rights in a global economy. 
III. LoCAL OPTioNs AFrER CRosBY 
The Massachusetts Burma law employed some (but not all) of the 
statutory methods of economic advocacy that evolved from the anti-
Apartheid era. It established a procurement limit and also required 
disclosure of companies doing business in Burma. The Vermont Burma 
law used a different mechanism to address its concerns about Burma. 
Adopted in the midst of the Massachusetts litigation, the Vermont 
Burma law relied on political speech (in the form of an introductory 
resolution) and provisions directing public fund managers to vote for 
shareholder resolutions, rather than focusing on procurement.98 Other 
Burma laws illustrate other possibilities. For example, the Burma 
ordinances put forth by Oakland and Santa Cruz combine procure-
ment, divestment, and political speech, but not disclosure.99 
98. An Act Relating to Doing Business with Burma (Myanmar), 1999 Vt. Acts & Res. 34. 
99. See Santa Cruz Res. (City Council Policy Manual No. 29.12 §§II-IV (1997); Oakland Ord. 
§§II-IV (1996), available in IRRC REPORT 1998, supra note 19, at app. F. 
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Potential Combination of Options 
Vertical axis =political visibility and economic significance. 
Horizontal axis= likelihood of federal preemption. 
The methodologies employed by pre-Croslry legislation can be sorted 
in the order of greatest-to-least economic impact on private companies; 
this order also reflects their level of preemption risk under Crosby. 
1. Procurement boycott of companies that do business in Burma. How-
ever, this secondary boycott could be narrowed to cover only compa-
nies that have a primary connection to violations of human rights 
(the Court found this option to be preempted by federal law). 
2. Disclosur-e by companies of business they do (or do not do) in 
Burma as a condition for procurement. Disclosure can be used as 
a less-restrictive alternative to a primary procurement boycott. 
3. Divestment of stock mvnership in companies doing business in 
Burma. 
4. Shar-eholder-resolutions that seek to develop corporate human rights 
standards and accountability. 
5. Political speech in either of two forms. The first is publication of the 
names of companies doing business in Burma, with which the 
state or local government must now do business. The second is 
adoption of a legislative resolution that condemns human rights 
violations by the government of Burma and the complicity of 
corporations that support the military government. 
These options can be combined in order to increase the political 
visibility as well as the legal sustainability of a local policy. If options that 
are at a higher risk of preemption were found to be vulnerable, the 
lower-risk components of the policy would still remain in place with a 
well-drafted severability clause. The following chart illustrates the 
possible layers of a state or local policy. The broader the layer, the more 
secure it is from legal challenge on grounds of preemption. 
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The following sections analyze the risk of preemption for each of 
these respective layers, starting with the option at the greatest risk of 
preemption, procurement. 
A. Procurement 
As interpreted by the Crosby Court, the federal Burma law pre-
empted the Massachusetts Burma law because the state law created 
an obstacle to congressional policy objectives, even though both 
laws shared the same broad goal. The NFTC made much of the 
purpose declared by the state law's sponsor, Representative Byron 
Rushing, which was to promote a foreign policy purpose: democracy 
. h 100 m anot er country. 
When defending its Burma law, the Massachusetts attorney gen-
eral argued more cautiously that the law served a local moral 
purpose, 101 which was "to disassociate the Massachusetts govern-
ment and its tax dollars from the denial of human rights in Burma. 
There is no question on this record that the Massachusetts Legisla-
ture would have enacted the Burma Law even if it believed that it 
could not affect change in Burma."102 In short, Massachusetts 
argued that its right to disassociate its spending from "a repugnant 
regime" is a valid purpose, regardless of whether the law might serve 
a broader foreign policy goal. 103 
The NITC argued, in effect, that a secondary boycott cannot serve a 
local purpose because its ultimate objective is to avoid doing business 
with a country, and individual companies doing business in Burma may 
have no direct connection to the human rights abuses. When asked by 
the Court to compare the secondary boycott to a boycott of goods 
derived from Burma, counsel to the NITC responded, "that's a very 
different case. [The secondary boycott] is not limited to goods coming 
from Burma. [Massachusetts is saying,] [w]e're not going to buy 
computers from a German company because they sell pencils to Burma 
100. See Rushing, supra note 44, at 7. Representative Byron Rushing, stated that "if you're 
going to engage in foreign policy, you have to be able to identifY a goal that you will know when 
it is realized ... [T]he identifiable goal is, free democratic elections in Burma." National 
Foreign Trade Council v. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d 287, 291 (D. Mass. 1998); see Rushing, supra note 
44, at 7. 
101. See, e.g., Brieffor Massachusetts at 48, Croslly (No. 99-4 74) ("the Court should uphold the 
law because it has a legitimate local purpose: to disassociate Massachusetts from the human rights 
violations in Burma."). 
102. Id. at 31-32. 
103. !d. at 32. 
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... That is highly coercive, and it has nothing to do ... with the notion 
of disassociation. "104 
This distinction between primary and secondary boycotts is the basic 
idea behind an alternative procurement standard. The primary I 
secondary distinction is well developed in U.S. labor law; the National 
Labor Relations Act prohibits unions from engaging in secondary 
boycotts, but not primary boycotts. 105 A union may not refuse to handle 
goods of a "secondary" business, with which the union has no com-
plaint, in order to put economic pressure on the "primary" business 
with which the union has a complaint.106 The Supreme Court has 
recognized that a primary labor boycott may legally have incidental 
effects upon secondary employers who deal with boycotted goods. 107 
The labor law analogy does more than define the difference between 
primary and secondary boycotts: it suggests that if a primary boycott can 
withstand judicial scrutiny under an explicit prohibition of secondary 
boycotts by Congress, then a primary procurement boycott would 
withstand even strict judicial scrutiny under the obstacle preemption 
doctrine. A primary boycott of individual companies based on their 
own conduct can be distinguished from the purpose and effect of a 
secondary boycott based more broadly on doing business in Burma, 
which the Court has found t<? be an obstacle to the objectives of federal 
sanctions. 108 
104. Oral Argument Transcript at 26, Crosby (No. 99-474). Also during oral argument, 
Timothy Dyk, counsel for the NITC, argued that secondary boycotts "only work if you communi-
cate disapproval [of a country]. or communicate a desire to change." He acknowledged that if 
Massachusetts sought to avoid goods made in Burma that would be "a different case," although the 
NITC's position is that a boycott of goods made in Burma would also be unconstitutional and 
presumably preempted by the federal Burma sanctions as welL /d. at 26-27. 
105. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § l58(b) (4) (2000). 
106. The Supreme Court has had numerous occasions to elaborate on the distinction 
between primary and secondary boycotts. NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, 
377 U.S. 58, 91 (1964); Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443,466 (1921) (defining a 
secondary boycott as an "exercise [of] coercive pressure upon ... customers ... in order to cause 
them to withhold orwithdrawpatronage" from the party with whom a union has a complaint). It is 
conceivable that companies would argue that they are merely "customers" of government 
ministries or private firms in Burma that violate human rights. This distinction is not valid for at 
least two reasons. First, many of those companies are joint venture partners with government 
ministries, not merely customers. Second, even if they were "customers," a downstream boycott of 
goods or services is still "primary" if the goods or services retain a competitive benefit (because of 
the human rights violations) or if the downstream boycott is "against the merchandise" or service 
of the primary producer. 377 U.S. at 64 n.7. 
107. See International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Allied Int'l, 456 U.S. 212, 217 n.9 (1982). 
108. See infra Part IV-B-2. 
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A primary boycott of individual companies is much narrower than a 
boycott of all goods made in Burma.109 It is a boycott of specific 
companies, or companies within a defined economic sector, based 
specifically upon the behavior and harm caused by companies con-
nected to violations of human rights. For example, some oil and gas 
companies benefit from the use of forced labor. Forced labor is not 
merely regulated conduct, it is a crime under international law that 
applies to governments, private individuals, and companies alike. 110 
Thus, a primary procurement standard seeks to disassociate from 
particular companies because they are connected to violations of 
international law. Such a standard is much narrower-and also more 
difficult to establish-than merely finding that a company does busi-
ness within a repressive nation like Burma. 
For a procurement limit to avoid preemption under the Crosby 
analysis, it must be neutral with respect to companies that are simply 
doing business in Burma. Many companies do business in Burma (or 
even business with the government of Burma) without any complicity 
in human rights violations other than the indirect complicity of provid-
ing financial support to the government. Conversely, a company that 
does no business in Burma but benefits elsewhere from violations of 
human rights could be affected by a primary procurement policy. 
In short, a "primary" procurement standard would disassociate a 
government purchaser from companies that are complicit in violations 
of human rights. Two elements require statutory definition - human 
rights and complicity. The review of human rights abuses in Burma in 
part IV-B below illustrates three options for defining the human rights 
element, each of which is recognized in an international human rights 
agreement: 
• repression of labor rights of association; 111 
109. Several commentators have described a boycott of goods made in Burma as a "primary" 
boycott because it does not avoid business with companies simply because they do business in 
Burma. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Globalization and Federalism in aPost-Prinz World, 36 TuLSA L.J. 11, 26 
n. 87 (2000). 
110. See INT'L LABOR 0RG., FORCED LABOUR IN MYANMAR (BURMA) § 204 (1998) [hereinafter 
ILO REPORT]. 
111. Convention Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Orga-
nize (No. 87), entered into force, july 4, 1950, 68 U.N.T.S. 17; see also International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, art. 22.1, entered into force Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 1171 ("Everyone shall 
have the right to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and join trade 
unions for the protection of his interests.") [hereinafter ICCPR]; Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights, art. 20, G.A. Res. 217A, 3 U.N. GAORPt. 1, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR]. 
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• forced relocation;112 and 
• forced labor. 113 
Approximately twenty-three of the 329 foreign companies doing 
business in Burma operate in sectors where human rights violations are 
prevalent, and an additional thirty-four firms have withdrawn from 
those sectors but could return if the business climate becomes more 
tolerant of human rights abuses. 114 However, not all of these firms sell 
products or services that are purchased by governments. Roughly, 
there are at least six companies that operate in sectors where human 
rights violations are prevalent and these companies are also active in 
procurement markets; an additional nine firms have withdrawn from 
those sectors but could, likewise, return if the business climate becomes 
more tolerant of human rights abuses.115 The review of corporate 
connections to human rights violations in Burma reveals that there are 
several degrees of complicity, as shown in the following chart. 
The review of company involvement with human rights violations in 
Part N-B does not identify any foreign companies that direcdy partici-
pate in violating human rights. However, there are many companies 
that direcdy benefit from violations of human rights. For example, 
Totalfina and Unocal are companies that have direcdy benefited from 
112. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the 
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), art. 17, entered into farce 
Dec. 7, 1978, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609,616, providing: 
1. The displacement of the civilian population shall not be ordered for reasons related 
to the conflict unless the security of the civilians involved or imperative military reasons 
so demand. Should such displacements have to be carried out, all possible measures 
shall be taken in order that the civilian population may be received under satisfactory 
conditions of shelter, hygiene, health, safety and nutrition. 
2. Civilians shall not be compelled to leave their own territory for reasons connected 
with the conflict. 
See also ICCPR, supra note 111, art. 12.1 ("Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, 
within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence.") 
and art. 17.1 ("No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, 
family, home or correspondence.); VDHR, supra note 111, arts. 12 and 17. 
113. Convention Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labor, entered into farce Jan. 10, 1957, 
320 U.N.T.S. 291, ratified May 14, 1991 (by the United States); Convention Concerning Forced or 
Compulsory Labor, May 1, 1932, 39 U.N.T.S. 55. See alsolCCPR, supra note ll1, art. 8(3)(a) ("No 
one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labour."). 
114. See Chart, Potential Reach of Primary Investment & Procurement Measures, infra Part 
IV-B-2. 
115. !d. 
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l.e•·cl of' Complicity: 
Levels of Corporate Complicity 
in Violation of Human Rights 
ludude1 Compcmit'' that: 
1. Participate a. Operate apparel sweatshops that repress labor rights. 
in violating human rights. b. Use forced labor to build hotels or industrial parks/facilities. 
c. Use forced labor to harvest or transport logs or crops. 
2. Directly benefit a. Purchase/resell apparel made in sweatshops. 
from violating human b. Purchase/resell logs or crops harvested or transported with forced 
rights. labor. 
c. Occupy or manage facilities or industrial parks built with forced 
labor. 
d. Invest in or provide financial services to projects built with forced 
labor or projects on land cleared by forced relocation. 
f. Sell construction services, equipment or transportation used in 
projects built with forced labor or projects on land cleared by 
forced relocation. 
f. Contract for security services that use forced labor, use forced 
relocation or commit violence against civilians. 
3. Indirectly benefit a. License trademarks to companies that buy sweatshop apparel. 
from violating human b. Provide equity, financing or services to industries/ministries that 
rights. benefit from forced labor. 
the government's use of forced labor to build and police a gas pipe-
line. 116 Most of the examples in Part 111-B fall into this "directly benefit" 
definition. An example of a company that "indirectly benefits" might 
be Suzuki, which provides equity value and financing as ajoint-venture 
partner with the military government in order to operate a manufactur-
ing facility in Burma.117 
Using definitions of human rights and complicity, the syntax of 
"primary" procurement legislation might follow this model: The govern-
ment must not purchase goods or services from a company that: 
(a) participates in, or benefits from, violation of 
(b) internationally recognized labor rights of association, freedom 
from forced relocation, and freedom from forced labor. 
The definition of either complicity or human rights could be scaled 
back in order to further reduce the risk of preemption, the scope of 
political opposition, or the administrative complexity of the procure-
ment policy. For example: 
• The degree of corporate complicity could cover only companies that 
directly benefit ·from violation of human rights. An indirect benefit 
test would encompass so many companies that have economic ties to 
116. See infra Part IV-B-2. 
117. See infra notes 288-90. 
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the government that it would approach the scope of a secondary 
boycott, both conceptually and numerically. A "direct benefit" test is 
probably necessary to make a clean distinction between primary and 
secondary complicity in violation of human rights. 
• The human rights element could be narrowed to 
cover only companies that benefit from violations of 
freedom from forced labor, rather than a broader 
scope of core labor standards. 
To reduce the risk of preemption, legislation could also be tailored 
to narrow the scope of companies that would be affected by the policy. 
For example: 
• The policy could exempt products or services from countries that 
are members of the WTO procurement agreement, which would 
avoid the conflicts that the European Union andjapan raised over 
the Massachusetts Burma law. Alternatively, the policy could be 
limited to the local level of government, which is not covered by 
the WTO agreement. 
• The scope of affected procurement could be scaled back to cover 
only the products or services of a corporation that are within an 
economic sector where human rights violations are prevalent . 
• To narrow the reach of legislation still further, the scope of 
affected procurement could be scaled back even further to cover 
only those products or services that were actually produced with 
the benefit of human rights violations.118 
A "primary" human rights standard for procurement would not be 
preempted by the federal Burma law if an affected company and its 
conduct have nothing to do with Burma.u9 If a company's conduct 
does link it to Burma, the purpose and scope of the statute would be far 
narrower than a secondary boycott, affecting just a few companies 
rather than a few hundred. 
118. The California legislature recently adopted a "benefit from" standard that applies only 
to goods and setvices provided to the state, not to the company with which the state does business. 
CAL. PUB. CoNTRAcr CODE§ 6108 (a) (1) (2000) (amended Sept. 28, 2000). It required contractors 
to certify that goods and services provided to the state were not produced "with the benefit of 
forced labor, convict labor, indentured labor under penal sanction, abusive forms of child labor 
or exploitation of children in sweatshop labor." !d.§ 2(a) (I). 
119. There could be other federal statutes pertaining to other countries, now or in the 
future, that might preempt the application of a procurement policy to companies that benefit 
from human rights violations in those countries. 
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Would this dramatic narrowing of the purpose and scope save a 
primary procurement policy from preemption under the Crosby analy-
sis? An argument that it would not might start with the Court's 
observation that the federal Burma sanctions were designed not only to 
bar what federal law prohibits, but also to allow what federal law 
permits.120 Thus! a primary procurement policy arguably would pro-
hibit contracts with some companies that trade rather than invest in 
Burma, non-U.S. companies, or companies whose investments pre-date 
the federal Burma sanctions, all of which Congress intended to permit 
(in the opinion of the Supreme Court).121 
In addition, even a narrow primary procurement policy could still 
give the European Union, Japan, or other nations cause to complain 
that the policy violates the WTO procurement agreement if it results in 
states (not local governments) rejecting business from companies that 
benefit from violations of human rights. Hence, the problem with 
multilateral cooperation still might exist. 
Given the subjective nature of obstacle preemption, these preceding 
complications could well end a judicial inquiry in favor of preemption. 
But this same degree of subjectivity also means that a policy with a 
dramatically narrower purpose and scope might withstand obstacle 
preemption scrutiny. As the NFTC has acknowledged, even a boycott of 
goods made in Burma would be "a very different case" than the one 
decided in Crosby, 122 and a primary procurement policy would be much 
narrower than that. 
The argument that a primary boycott would not be preempted under 
Crosby draws support, first, from the Court's own obstacle preemption 
analysis, which, as noted above, might leave room for a procurement 
policy that dramatically reduces the level of "obstacle" conflict with the 
federal Burma law. A law that presents a lower level of conflict is even 
120. As noted previously, however, the federal law does not actually state what is intended as 
permissible; it only defines what the President may prohibit. See National Foreign Trade Council v. 
Crosby, 120 S. Ct. 2288, 2298 (2000); see Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related 
Programs Appropriations Act, Pub. L. 104-208, § 570(0 (2), 110 Stat. 3009-166 (1997). Professor 
Lucien Dhooge concludes that "any local procurement scheme that requires the termination of 
international business relationships deemed legal by federal law is ripe for preemption. • Dhooge, 
supra note 9, at 453. The concept of "deeming" something to be legal for certain purposes on the 
state and local level because it is not banned on the federal level goes even further than obstacle 
preemption doctrine to make statutory interpretation an exercise in subjective policy judgement 
rather than a guideline of interpretation that can be applied consistently through a complex 
federal system. 
121. See 120 S. Ct. at 2297·98. 
122. Oral Argument Transcript at 26, Crosby (No. 99-474). 
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more likely to avoid preemption if courts recognize a presumption 
against preempting state and local market participation laws. 
By its own reckoning, the Court took pains to avoid ruling out a 
presumption against preempting state market participation mea-
sures.123 Instead, it held that even if there a presumption against 
preemption exists, the degree of conflict with the Massachusetts Burma 
law was high enough to overcome such a presumption. Accordingly, a 
presumption against preempting market participation measures still 
may exist if the measures present a lower level of conflict (such as a 
primary boycott). There are no less than three justifications for a 
presumption against preemption of a primary boycott measure. 
The first justification is that a primary boycott is arguably a form of 
political activity that is at least favored, if not protected, under the First 
Amendment. Like foreign affairs, labor relations is a field of strong 
federal interest. Yet in interpreting the ban on secondary labor boycotts 
under the National Labor Relations Act, the Supreme Court has 
avoided regulating primary boycotts because a broad ban "might 
collide with the guarantees of the First Amendment."124 This does not 
mean that primary labor boycotts are immune from regulation, but the 
Court has gone to great lengths to distinguish primary from secondary 
boycotts, and it has tolerated the incidental economic effects that a 
primary product boycott has upon the secondary employers who sell a 
boycotted product.125 
A presumption against preempting primary procurement boycotts is 
also supported by the Court's holding that political boycotts outside of 
the labor context are protected by the First Amendment. 126 Courts 
need not find that state and local governments enjoy immunity from 
regulation under the First Amendment in order to find that First 
Amendment values support a presumption against preempting pri-
mary boycotts in the public sector, as long as there is a legitimate public 
purpose to justify the boycott.127 
123. 120 S. Ct. at 2294 n.8. 
124. National Labor Relations Board v. Fruit and Vegetable Packers and Warehousemen, 
Local 760, 377 U.S. 58, 62 (1964). 
125. See International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. AUied lnt'~ 456 U.S. 212, 217 n.9 (1982); Gary 
Minda, TheLawandMetaphorofBoycott, 41 BuFF. L. REv. 807,843,898 (1993). 
126. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982); see also Missouri v. NOW, 
620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1980). 
127. See Matthew Porterfield, supra note 7, at 4047. There are at least three published 
opinions that support giving First Amendment protection to the activities of state and local 
governments. See Creek v. Village of Westhaven, 80 F.3d 186 (7th Cir. 1996); County of Suffolk v. 
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The second justification for a presumption against preemption is 
that a primary procurement boycott, which avoids companies that 
directly benefit from violations of international law, is arguably entitled 
to the deference that courts have traditionally shown to procurement 
preferences and ethical standards. It is true that some courts interpret 
state competitive bidding statutes narrowly to limit discretion such that 
the lowest bidder may be avoided only on grounds that the lowest 
bidder is not capable.128 However, most courts enforce procurement 
preferences like minority contractor preferences that are based on 
clearly stated "public interests" and interpret "responsible bidder" 
requirements to mean that qualified bidders must be socially respon-
sible in addition to being a financially qualified bidder. 129 New Jersey 
courts, for example, have defined "responsible bidder" to include a 
consideration of moral integrity and have upheld rejection of low 
bidders in order to avoiding associating with criminals or with firms 
that knowingly associate with criminals. 130 
These public standards, which are tantamount to a primary boycott 
of unethical business partners, are analogous to private sector sourcing 
guidelines such as those of Levi Strauss & Co., which are based on 
avoiding business partners that associate with governments that violate 
human rights. 131 Actually, private-sector standards function much more 
like a secondary boycott than the more limited ethical contracting 
standards to which courts routinely defer. 
The third justification for a presumption against preemption of a 
primary boycott is the relationship of state governments to specific human 
rights conventions. As our culture and economy become more global, 
international law gains increasing importance in defining universal stan-
dards . of public morality.132 It is common sense that state and local 
governments would orient their standards of public welfare and morality 
to international consensus on "those benefits deemed essential for indi-
Long Island Lighting Co., 710 F. Supp. 1387 (E.D.N.Y. 1989); Nadel v. Regents of University of 
California, 34 Cal. Rptr. 2d 188 (1994). 
128. See, e.g., MCM Construction, Inc. v. City & County of San Francisco, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 44 
(1998); Arrington v. Associated General Contractors, 403 So. 2d 893 (Ala. 1981). 
129. See generaUy 10 McQUil.LIN ON MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS§ 29.73a-To other than lowest 
bidder; M. Victoria Wilson, Set-Asides of Local Government Contracts for Minority Oumed Busines.res: 
Constitutional and State Law Issues, 17 N.M. L. REv. 337 (1986). 
130. See Bodies by Lembo, Inc. v. County of Middlesex, 669 A.2d 254 (NJ. Sup. Ct. 1996); 
Trap Rock Ind., Inc. v. Kohl, 284 A.2d 161, 166 (NJ. 1971). 
131. See Levi Strauss & Co., Global Sourcing and operating Guidelines-Terms of Engagement, at 
http://www.levistrauss.com/about/code.html (last visited Nov. 28, 2000). 
132. See Brief of Amici Curiae Non-profit Organizations at 12, Crosby (No. 99-4 74). 
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vidual well-being, dignity and fulfillment and ... a common sense of 
justice, fairness and decency."133 With regard to worker rights of associa-
tion, freedom from forced relocation, and freedom from forced labor, 
international commitments have been ratified by the United States. A 
primary procurement standard would honor the letter and the spirit of 
these federal foreign commitments and thus deserve some deference in 
the balancing of interests in obstacle preemption analysis. For example, 
the Convention Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labor (No. 105), not 
only prohibits forced labor, it commits its signatories to suppress the use of 
any form of compulsory labor "for purposes of economic develop-
ment."134 
Equally important for preemption analysis, U.S. state governments 
retain delegated discretion in meeting their own obligations under the 
international agreements that define worker rights of association and 
freedom from forced relocation and forced labor. The forced labor 
conventions are implemented under the constitution of the Interna-
tional Labor Organization ("ILO"). The ILO constitution has its own 
federalism clause, which means that when the subject of a labor 
convention involves state authority as well as federal authority, that 
convention is treated like a recommendation to the states and is 
"referred to the state[s] for such action as they may care to take," 
including state-level implementation of an ILO convention that is 
independent of actions of the national government, even if the na-
tional govemment has not ratified the ILO convention.135 
On june 15, 2000, for the first time in its history, the ILO called upon 
its members (nation-states, labor unions and employers) to limit their 
trade relationships with a country, Burma, in order to suppress the use 
of forced labor (beginning on November 30, 2000) .136 The ILO action 
133. LoUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 2 ( 1996); see Peter J. Spiro, The States and International 
Human Rights, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 567 (1997). 
134. Convention Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labor, supra note 113, at art. I (b). 
135. The Constitution of the International Labour Organisation Instru~ent of Amendment, 
1946, art. 19. 7, opened for signature Oct. 9, 1946, 62 Stat. 3485, 3522, 15 U.N.T.S. 35, 72; Hearings on 
SJ Res. 117 Before the Senate Subcomm. on Labor & Pub. Welfare, 84th Con g. 249-50 ( 1956) (statement 
of Philip M. Kaiser, Assistant Sec. of Labor for Int'l Affairs). 
140 
136. The relevant part of the ILO resolution reads as follows: 
[The International Labor Conference recommends] to the Organization's constituents 
as a whole-governments, employers and workers-that they ... review ... the 
relations that they may have with [Burma) and take appropriate measures to ensure 
that [Burma] cannot take advantage of such relations to perpetuate or extend the 
system of forced or compulsory labour. 
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strengthens the position ofiLO-member nations and their sub-national 
units of government against future arguments that withdrawal from 
trade with Burma in the context of forced labor somehow violates 
international trade obligations. In general, ILO action establishes a 
more favorable context for future court review of procurement stan-
dards that seek to avoid businesses that have a direct or "primary" 
connection to ventures that perpetuate a system of forced labor. 
An even more explicit delegation of discretion to state governments 
is contained in the International Convention on Civil and Political 
Rights, which defines worker rights of association and human rights to 
freedom from forced relocation and forced labor. The United States 
Senate ratified this convention in 19~2, subject to a federalism reserva-
tion that states that the United States government must implement the 
convention "to the extent that it exercises legislative and judicial 
jurisdiction over the matters covered by the Convention and otherwise by 
the state and local governments. "137 
The Senate's deference to state sovereignty is consistent with the 
Supreme Court's more recent development of a constitutional prin-
ciple against singling out state officials and commanding them to 
implement federal policy objectives.138 The Crosby Court may have 
ruled out constitutional immunity for the Massachusetts Burma law, 
but the Court's reasoning leaves room for a qualified immunity that 
applies to less "coercive" forms of state market participation. 139 The 
Int'l Labor Conference, 88th Session, Geneva, June I5, 2000, Fourth Report of the Selection 
Committee, Resolution 'll I (b). The effective date of the resolution was deferred until November 
30, 2000, to enable the government of Burma to take concrete action through legislative, 
executive, and administrative measures to suppress the use of forced labor. When the government 
of Burma failed to so, the ILO governing body refused to stay implementation of the resolution, 
which took effect on November 30, 2000. Press Release, International Labor Organization, ILO 
Governing Body opens the way for unprecedented action against forced labor in Myanmar (Nov. 
I7, 2000) (on file with author). 
I37. I38 CoNG. REc. 4784 (1992) (emphasis added). 
I38. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. I44, I49 ( I992) (holding that Congress may not 
require states to take title to nuclear waste as an incentive for states to take responsibility for 
disposing it); Printz v. United States, 52I U.S. 898, 935 (I997) (holding that Congress may not 
direct state officials to conduct background checks in order to implement federal handgun 
policy). 
I39. Mark Tush net suggests that states might retain some degree of constitutional immunity 
for market participation that would protect statues less intrusive than the Massachusetts Burma 
law. See Tushnet, supra note I 09. Professor Tushnet offers a primary boycott law as an example that 
a state law that might be immune from preemption as well as the reach of the dormant commerce 
clause. However, he defines a primary boycott more broadly than the option presented in this 
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idea that the federal Burma sanctions should also preempt a narrow 
primary boycott sounds much more like interpreting Congressional 
intent as mandating "forced commerce" with morally offensive busi-
ness partners when, in fact, Congress said nothing of the sort. Mark 
Tushnet argues that preemption of state procurement preference~ 
amounts to "conditional commandeering" or "negative commandeer-
ing" of state policy, a practice which raises the same federalism con-
cerns that motivated the Supreme Court to strike down federal laws 
that affirmatively commandeer state policy. 140 
The problem is not only that the CroslJy decision interprets the federal 
Bunna law in such a way that it commands state officials to do business 
with companies that the state would otherwise avoid on grounds of public 
morality. More specifically, the problem is that if read too broadly, the 
CroslJy interpretation appears to single out state and local governments and 
target them for regulation in a way that is distinct from the way that 
Congress regulates private market participants. 
In the Burma-law litigation, Massachusetts and its amici drew upon 
this non-targeting principle and arguments based on the 1 Qth Amend-
ment asserting that states are immune from judicial or congressional 
commands that leave them with inferior market participation rights in 
comparison to corporations in the private sector.141 The Supreme 
Court did not seriously consider this argument, ostensibly because 
Massachusetts had conceded the obvious but different point that 
Congress has the power to preempt its Burma law if Congress chooses 
to exercise that power.142 
One way to resolve the tension between the Court's federalism 
decisions and preemption under Crosby is simply to recognize a 
presumption against preemption of state market participation laws 
that are consistent with the objectives and practices of private 
market participants. With or without such a presumption, it is much 
easier to argue that a narrow primary boycott would survive judicial 
scrutiny, in part because it is indistinguishable from the routine 
behavior of private market participants, including members of the 
section. The narrower approach to defining primary boycott in this section strengthens Professor 
Tushnet's immunity argument. !d. 
140. !d. 
141. See Brief for Massachusetts at 30, Crosby (No. 99-494); Brief of Amicus Curiae Earth-
Rights International, National Foreign Trade Council v. Laskey, sub 11Q111. National Foreign Trade 
Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 1999) (No. 98-2304). 
142. Crosbyv. National Foreign Trade Council, 120 S. Ct. 2288, 2294 n.7 (2000). 
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NFTC who have chosen to avoid suppliers that exploit the repressive 
conditions in Burma.143 
While it opposed the secondary Burma boycott, the Executive Branch 
appears to agree that a primary procurement policy focused on specific 
sectors or companies does not conflict with the federal Burma sanc-
tions. Long after the federal Burma sanctions were in place and the 
NFTC challenge to the Massachusetts Burma law was on appeal, the 
President issued an Executive Order barring federal agencies from 
purchasing goods produced with forced child labor/44 the order was 
based upon a broad definition in federal law that bans the import of 
goods made with forced child labor.145 Mter the Crosby decision was 
announced, the U.S. Department of Labor issued a list of banned 
products made with forced child labor, which listed the products by 
country of origin. All eleven products listed are from Burma; one 
product is also from Pakistan.146 This product list is based upon an 
Executive Order that is neutral with respect to Burma or any other 
country of origin. As such, it shows how a primary boycott policy can be 
independent of the federal sanctions on Burma.147 Like a primary state 
procurement policy, this federal policy is designed to serve a moral 
policy objective that does not impair the "delicate balance" of the 
federal Burma sanctions. 
143. See Carlos M. Vasquez, Breard, Printz, and the Treaty Power, 70 CoLO. L. REv. 1318, 1344-50 
(1999). For example, Levi Strauss has sourcing guidelines that enable the company to avoid 
suppliers based on the "human rights environment" and the employment practices of potential 
business partners including such core labor standards as a prohibition on use of child labor, 
prison labor, forced labor and discrimination against workers who exercise their rights to organize 
or associate with a union. See Levi Strauss & Co., supra note 131. 
144. Executive Order 13126, 64 Fed. Reg. 32,383 (June 12, 1999). 
145. A state or local primary procurement ban would be compatible with the federal import 
ban on products made with forced labor, which was passed by Congress that took effect in 1932, 
the same year that the ILO Forced Labor Convention entered into force. It prohibits import of 
goods "produced or manufactured wholly or in part in any foreign country by convict labor 
or/and forced labor or/and indentured labor." Tariff Act of 1930, tide III, part I,§ 307, 46 Stat. 
689 (1930) (current version at 19 U.S.C. § 1307 (1994). It defines "forced labor" to include "all 
work or service which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty for its 
nonperformance and for which the worker does not offer himself voluntarily." The term includes 
forced child labor. /d. 
146. The complete list of products made with forced or indentured child labor includes: 
Bamboo, beans, bricks (hand-made), chilies, com, pineapples, rice, rubber, shrimp (acquaculture), 
sugarcane and teak. Request for Comments, Notice of Preliminary List of Products Requiring Federal 
Contractor Certification as to Forced or Indentured Child Labor Under Executive Order No. 13,126, 
65 Fed. Reg. 54,108, 54,109 (Sept. 6, 2000) [hereinafter Forced Labor Notice]. 
147. The Forced Labor Notice cites the Tariff Act of 1930 and Department of Labor reports 
on suppressing child labor as its legal authority and policy purpose. /d. at 54,109. 
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To summarize, state or local governments may be able to avoid 
preemption under the federal Burma sanctions or other similar sanc-
tions of the local interest can be defined narrowly to affect companies 
that benefit from trade in sectors where violations of human rights 
predominate. However, this argument is stronger if the local interest is 
defined more narrowly to affect companies whose own products or 
services directly benefit from violations of human rights. The argument 
is stronger still if the local interest can be defined as avoiding business 
with such a company but only regarding the specific products that 
directly benefit from the violation of human rights. 
While these options are promising, a word of caution is in order. The 
inherent vagueness of obstacle preemption means that a court might 
see an obstacle even in avoidance of a company that directly benefits 
from the violation of human rights if the law is challenged by a 
company doing business in Burma. If so, a savings clause should work 
to limit the effect of any preemption to just companies in Burma. Of 
course, the arguments on either side of this option will be theoretical 
until they are tried and tested. 
Two issues that worked against the Massachusetts Burma law remain: 
potential conflict with trade agreements, and duration of the law. Both 
of these concerns can be avoided with careful legislative drafting. 
As noted above, conflict with the wro procurement agreement is a 
problem only at the state level. Local procurement is not covered by 
that agreement. The potential for state-level conflict can be avoided by 
following the approach of the President's Executive Order, which bans 
federal government purchase of products made with forced or inden-
tured child labor. That policy avoids the WfO conflict by simply 
exempting products from nations that are signatories to the wro 
procurement agreement or NAFfA.148 
148. The Executive Order provides that: 
This order does not apply to a contract that is for the procurement of any product, or 
any article, material, or supply contained in a product that is mined, produced, or 
manufactured in any foreign country if: (1) dte foreign country is a party to the 
Agreement on Government Procurement annexed to the WfO Agreement or a party 
to the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"); and (2) the contract is of a 
value that is equal to or greater man me United States mreshold specified in the 
Agreement on Government Procurement annexed to the wro Agreement or NAFTA, 
whichever is applicable. 
Executive Order 13126, § 5(b), supra note 144. 
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This exception might be a symbolic loophole, but it sacrifices little of 
substance because it affects products from only two dozen countries, 
most of which have highly developed economies. Ultimately, it ex-
cludes very few products and companies that benefit from the violation 
of human rights. 149 For example, the exception does not exclude 
products made in Burma, which like most developing countries, has 
not joined the wro procurement agreement. 
The Supreme Court also objected to the Massachusetts Burma law 
because of its permanent status. Even if the President removed federal 
sanctions as an incentive or a reward for progress toward democracy in 
Burma, the Massachusetts law would have remained in place (unless 
repealed). One obvious way to avoid this problem-the simple ap-
proach of annually sunsetting a primary procurement policy-would. 
be cumbersome and unsuitable to a policy that is not Burma-specific. 
There are at least two additional ways to provide flexibility in a 
permanent procurement policy, however. One is to authorize a inayor 
or governor to suspend application of the law. The other way to 
promote flexibility is to make suspension of the law automatic upon the 
occurrence of certain circumstances. 
Whether suspension is authorized or automatic, the legislation should 
provide the guidelines or standards for doing so. For example, the law 
could authorize or require suspension of a primary procurement policy 
as applied to a company doing business in a particular country, if: 
• the President suspends or terminates limits on trade or investment 
within that particular country, or 
• Congress or the President recommend to state and local govern-
ments that they suspend a primary boycott policy as applied to 
companies doing business in a particular country. 
The idea of linking suspension of state or local measures to a federal 
recommendation could introduce a more nuanced and effective rela-
tionship between state and federal policies, particularly in the context 
of foreign affairs. Neither the alternative of a primary boycott nor a 
suspension clause to temper its administration were considered during 
the litigation over the Massachusetts Burma law. 
149. The most notable problem under such an exception would probably be Mexico. There 
are numerous reports that companies harass and intimidate workers who attempt to exercise their 
rights to organize under Mexican law. See, e.g., David Bacon, Tijuana Troubles; NAFTA is Failing 
Mexican Work=, IN THESE TIMES, Aug. 21, 2000, at 23; William K. Tabb, Turt/i>s, Teamsters, and 
Capital's Designs, MoNTIILY REv!EW,july 1, 2000, at 28; Susan Ferriss, Mexico Labur Battle Tests NAFTA 
Rules, ATLANrAj. CoNST., Aug. 3, 1998, at 6A; Laura Eggerston, Canadian Labour Backing Mexican 
Worker.5, TORONTO STAR, Apr. 7, 1998. 
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A suspension provision is not necessary in the sense that the Presi-
dent or federal agencies have the power to "administratively preempt" 
state or local law. Administrative preemption requires either exclusive 
presidential power or a clear delegation of discretion to the President 
or an agency, which exists under the federal Burma sanctions. 150 
However, in Crosby, the Court held that the opportunity for an Execu-
tive Branch preemption option was not a factor that should weigh 
against a finding of obstacle preemption.151 Suspension provisions 
would alleviate the need for federal officials to formally preempt state 
or local law. . 
The foregoing analysis provides drafting choices for creating a primary 
procurement option that can avoid preemption: purpose, scope, level of 
government, and suspension (duration). The result could be a policy that 
is dramatically lower-profile than the secondary boycott that the Supreme 
Court found to be preempted in Crosby. Its impact on foreign commerce 
in Burma could be reasonably characterized as incidental. Still, the subjec-
tive nature of the obstacle preemption doctrine means that the risk of 
preemption is moderate to high, depending on the scope of the measure. 
The least-risky options within this range would be the narrowest (1) 
avoiding any procurement business with a company that benefits from 
violation of human rights; or more narrowly, (2) avoiding only a specific 
product from a specific company when that product benefits from the 
violation of human rights. 
A full discussion of drafting options for a primary boycott exceeds 
the scope of this article because of its technical complexity. However, it 
is worth noting some of the approaches that drafters could take. These 
include: 
• Requiring companies to certify that they do not benefit from 
violation of human rights (the scope of which would have to be 
defined as noted above) . 
• Including respect for human rights as part of the moral or integrity 
standards for being a "responsible bidder," which would enable the 
150. See, e.g., United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 210-13, 230 (1942); RoNALD D. ROTUNDA & 
JoHN E. NowAK, TREATISE ON CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw, Substance and Procedure § 12.4, at 220 n.23 
(3d ed. 1999) ("When Congress gives an administrator or agency discretion to regulate a field of 
commercial activity the agency's decision to preempt should be upheld unless it is clear that 
Congress would not have sanctioned a preemption of state authority in the area regulated by the 
agency."); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw: PRINCIPLES AND POUCIES 272 (1997); REsTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RElATIONS,§ 115 cmt. e (1987) ("In principle, a United States treaty or 
international agreement may also be held to occupy a field and ... supersede State law or policy 
even though that law or policy is not necessarily in conflict with the international agreement"). 
151. SeeCrosbyv. National Foreign Trade Council, 120 S. Ct. 2288,2301 n.24 (2000). 
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government purchaser to either select a higher bidder that does 
not benefit from violation of human rights or disqualify a bidder as 
not responsible. 
• Including human rights provisions in an ethics policy for the govern-
ment and its business partners, the violation of which would enable 
the government to terminate or avoid a business relationship. 
• Including human rights provisions in a fair competition policy, 
which would enable competitors or citizens to challenge a bidder 
on grounds that the bidder has an unfair advantage based on 
violation of human rights. 
B. Disclosure 
An alternative to a primary boycott of companies that benefit from 
human rights violations would be a requirement that such companies 
disclose the nature of their business if they operate in a sector that is 
prone to human rights violations. A company would not be placed at 
any disadvantage in bidding for public procurement except for the 
requirement to disclose. 
If a state or local government can confirm that a company does 
benefit from the violation of human rights, this information has several 
potential uses. First, the information can underscore the need for a 
stronger procurement or investment policy to disassociate from compa-
nies that benefit from the violation of human rights. Second, a state or 
local government can use the information to petition Congress on the 
need for adopting, keeping in place, or changing federal policy with 
respect to companies that benefit from the violation of human rights. 
Third, simply asking for the information and publicizing it will get the 
attention of a company's management. 
The NFTC established its standing to challenge the Massachusetts 
Burma law by showing the court that at least fifteen companies did 
business in Burma and had an interest in bidding for procurement 
contracts with Massachusetts. The NFfC asked for and received a 
protective order from the court in order the keep the names of these 
companies secret, acknowledging that mere disclosure has a power all 
its own.152 Apparently, disclosure alone raises a risk of embarrassment, 
consumer boycotts or shareholder resolutions for these companies.153 
152. National Foreign Trade Council's Motion for Protective Order at 1, National Foreign 
Trade Council v. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d 287 {D. Mass. 1998) {CANo. 98-CV-10757). 
153. /d. at 1-2. 
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The NITC's past efforts to protect the identity of its members in 
Burma suggest that even a disclosure measure connected to procure-
ment but detached from a secondary boycott would be challenged on 
preemption grounds. A disclosure requirement is less "coercive" than a 
procurement standard based on how or where a company does busi-
ness: even if a company does benefit from violation of human rights, it 
can still make a procurement contract as long as it discloses the 
information. This reduces the risk of preemption slightly, but iffailure 
to disclose results in loss of a contract, then preemption arguments 
might still be used to challenge disclosure.154 A cautious approach to. 
drafting a disclosure law would be to make it as narrow as a procure-
ment measure would have to be in order to avoid preemption, as noted 
in the previous section. 
In sum, while disclosure may not be more secure from preemption, 
the option is still worth considering because it offers a less coercive 
alternative to a primary boycott of companies that benefit from the 
violation of human rights. 
C. Divestment 
A divestment ordinance would affect portfolio investments, not 
the foreign direct investment addressed by Congress in the federal 
Burma sanctions. The Supreme Court's decision in Crosby does not 
invalidate Burma-divestment laws because the Massachusetts law did 
not include portfolio divestment; therefore, the connection be-
tween the federal Burma sanctions and portfolio divestment was 
simply not an issue. 155 Even if it had been, divestment does not 
constitute a secondary boycott, which is what the Court found to 
conflict with the sanctions adopted by Congress. It was the "coer-
cive" force of a secondary boycott that the Court found to conflict 
with the federal sanctions, in part because it sanctioned trade that 
Congress did not prohibit, and in part because it allegedly con-
flicted with the procurement agreement of the World Trade Organi-
zation ("WTO"). 
154. In Gerling Global Reinsurance Corp. et al. v. Quakcenbush, No. Civ. S-00-0506WBSJFM, 2000 
WL 777978 (E.D. Cal. 2000), the California Insurance Commissioner threatened that failure to 
disclose information related to the insurance policies of Holocaust survivors would result in loss of 
several companies' licenses to sell insurance in California. The Federal District Court granted a 
preliminary injunction against enforcement of the statute on foreign affairs and foreign Com-
merce Clause grounds. ld. at 10, 13. 
155. See Brief of Amicus Curiae the United States at 29, Crosby (No. 99-474) (the Massachu-
setts case presented "no occasion in this case" to consider the validity of divestment). 
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While acknowledging that disassociation from morally tainted 
companies is a legitimate objective, 156 the NFTC took the position in 
Crosby that divestment laws are unconstitutional. 157 Presumably, the 
NFTC objects to the br:oad scope of divestment from all companies 
doing business in a specific country, viewing such expansiveness as 
an encroachment into foreign affairs and an implicit criticism of a 
foreign government. However, a law that divests from all companies 
doing business in Burma has no direct economic effect on those 
companies, which means it would pose no obstacle to the "delicate 
balance" of congressional sanctions or presidential discretion in 
implementing those sanctions. Nor does divestment have any bear-
ing on a WTO agreement, which was the source of international 
conflict over the Burma law. Additionally, the United States govern-
ment has not complained, as it did repeatedly about the Massachu-
setts procurement law, that divestment laws create any problem 
under the Burma sanctions or for foreign policy in general. In fact, 
it has suggested divestment as a viable state and local non-
procurement option. 
While noting that corporations might claim that divestment laws 
attempt to "regulate," the United States agreed that divestment would 
not have as direct an effect as a regulation, because "stock divested by a 
pension could still be purchased by someone else, and the transaction 
would not be directly linked to any conduct by the purchaser, the 
company, or the foreign government."158 
The low economic impact of divestment makes it virtually a symbolic 
act of economic speech. 159 Symbolic speech of this nature might be 
resented by a foreign government or a corporation from which a city or 
state seeks to disassociate itself. However, to stretch Crosby's "purpose 
and effect" reasoning to reach divestment would ignore the fact that 
divestment has no direct economic effect. It would also ignore the 
purpose of divestment, which is to reject the intimacy of ownership of a 
morally tainted company, as compared with avoiding trade with a 
company. 
The most persuasive reasons to balk at wholesale divestment are not 
legal; they are administrative and tactical. For example, a law that 
requires divestment from all companies doing business in Burma 
156. See Oral Argument Transcript at 27, Crosby (No. 99-474). 
157. !d. at 22 ("we think the divestiture laws are unconstitutional, but we recognize they're 
quite different [from selective purchasing]"). 
158. Brief of Amicus Curiae the United States at 28-29, Crosby (No. 99-474). 
159. See infra Part III-E. 
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would be a one-time symbolic event, and then the city or state will be 
out of the game as an investor. The alternative would be to sell the stock 
of a narrow class of companies that benefit from the violation of human 
rights. These could be companies within a sector, such as oil and gas 
pipelines in a country like Burma. Alternatively, a city or state could sell 
stock selected from a list of specific companies. 
A narrower approach to divestment preserves the option of future 
divestment, and thus may carry equal or greater symbolic weight than a 
one-time event. The message is also more direct. Rather than trying to 
focus on a large number of companies that support the military 
government by doing business in Burma, the narrower approach can 
focus attention on co~panies that are themselves connected to human 
rights violations. This is a more cost-effective approach as well. Com-
pared to divestment from all companies that do business in Burma, 
divestment from a narrower class of companies enables pension fund 
managers to undertake fewer transactions, make fewer inquires of 
individual companies, and reduce the cost of implementing divest-
ment.160 
160. Concerns over the cost of divestment to pension fund beneficiaries have been addressed 
in the context of divestment from South Africa. There are two levels of concern, one being the 
transaction costs of divestment, and the other being the effect of divestment on risk and rate of 
return. Both concerns were raised in the challenge against Baltimore's divestment ordinance, 
Board of Trustees v. Mayor& City Council of Bait., 562 A.2d 720 (Md. 1989), ccrt. denied, 493 U.S. 1093 
(1990). 
The Maryland Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court's judgement that the costs of 
divestment were de minimus when viewed in relation to the system's total assets." /d. at 737 n.36. 
The annual divestment cost was estimated at between 1/10th and 1/20th of one percent of fund 
assets. The percentage was this low even though the Baltimore ordinance required divestment of 
47% of the fund's equity holdings. /d. at 726-27. Divestment costs are likely to be significantly less 
for Burma than for South Africa because fewer foreign companies do business in Burma than did 
business in South Africa in the early 1980s. 
The Maryland court rejected the argument that divestment would imprudently reduce the 
universe of eligible investments needed to maintain portfolio diversity by noting that economi-
cally competitive substitutes remained available. !d. at 735. Nor did a morally based policy for 
divestment conflict with the trustees' duty of loyalty to beneficiaries of the fund. The court 
explained that the fiduciary standard is not to "maximize the retum on investments but rather to 
secure a just' or 'reasonable' return while avoiding undue risk." /d. at 737. The court concluded 
that it is appropriate for fund managers to avoid investments that are morally offensive to the 
community: "by investing in business with 'a proper sense of social obligation,' they will in the long 
run best serve the beneficiaries' interests and most effectively secure the provision of future 
benefits." /d. at 738. 
While the Maryland court had little trouble accepting the divestment ordinance on fiduciary 
grounds, it stressed repeatedly that tl1e ordinance protected the interests of pension beneficiaries 
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While divestment from all companies doing business in Burma poses 
a low risk of preemption, divestment from a much narrower class of 
companies that benefit from human rights violations reduces that 
minimal risk is even further. 161 
Regardless of how the legal scope of divestment is defined, however, 
a reviewing court will probably respect a decision to divest because of 
the complexity and fiduciary judgement involved in that decision. 162 
When considering divestment from South Mrica, local legislatures and 
pension fund managers based their decisions on both the moral 
considerations and the investment risks presented by investing in 
companies that are prone to consumer boycotts, or that invest in 
countries where repression could eventually spark civil strife or revolu-
tion. 163 The managers of a public pension fund may not need a 
legislative mandate; they may choose to divest from a company doing 
business in Burma based solely on their risk analyses. This is exactly the 
tack taken by the nation's largest public pension fund, the California 
Public Employees Retirement Fund (CalPERS), when it recently an-
nounced a policy of avoiding unnecessary risk by avoiding stock compa-
nies that trade or invest in unstable and undemocratic nations. 164 
Simply put, moral and prudential considerations intertwine, and the 
exercise of fiduciary judgment to divest from companies doing business 
in Burma is in no way an obstacle to congressional policy objectives. 
There are some drafting considerations worth noting for any divest-
ment option. One is to recognize that "divestment" connotes not only 
disassociating from corporations in which stock is already owned, but 
also that the policy should apply prospectively to future purchases of 
by giving fund managers a reasonable period of time for divesunent and the latitude they needed 
to manage risks that might arise due to market fluctuations. !d. at 736. 
161. Minneapolis and Los Angeles were the first cities to enact divesunent measures after the 
Crosby decision. The Minneapolis resolution prohibited new invesunent and retention of invest-
ments in companies that engage in "the economic development of resources located in Burma." 
City Council of Minneapolis Res.§ 1, Oct. 10, 2000 (enacted Oct. 13, 2000); see Rochelle Olson, 
Panel Approves Latest Myanmar Divestiture Resolution, STAR-TRIB, Oct. 11, 2000, at 5B. The resolution 
also authorizes divesunent from any company based on invesunent risk. City Council of Minneapo-
lis Res. § 2. The Los Angeles City Council voted unanimously to adopt a recommendation to 
managers of the city's pension funds to sell the stock of all companies that invest in Burma. Press 
Release, Burma Forum-Los Angeles, L.A. City Council Votes Unanimously to Sell Burma-Related 
Stock (on file with author). 
162. See Robert Collier, Pension Fund Tightens Foreign Stock Rules, CalPERS Board Gives Weight to 
Human Rights, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 14, 2000; Tribe, supra note 8, at 23,291-92. 
163. See Rodman, supra note 14, at 26. 
164. See Tribe, supra note 8, at 23,292 ("no prudent investor could fail to see the economic 
implications of investing in a country undergoing a profound political and social upheaval"). 
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stock as well. Another drafting consideration is that local governments 
may not have the authority to set policy for the public pension funds in 
which their employees participate. This is important because most of 
the Burma laws were adopted at the city or county level. These 
jurisdictions can still act on divestment policies, but they must do so in 
the form of a resolution that advises the pension fund managers, state 
legislature, or other body with legal authority to change investment 
practices. This complicates the task because success may depend on 
persuading other cities and counties to adopt the resolution in order to 
accomplish a change in state-level policy. The result may be well-worth 
the greater effort, however, because state pension funds have so much 
greater visibility and clout in the stock markets. 
D. Shareholder Resolutions 
Investor initiatives, such as shareholder resolutions, are not an 
economic transaction. Rather, they are pure speech between an inves-
tor (possibly a government investor) and the company in which that 
investor holds stock. Nonetheless, the NITC has speculated that mere 
state government expression of views critical of a foreign government 
may be unconstitutional.165 This is presumably' because the NITC has 
argued that under Zschernig v. Miller, city or state criticism of a foreign 
government creates a "great potential for disruption or embarrass-
ment" to the United States. 166 Zschernig's constitutional preemption of 
"embarrassing" local statements may be used as an analogy to support a 
statutory preemption claim. Under the Crosby preemption analysis, any 
"speech" made by a city or state that is critical of a foreign government 
would compromise the capacity of the President to speak for the 
United States in developing a unified Burma policy. 167 
As noted in the context of divestment, however, Zschernig does not 
hold that critical speech alone encroaches on federal foreign affairs 
power. Nor does the U.S. Government oppose speech by state or local 
officials that is critical of a foreign government because its impact on 
165. Oral Argument Transcript at 22, 26, Crosby (No. 99-474). 
166. This constitutional assertion is addressed in the following section. Zschernig v. Miller, 
389 U.S. 429, 435 (1968); Brief of National Foreign Trade Council at 27, Crosby v. National 
Foreign Trade Council, 120 S. Ct. 2288 (2000) (No. 99-474). 
167. SeeCrosbyv. National Foreign Trade Council, 120 S. Ct. 2288,2299 (2000). This analogy 
is superficial at best because the actions by Oregon probate courts at issue in Zschemig involved 
more than political speech. The risk of embarrassment in Zschemigwas created when local courts 
undertook their own investigations into the "democracy quotient" of communist governments, 
including direct contact with officials in those governments. See 389 U.S. at 433-34. 
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foreign affairs is merely "indirect or incidental."168 Moreover, Justice 
Souter himself suggested that state and local governments should be 
able to "express themselves, to express their views ... so long as they do 
not go beyond the point of verbalizing [condemnation of] the regime 
in Burma and, indeed, those who do business with it .... "169 In sum, 
courts are unlikely to conclude that investor initiatives fall within the 
scope of the federal Burma sanctions and the findings of Crosby. 
However, the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") does 
set limits on shareholder resolutions. In addition to numerous 
technical standards, the SEC170 allows a company to exclude a 
shareholder proposal if it relates to operations that account for less 
than five percent of a company's total assets, and less than five 
· percent of net earnings and gross sales, and is not otherwise signifi-
cantly related to the company's business. 171 The larger a company, 
the more likely it can exclude a shareholder resolution with respect 
to human rights violations in any particular locale where the com-
pany operates. This de minimus rule is likely to exclude the most 
direct kind of resolutions that are specific to a location, for example: 
(1) a resolution to disclose the nature of a company's business in 
Burma, or (2) a resolution that recommends that a company 
withdraw from operations in Burma. 
In recent years, a number of resolutions have survived the de minimus 
rule. A state or local investment policy could require or authorize fund 
managers to vote "yes" or even cosponsor resolutions such as the 
following: 
• Adopt human rights standards. The purpose of the standards would 
be (1) to avoid business relationships in countries where all com-
merce indirectly ~upports repression of human rights, or (2) to 
avoid business with particular partners, contractors, or suppliers 
that benefit from the violation of human rights or participate in 
168. Brief of Amicus Curiae the United States at 36, Crosby (No. 99474) (quoting Zschemig, 
389 U.S. at434). 
169. Oral Argument Transcript at 12, Crosby (No. 99474). 
170. The standards include a SEC requirement that the sponsor of a resolution own stock 
that is worth at least $2,000 in market value or I% ofthe company's securities. 17 C.F.R Ch. II, 
§ 240.14a-8(b) (2000). In addition, without a company's consent, shareholders have only four 
bites at the apple. If a second shareholder proposal deals with "substantially the same subject 
matter" as another proposal in the previous five years, then the company may exclude the current 
proposal if the first vote was less than three percent. The company may exclude a third proposal if 
the second vote was less than six percent. The company may exclude a fourth proposal if the third 
vote was less than 10%. § 240.14a-8(b) (2)(ii). 
171. § 240.14a-8(i)(5). 
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projects or products that were developed or produced with .viola-
tion of human rights. As proposed to several companies in recent 
years: 
the shareholders request the Board to review and develop guide-
lines for country selection and report these guidelines to sharehold-
ers and employees by October [year]. In its review, the Board shall 
develop guidelines on maintaining investments or withdrawing 
from countries where: 
- there is a pattem of ongoing and systematic violation of human 
rights; 
- a govemment is illegitimate; or 
- there is a call by human rights advocates, pro-democracy organi-
zations or legitimately elected representatives for economic sanc-
tions against their country. 172 
• Evaluate the cost of business in Burma. The resolution would 
require a committee of independent directors to weigh the 
benefits of doing business in Burma (or other areas that are 
prone to pervasive violation of human rights) against the costs 
of risking consumer boycotts, lobbying expenses to oppose 
federal, state or local policies, and damage to the company's 
reputation and good will. 173 
• Provide incentives for ethical management. The resolution would re-
quire a committee of independent directors to review ways to link 
executive compensation with the Company's ethical and social 
performance.174 _ 
While shareholder resolutions do not have direct economic conse-
quences, some human rights strategists believe that resolutions are 
superior to divestment as a communication and constituency-building 
tool.175 Rather than disassociate shareholders from a morally tainted 
company, they engage the shareholders in discussion or debate with 
corporate managers and other shareholders. The value of shareholder 
172. BAKER HUGHES CoRP., REsoLUTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (1998) (on file with author); 
CATERPILLAR CoRP., REsoLUTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (1997) (on file with author); INTERDIGITAL 
CoRP., REsoLUTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (1997) (on file with author); UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CoRP., 
REsoLUTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (1997) (on file with author). 
173. UNOCAL CoRP., REsoLUTION ON EXECUTIVE CoMPENSATION Uune 2000) (on file with 
author). 
174. UNOCAL CoRP., REsoLUTION 9N REPoRT OF FuLL CoSTS OF DOING BUSINESS IN BuRMA Uune 
1998) (on file with author). 
175. See Simon Billenness, Burma Divestment Revisited (Apr. 15, 1997), available at http:/ I 
www.freeburmacoalition.org/ old/ divesunent.html. 
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resolutions for promoting human rights may come from the substance 
of that debate, the risk of wasting the company's good will and appeal 
to consumers, the sheer "hassle factor," 176 or most likely a combination 
of these factors. 
The most persuasive voices for human rights standards in business 
will likely be corporations themselves. For example, Levi Strauss (a 
member of the NFTC) pulled out of Burma in the early 1990s, citing its 
own sourcing guidelines, which provide that: 
Levi Strauss & Co. bases its decision on whether to do business 
in certain countries based on criteria that include whether: 
- Brand image would be adversely affected by a country's 
perception or image among our customers and/ or consum-
ers. 
- Human rights environment would prevent us from conduct-
ing business activities in a manner that is consistent with the 
Global Sourcing guidelines and other company policies. 
- Political, economic and social environment would threaten 
the Company's reputation and/ or commercial interests. 177 
What is most striking about this policy is not its idealism, but its focus 
on sustainable profitability and the risks posed to the company by 
associating with violators of human rights. The policy suggests not only 
that repression creates risk of strife or revolution but that consumers 
will judge the corporation by the company it keeps. 
E. Political Speech 
Political speech options take one of two forms. The first is publication 
of the names of companies doing business in Burma, with which the 
state or local government must now do business. Unlike the preempted 
Massachusetts law, this kind of list cannot be linked to any economic 
consequences or it too would be preempted. Rather, the option is 
simply to publish information, which requires the publisher to under-
take a duty of accuracy. Considering that erroneous information could 
have economic consequences, publishing information about compa-
nies in Burma also brings the usual concerns about publishers' liability. 
The second form of "political speech" is adoption of a stand-alone 
resolution or a preamble that accompanies a procurement or invest-
176. See Rodman, supra note 14, at 27. 
177. LEvi STRAUSS & Co., GLOBAL SoURCING & OPERATIONS GUIDEUNES 155-57. 
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ment law. It is usually a factual resolution that summarizes human 
rights abuses and how governments that violate human rights are 
dependent upon foreign trade and investment. An equally important 
purpose is to explain how specific economic sectors and corporations 
are connected to human rights abuses. The facts are available in 
reports of the U.S. Government, the ILO, and the UN, among other 
sources. 178 
As Justice Souter's recommendation implies, it may be obvious that 
this kind of political speech is the least coercive role for state and local 
governments offended by the conduct of their business partners in the 
private sector. Nonetheless, state and local officials need to be pre-
pared in case the NFTC or one of its members reasserts that it is 
unconstitutional for state or local officials to express views critical of a 
foreign ·nation. 
The NFTC has asserted that political speech can be constitution-
ally preempted under the foreign affairs power of the federal 
government, 179 but the Supreme Court has never adopted this view. 
The NFTC's argument ignores the implications of the First Amend-
ment for state and local political speech.180 Both James Madison and 
Thomas Jefferson suggested that the First Amendment limits the 
capacity of Congress to regulate the speech of states, just as it limits 
the capacity of Congress to regulate the speech of individual citi-
zens.181 The Court has ruled that political speech may not be 
restricted simply to avoid offending a foreign government. 182 While 
the Supreme Court has not decided whether states have First 
178. See infra Part IV. 
179. In oral argument before the First Circuit Court of Appeals, Timothy Dyk, counsel for 
the NFTC, speculated that "perhaps even a resolution by the state condemning a foreign 
government would be preempted by the foreign affairs power." Oral Argument Transcript at 8, 
National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 1999) (No. 98-2304). In oral 
argument before the Supreme Court, Dyk faulted selective purchasing laws because they "target a 
foreign country" and "communicate disapproval." Oral Argument Transcript at 19, Crosby (No. 
99-704). 
180. For comprehensive arguments against constitutional preemption under the foreign 
affairs power, see, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae City of Berkeley, Cal., at 1, National Foreign Trade 
Council v. Laskey, sub nom. National Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 1999) 
(No. 98-2304); Porterfield, supra note 7. 
181. Thomas jefferson and James Madison drafted resolutions for the Kentucky and Virginia 
legislatures, respectively, denouncing the restrictions on political expression under the 1789 Alien 
and Sedition Acts of Congress as violations of both the First and Tenth Amendments. See 
Porterfield, supra note 7, at 26. 
182. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988) (striking down a District of Columbia law banning 
signs within 500 feet of a foreign embassy). The Court held that regulating a type of speech in 
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Amendment rights, it has ruled that the identity of the speaker is not 
important when considering the First Amendment as a limit on the 
power of Congress to regulate speech. 183 At least four published 
opinions of federal and state court have recognized that political 
speech by state and local governments is protected by the First 
Amendment. 184 
Accordingly, state and local officials should feel secure in their 
official capacity to speak on issues that affect foreign affairs. The 
immediate concern is not what they may say, but what they should say. 
As the opponents of "sanctions" rightly observe, the least-attentive 
audience is a foreign government that violates human rights to stay in 
power.185 Consistent with that observation, the immediate audience for 
political speech is the U.S. public, the Congress, and the Executive 
Branch of the federal government. For these audiences, the most 
important questions to address in a resolution that accompanies pro-
curement or investment legislation are the following: 
• State or local interest. Is there a connection between the participation 
of state and local governments in a global market (as investors or 
consumers) and either (a) the ability of companies to benefit from 
the violation of human rights; or (b) the ability of repressive 
governments to draw financial resources from foreign trade and 
investment? If so, then it is important to state the purpose of a local 
procurement or investment measure in terms of disassociating the 
government from companies that are connected to the violation of 
human rights? 
• Federal-state relations. Is there a need for Congress or the Execu-
order to minimize its "secondary impact" on foreign governments is still a content-based 
restriction, which triggers strict scrutiny. !d. at 334. 
183. See First Nat'! Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 ( 1978). When political speech 
is involved, the Court has recognized the free speech rights of various organizational entities, 
including regulated private utilities, for-profit corporations, non-profit corporations and political 
parties. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 8 (1986) (ruling that 
California may not require a privately-Qwned utility to include in its billing envelopes the speech of 
third parties with which the utility disagrees); Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 767, 797 (concluding that the 
First Amendment rights of for-profit corporation could not be limited to issues materially 
affecting its business, property, or assets); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,428-29 (1963) (holding 
that the NAACP, even as a non-profit corporation, engages in activities meriting First Amendment 
protection); San Francisco County Democratic Cent. Comm. v. March Fong Eu, 826 F.2d 814, 
825-26 (9th Cir. 1987), affd489 U.S. 214 (1989) (establishing First Amendment rights for political 
parties). 
184. See Porterfield, supra note 7, at 34. 
185. See, e.g., Dan Griswold, Trade Sanctions & Selective Purchasing Laws, BURMA DEBATE, 
Summer 1999, at 12-13, 15. 
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tive Branch to show greater deference to the exercise of legisla-
tive or market- participation power at the state and local level? 
State and local governments that have been preempted may 
want to petition Congress to authorize (or reauthorize) their 
exercise of selective purchasing power. However, before making 
such a request, state and local officials should remember the 
importance of politically astute timing. A petition to Congress tp 
restore local authority could backfire unless it first takes into 
account (a) the foreign affairs climate of the day, and (b) 
Congress's tendency to take no action on a petition unless the 
timing is right and the petition is part of a well-orchestrated 
lobbying campaign. 
• Federal fareign policy. Is there a need to adopt, keep in place, or 
change a particular kind of national policy? 
Another important audience is the market in which a state or 
local government is a participant. This market includes the corpora-
tions that benefit from violations of human rights as well as their 
consumers and investors. With this audience, a resolution can state 
the local interest as noted above, as well as address the following 
questions: 
• Consumer and investar relations. How can consumers and investors 
hold corporations accountable for violating standards of public 
morality? The law introduced by the resolution is one way to do so, 
but participation by other market actors is necessary for corporate 
accountability. 
• Corparate human rights standards. How can corporations assure their 
consumers and investors that they will not exploit repression as a 
market opportunity? A resolution can explain the history and use 
of human rights standards, which corporations can adopt individu-
ally or collectively. 
Whether the audience is Congress and the public or corporations 
and their consumers, the political speech component of state and local 
policy communicates the importance of economic advocacy in a global 
economy. 
IV. ECONOMIC ADVOCACY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 
The corporate campaign against the Burma law has always been 
reinforced by the political argument that selective purchasing and 
other forms of economic advocacy are "sanctions" that do not work.186 
186. !d. 
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"Not working" has been defined in terms of the futility of persuading 
dictators to give up power. For example, the military government of 
Burma has little to do with the U.S. economy and cares little about 
public opinion anywhere.187 
The free-Burma campaign also understands the isolationist charac-
ter of the military government, perhaps as well as the junta's business 
partners. Not surprisingly, the view of "what works" for a human rights 
campaign is more from the bottom-up than from a top-down perspec-
tive. From the bottom-up perspective, influencing the generals in 
Rangoon is indeed an objective, but it is the least of five functions of 
procurement policy or other forms of economic advocacy. The five 
functions follow a natural sequence in building a grassroots campaign 
into an international movement. They include: 
• defining human rights standards for market participation; 
• targeting violations of those standards; 
• building a constituency for human rights; 
• creating a laboratory for national policy; and 
• influencing foreign affairs. 
Human rights advocates can evaluate the policy options discussed 
above in terms of whether the options enable them to fulfill these 
functions of economic advocacy for human rights. This is not to say that 
the process or means are more important than the policy result, which 
is to create economic incentives for corporations and governments to 
implement human rights. Rather, the point is that the process/means 
and the policy/ends are symbiotic. You cannot organize without a 
viable policy goal, and you cannot change policy without an organized 
base of support. 
A. Defining Human Rights Standards for Market Participation 
The first function of economic advocacy measures is the most 
obvious: they define human rights standards for market participation. 
Most immediately, they determine the companies with which a govern-
ment will do business or in which a public investment manager will own 
stock. 
Human rights standards for market participation can be classified in 
terms of whether they seek to avoid support for a repressive govern-
ment or whether they seek to avoid association with individual compa-
nies: 
187. /dat 1&-18. 
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• Avoiding support for repressive governments. In addition to the Burma 
and South Mrica boycotts, there have been proposals for procure-
ment or divestment campaigns related to Nigeria, 188 Cuba, 189 
Indonesia, 190 and Tibet.191 The lack of success in building the 
latter campaigns can be attributed to how difficult it is to amass the 
financial, human, and organizational resources that it takes to 
mount an international campaign. It also indicates the heavy 
burden of proof that advocates must meet in order to make the 
political case that violations of human rights are so endemic to the 
political and economic system that merely doing business in the 
country necessarily provides economic support that perpetuates 
the repression.192 This standard can be narrowed somewhat by 
focusing on delivery of financial services to a repressive govern-
mene93 or by focusing on strategic industries (such as oil, other 
extraction industries and electric power generation) that are di-
rectly owned or controlled by the repressive government in order 
to maximize its foreign exchange and revenue.194 
• Avoiding association with individual companies. A human rights stan-
dard can be defined as a boycott of goods that are produced in 
violation of a specific human right based on international law. For 
example, California amended its procurement code in September 
of 2000 to ban state agencies from purchasing goods made with the 
188. The jurisdictions include Alameda County, CA; Amherst, MA; Berkeley, CA; and 
Oakland, CA. IRRC REPORT 1998, supra note 19, app. F (char). 
189. See Miami Light Project v. Miami-Dade County, 97 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1176 (S.D. Fla. 
2000). As noted above, the Miami-Dade resolution was partly enjoined as an unconstitutional 
encroachment on the federal foreign affairs power and preempted by the federal sanctions on 
Cuba. See id. at 1181. 
190. Bills were proposed in a number of jurisdictions but not adopted. See, e.g., H.B. 3177, 
18lst Gen. Court, Reg. Sess. (Mass. 1999). 
191. Free-Tibet activists have promoted self-detennination for Tibet and condemned Chi-
nese occupation of Tibet through non-binding "Tibet Support Resolutions" that have been 
adopted in 2 states and 13 cities as of May 2000. The states include Massachusetts and New Mexico. 
The cities include Amherst, MA; Atlanta, GA; Berkeley, CA; Indianapolis, IN; Los Angeles, CA; 
Madison, WI; Miami, FL; Middletown, CT; New Paltz, NJ; Philadelphia, PA; Princeton, NJ; Santa 
Cruz, CA; and Tucson, AZ. United States SufJrerM Courl to Rule on Selective Purchasing, TIBET BRIEF 
(Int'l Comm. of Law. for Tibet, Berkeley, Cal.), Spring/Summer 2000, at 13. 
192. There are other important reasons why the burden of persuasion is high, including the 
risk of retaliation to U.S. companies (as in the case of China) and the quickly changing nature of 
events in the foreign country (as in the case of Nigeria). 
193. See, e.g., H.B. 1273, 413th Reg. Sess. (Md. 1999) (proposing, but failing to enact, a bill for 
Nigeria). 
194. /d. 
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benefit of forced labor.195 A somewhat broader approach would be 
to boycott companies (not just individual products) that violate 
specific human rights or that directly benefit from exploitation of 
human rights. For example, four jurisdictions recently threatened 
to boycott Swiss banks because they benefitted from withholding 
assets from the families of Holocaust survivors and (at the time) 
refused to make what the families considered to be adequate 
compensation. 196 Another way to define a class of companies is to 
incorporate a corporate code of conduct by which companies can 
make a public commitment to honor human rights in the coun-
tries where they do business. For example, at least fifteen jurisdic-
tions have a purchasing or investment preference for companies 
that subscribe to the MacBride principles for employers to avoid 
religious discrimination in Northern Ireland.197 
• As the litigation over the Burma law reveals, defining the scope 
of a human rights standard is a crucial political judgment. A 
broad definition will hit the target, but it will also include a large 
number of powerful market participants that may object to the 
standard and attack it in legislatures and courts. Human rights 
advocates are likely to be more risk-averse after the Crosby 
decision. If they choose an option that has a high risk of being 
overturned in court, they ris~ losing political credibility with 
public officials as well as wasting their time and resources. 
However, if they are too risk averse, they may miss an opportu-
nity to retake and defend the middle ground. Whether that 
middle ground is worth defending depends upon the value that 
potential procurement or investment options add to the other 
functions of economic advocacy, which are addressed below. 
195. CAL. PuB. CoNr. CoDE§ 6108 (Deering 2000 Supp.). 
196. The threatened boycott produced an almost immediate response by the banks, which 
led to a settlement of claims. The public officials involved in this effort included the comptroller 
of the City of New York and the state treasurers of California, New York and Pennsylvania. See John 
Zarcorostas, Bern Withdraws Threat UIJer Holocaust claims, J. CoM., July 8, 1998, 3A; John Goshko, 
Swiss Banks' Pact Ends NY Threat of Sanctions, WASH. Posr, Aug. 14, 1998, at Al4; John Goshko, 
Sanctions on Swiss Banks to Proceed, WASH. Posr,July 2, 1998, at A3; David Sanger, How a Swiss Bank 
Goat ld Deal Eluded a U.S. Mediator, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 1998, at A6; Henry Weinstein & John 
Goldman, Nazi-Em Claims Spark Sanctions on Swiss Banks, L.A. TIMES, July 2, 1998, at Al. 
197. See, e.g., MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 32, § 23(1)(d) (iii) (West 1998). The other 12 
jurisdictions include Albany, NY; Boston, MA; Chicago, IL; Cleveland, OH; Lakewood, OH; New 
York, NY; Philadelphia, PA; Renssalear City, NY; Rochester, NY; San Francisco, CA; Scranton, PA; 
and Yonkers, NY. 
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B. Targeting Violations of Human Rights 
From an organizing and media perspective, the level of conflict that 
surrounded the Massachusetts selective purchasing law was desir-
able.198 This is not to say that generating media coverage was the 
objective in choosing a controversial legislative standard, but it was 
certainly one tangible outcome of the strategy. Both the process of 
campaigning to enact selective purchasing laws and the process of 
defending those laws against legal attack enabled human rights advo-
cates to communicate their message to millions of people. According 
to Simon Billenness, a strategist in the free-Burma campaign, the 
litigation "expanded public awareness of the human rights violations in 
Burma and how we as consumers, as investors, can use our freedom in 
the marketplace to effect political and social change.199 Of course, the 
publicity value of litigation does not justify starting or provoking 
litigation that would risk losing important economic policies. However, 
once the batde is joined, the Burma law litigation proves that even a 
losing cause can generate opportunities for public education. 
Would purchasing or investment measures that stop short of a 
country-specific boycott enable human rights advocates to publicize 
violations of human rights? The alternative would be for private actors 
to disclose violations to the media or to promote company boycotts 
without any connection to public policy. By comparison, linking the 
same actions to a public procurement or public investment policy 
brings several advantages. First, it turns a distant human rights issue 
into a local issue that connects to the moral grounding of taxpayers and 
pension fund investors. Second, the passage of a controversial law and 
the likelihood of conflict over that law make news. Third, the focus on 
an individual company can still illustrate the violation of human rights 
by the government of a country. 
The way to illustrate the value that middle-ground options bring to a 
campaign is to first summarize the nature of human rights violations by 
the Burmese government as a case study and then ask whether the 
presence of specific companies is direct enough to engage the company-
specific policies being considered. The examples below presume that 
the alternative to a secondary boycott of all companies in Burma is 
198. A Lexis News search on the terms "Massachusetts," "Burma" and "National Foreign 
Trade Council" since the date on which the NITC filed its complaint against the Massachusetts law 
(April 30, 1998) shows that there have been over 300 media stories on the litigation or relating the 
case to the human rights violations in Burma. 
199. Goldberg, supra note 14. 
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either a primary boycott of companies that directly benefit from 
violations of human rights in Burma or non-procurement options such 
as divestment or shareholder resolutions that aim to change corporate 
behavior. 
1. Violation of Human Rights by the Government of Burma 
The "foreign policy" objective of both state and federal Burma laws 
was the restoration of democracy. Mter the government of Burma lost 
eighty-two percent of the seats in Parliament in 1990 to the National 
League for Democracy ("NLD"), the government repudiated the elec-
tion.200 The junta-the State Law and Order Council ("SLORC")-
wages a war of attrition against the NLD. Its goal is to "annihilate" the 
NLD by imprisoning, harassing, economically coercing, and isolating 
NLD leaders.201 Recently, the SLORC dropped all pretense of tolerat-
ing an opposition party when it blockaded attempts by Aung San Suu 
Kyi to travel outside of Rangoon, placed her and the entire NLD 
leadership under effective detention, raided the headquarters of the 
NLD, and escalated what various reports describe as an ·endgame to 
"finish off" the NLD.202 A Special Rapporteur for the UN concludes 
that the economic suffering of the Burmese people is a result of this 
repressive political climate. 203 
200. For a capsule history of Burma since World War II, see Brief Histury, BuRMA: CoUNTRY IN 
CRISIS (Open Society Institute, New York, N.Y.), 1999, at 1-2 [hereinafter OSI REPORT]; see also 
Dhooge, supra note 9, at 390-92. 
201. Aung San Suu Kyi, Editorial, Why Burma Must Tall£ Steps to Change, WASH. PoST, july 16, 
2000, at B7; Katherine Smyth, supra note 16. The junta now calls itself the State Peace and 
Development Council ("SPDC"). However, outside of Burma and throughout this Article, the 
junta is referred to as the SLORC. 
202. See Berti! Lintner, Tightening the Noose: Rangoon's Military Junta Seems Bent on Finishing off 
the Main Opposition Party this Year, FAR E. EcoN. REv., Nov. 16, 2000, at 30; Burma Cracks down on 
Pro-Democracy Party, WASH. PoST, Sept. 3, 2000, at A2; Seth Mydans, Burma Leader Forced Home; 
Standoff Ends, N.Y. TiMES, Sept. 3, 2000, at Al, 9. 
203. The UN has reported the scope of repression in Burma as 
including the practice of torture, summary and arbitrary executions, forced labor, 
including forced portering for the military, abuse of women, politically motivated 
arrests and detention, forced displacement, serious restrictions on the freedom of 
expression and association, and the imposition of oppressive measures directed, in 
particular, at ethnic and religious minority groups. 
Human Rights Questions: Human Rights Situations and Reports of special Rapporteurs, U.N. GAOR, 51st 
Sess., Agenda Item llO(c) 3-4, U.N. Doc. A/51/466 (1996) [hereinafter Reports of Special 
Rapporteurs]. 
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The SLORC political repression extends to an elaborate system of 
economic control.204 It is not possible for a foreign investor or trader to 
do business in Burma without supporting and dealing with the military 
government. 205 As recently reported by the National Labor Committee: 
Foreign companies are not allowed to operate independently 
in Burma, but are required to be in joint ventures with the 
military government .... [For example,] apparel and textile 
firms in Burma are part-owned and controlled by the Burmese 
military government and the military itself. A portion of money 
earned from garment exports to the U.S. goes directly to the 
regime and is used to purchase weapons from China to repress 
the people of Burma. 206 
The military government derives financial support from trade not 
only from tariffs and taxes, but also profit-sharing from the holding 
companies that are owned by the Directorate of Defense Procurement 
or by the military's pension fund. 207 Foreign investors and traders can 
only move funds through government-owned banks, and Burmese 
204. See Brief of Amici Curiae American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial 
Organizations, National Foreign Trade Council v. Laskey, sub nom. National Foreign Trade 
Council v. Natsois, 181 F.3d 38 (1" Cir. 1999) (98-2304). 
205. Blaine Harden, How to Commit the Perfect Dictatorship, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2000, at WK5; 
Blaine Harden, The New Burmese Leisure Class: Anny Capitalists, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 2000, at A3. In 
her extensive discussion of economic repression in Burma, Barbara Victor writes: 
Without exception, outside investors who do business in Burma-venu~res that range 
from real estate to drug trafficking to money laundering-are selected based on their 
understanding and agreement that all profits are shared with the SLORC. Although 
kickbacks and bribes are not unusual, what is most disturbing is how many foreigners 
who represent legitimate enterprises-both Asians and westerners-and who may be 
upstanding citizens in their own countries, change drastically when they arrive in 
Burma. Somehow, they tend to ignore all the basic tenets of human rights. Instead of 
bringing wit them their own code of ethics, they embrace the practices of the SLORC 
and pay the Burmese shamefully low wages; frequently tum a blind eye to inhuman 
conditions ... and tacitly condone the razing of people's homes and lands to make way 
for their companies' industrial projects. 
Barbara Victor, THE LADY, AUNG SAN Suu KYI, NOBEL LAUREATE AND BuRMA'S PRISONER 19-20 ( 1998). 
206. NAT'L LABOR CoMM., U.S. RETAILERS INCREASE USE OF SWEATSHOPS IN BURMA AS IMPORTS 
SoAR 2-3, at http:/ /www.nlcnet.org/burma/burmapress.htm (june 22, 2000) (hereinafter NLC 
REPORT). 
207. See AM. EMBASSY RANGOON, 1 U.S. 0EP'T OF STATE, FOREIGN ECONOMIC TRENDS REPORT: 
BURMA 16 (1997) (hereinafter EMBASSY REPORT). 
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citizens must exchange any foreign currency that they receive.208 
According to the U.S. Embassy in Burma, "whenever, since 1988, the 
[government of Burma] received large infusions of foreign exchange, 
its defense imports increased sharply the following year."209 
It is this economic food chain linking all foreign trade and invest-
ment with military repression that Massachusetts sought to avoid by 
implementing the secondary boycott. In the words of the Levi-Strauss 
Corporation, one of the NFTC members that withdrew from Burma, "it 
is not possible to do business in Myanmar without directly supporting 
the military government and its pervasive violations of human rights.'mo 
Curiously, the strength of this evidence was scarcely acknowledged in 
the judicial review of the Massachusetts law. The trial judge only 
alluded to the state's moral concerns (which "may well be regarded as 
admirable"), 211 while the First Circuit limited its moral inquiry to 
dismissive agreement: "There is one matter on which the parties are 
agreed: human rights in Burma are deplorable. This case requires no 
inquiry into these conditions."212 It is no doubt easier to dismiss a 
moral purpose when that purpose is presented as a pure abstraction, 
stripped of all facts and human content. 
The links between international trade and repression in Burma go 
beyond the financial food chain that sustains a regime seeking to 
"annihilate" its democratic opposition. The other links involve govern-
ment policies that directly violate specific human rights. Addressing 
these government policies, rather than avoiding all contact with com-
mercial actors connected to Burma, could serve as the standard for 
procurement or investment. Objectionable policies include the repres-
sion of labor rights, the forced relocation of Burmese citizens, and the 
systemic use offorced labor. 
• Repressing labor rights. The AFL-CIO describes Burma as "one of the 
most longstanding and egregious violators" of international labor 
208. Brief of Amici Curiae American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial 
Organizations at 19, Natsois (98-2304). 
209. 2 EMBASSY REPORT, supra note 207, at 3. 
210. Letter from Sabrina johnson, Levi Strauss Corporation, to C.B. Loeb, Franklin Research 
& Development (June 22, 1992) (on file with author). This point is supported by the former U.S. 
Ambassador to Burma, Burton Levin, who said, "Foreign investment in most countries acts as a 
catalyst to promote change, but the Burmese regime is so single-minded that whatever money they 
obtain from foreign sources they pour straight into the army while the rest of the country is 
collapsing." RAINFoRESr R.EuEF, FREE BURMA-NO PETRo-DollARS FOR SLORC CAMPAIGN 4, at 
http:/ /www.biblio.org/ free burma/boycott/ oil/ oil.html. 
211. National Foreign Trade Council v. Baker, 26 F. Supp. 2d 287,292 (D. Mass. 1998). 
212. National Foreign Trade Council v. Natisos, 181 F.3d 38,45 (1st Cir. 1999). 
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standards.213 The ILO has documented systemic violations of ILO 
core labor standards on twelve different occasions in the past 
nineteen years: the military government recognizes no trade unions, 
and its Trade Union Act formally inhibits organizing and restricts 
the choice of union officials. In practice, it does not permit 
collective bargaining, and workers who attempt to organize or 
complain about conditions or wages are reported to the govern-
ment, which threatens them with arrest. 214 This repression oflabor 
rights violates the ILO Convention Concerning Freedom of Associa-
tion and Protection of the Right to Organize.215 
• Forced relocation. Approximately 1,000,000 farmers and rural villag-
ers have been displaced by the Burmese govemment.216 About half 
have been concentrated in camps without adequate food supplies 
or medical care, and there are reports of arrests or shootings of 
people who attempt to return to their farms. 217 As a result, many 
213. Brief of Amici Curiae American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial 
Organizations at 16, Natsois (98-2304). 
214. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF INT'L AFFAIRS, REPORT ON LABOR PRACfiCES IN BURMA 
65-70 (1998) [hereinafter DOL REPORT] for a summary of the ILO findings; see also NLC REPORT, 
supra note 206, at 3. Burma's Law on the Formation of Associations and Organizations prohibits 
formation of a labor federation, so the Burmese Federation of Trade Unions is forced to operate 
in exile with the support of international labor organizations. Brief of Amici Curiae American 
Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations at 17, Natsois (98-2304); DOL 
REPORT, supra, at 66, fns. 319, 320. 
215. Convention Concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Orga-
nize (No. 87), art. 2, Aug. 31, 1948, 68 U.N.T.S. 17. 
216. The U.S. Committee for Refugees has estimated that the the total number of displaced 
persons within Burma as high as 1,000,000. U.S. CoMM. FOR REFuGEES, WoRLD REFUGEE SURVEY 
2000: COUNTRY REPORT: BuRMA 1 (2000), available at http:/ /www.refugees.org/world/countryrpt/ 
easia_pacific/burma.htm. The Burmese Border Consortium reports a minimum of 600,000 
internally displaced persons in the border areas, mainly as a result of forced village relocations, 
including between 100,000 and 200,000 in the Karen State, 300,000 in the Shan State, 70,000 in 
the Karenni State, and 40,000 in the Mon State. Burmese Border Consortium, Areas in ~ich F(Yfced 
Lah(Yf Have Takn Place Since 1996 (map), rep(Yf(ed in NORWEGIAN REFuGEE CoUNCIL, GLOBAL lOP 
DATABASE, INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS IN MYANMAR (BURMA), CAUSES AND BACKGROUND OF 
DISPLACEMENT, POPULATION PROFILE AND FIGURES, NATIONAL TOTAL FIGURES, available at http:// 
www.db.idproject.org/Sites.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2000). Reports from the Karen Human 
Rights Group are higher than the estimates above, with 300,000 reported in central Shan State, 
50,000 in Karenni State, more than 300,000 in Karen State, and many throughout the Tenasserim 
Division. KAREN HUMAN RIGHTS GROUP, AN INDEPENDENT REPORT BY TIIE KAREN HUMAN RIGHTS 
GROUP (June 1, 2000), at http:/ /www.ibiblio.org/freeburma.html [hereinafter KHRG REPORT]. 
See generally AMNESTY INT'L, MYANMAR AITERMATII: THREE YEARS OF DISLOCATION IN TIIE KAYAH STATE 
(June 1999) (hereinafter, AMNESTY INT'L REPORT). 
217. AMNESTY INT'L REPORT, supra note 216, at 3; Burma: Refugees, in OSI REPORT, supra note 
200, at 11; U.S. DEP'T. OF LABOR, 2000 UPDATE ON FORCED LABOR AND FORCED RELOcATION 
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people die from easily preventable diseases. 218 Those who flee 
from the camps live in primitive conditions in the jungle, or they 
attempt to cross military lines to join over 300,000 refugees in 
camps on the other side of the borders with Thailand, India and 
Bangledesh.219 There are two motivations for forced relocation in 
Burma: the "four cuts" military campaign against armed ethnic 
minorities220 and major economic development projects such as 
logging, state farms, urban redevelopment, pipelines, and dams, 
which require large amounts ofland to be cleared and secured.221 
The U.S. Department of Labor reports that the practice of forced 
relocation "appears to have escalated" since 1988.222 
• Forced labor. Burma is building its commercial infrastructure at 
gunpoint. In the past decade, the military government has 
pressed over 5,000,000 people223 (approximately 11% of the 
population) into forced labor on railroad, highway, airport 
runway, agricultural-irrigation system, tourist attraction, and 
logging projects.224 Forced labor accounts for approximately 
§ Vl(A)-(B) (2000), at http:/ /www.dol.gov/ilab/public/media/reports/ofr/burma/forced.hun 
[hereinafter DOL UPDATE]. 
218. "Forced relocations place people into life-threatening conditions in relocation centers 
... Relocation centers often have inadequate or entirely lack housing, proper sanitation, safe 
drinking water, food, and medical care." DOL UPDATE, supra note 217, § Vl(B). 
219. AMNEsiY INT'L REPORT, supra note 216, at 4-5; BurtTUJ: Refugees, OSI REPoRT, supra note 
200, at 11. 
220. The army's "Four Cuts" counter-insurgency strategy entails cutting links of intelligence, 
food, money and recruits between the ethnic guerilla forces and the local civilian population. For 
example, "In March 1992, 57 villages were ordered to relocate to Pruso and other sites in 
northwest Kayah State. As a result, 8000 people moved; dozens of them were reported to have died 
from malnutrition in the relocation centres; and others were forced to do work on the Aungban-
Loikaw railway and perform pottering duties for the military. • AMNEsiY INT'L REPoRT, supra note 
214, at 3. 
221. DOL UPDATE, supra note 217, §VI; Burma: Refugees, inOSI REPORT, supra note 200, at 12; 
U.S. DEP'T OF LABoR, BUREAU OF INT'L LABoR AFFAIRS, SUMMARY OF THE 1998 REPORT ON LABoR 
PRACTICES IN BURMA§ II (Sept. 1999), at http:/ /www.dol.gov/dol/ilab/public/media/reports/ofr/ 
burma/summary.hun [hereinafter DOL SuMMARY]. 
222. DOL SUMMARY, supra note 221, § Ill. 
223. DOL REPORT, supra note 214, at 35; ILO REPORT, supra note 110, § 262. 
224. See, e.g., 1 BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGfiTS, AND LABoR, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 
CoUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGIITS PRACTICES FOR 1999 987, 1003 (2000) [hereinafter 1999 
CoUNTRY REPoRT]; DOL REPoRT, supra note 214, at 31-33; DOL UPDATE, supra note 217, §I; ILO 
REPORT§ 528, supra note 110; Measures Taken by the Government of Myanmar Folluwing the &commen-
dations of the Commission of Inquiry Established to Examine its Observance of the Forced Labour Convention 
§§ 34-44, ILO Doc. GB274/MYANM (May2l, 1999), at http:/ /www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/ 
relm/gb/docs/gb274/dg-myanm.hun [hereinafter ILO Director's Report]; NAT'L CoALITION Gov'T 
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seven percent of Burma's economy.225 Children and the el-
derly are commonly forced onto labor teams because village 
elders want to avoid sending the adults who are needed to 
grow food upon which the village depends for its survival.226 
The penalties for refusing to work include fines, beatings, arrest 
and detention. 227 Use or toleration of forced labor violates 
the ILO forced labor conventions, which Burma ratified in 
1948,228 and even the Burmese constitution prohibits forced 
labor. 229 
• Military portering. The most common form of forced labor, military 
portering, is not included in the numbers reported above.230 
Portering is most likely to be a violent experience for ethnic 
minorities and women, who are separated at night and frequently 
raped by soldiers.231 The U.S. Department of Labor reports that in 
OF THE UNION OF BURMA (NCGUB), HUMAN RIGHTS YEARBOOK 1998-99: BURMA 106-07 (1999) 
(hereinafter NCGUB REPORT). 
225. DoL REPORT, supra note 214, at 42. 
226. fLO Director's Report, supra note 224, § 24. 
227. /d.§ I(B). A U.S. State Department report on Burma's human rights violations stated: 
[i]n April authorities in Rangoon Division's Htan-Da-Bin Township ordered villagers to 
work on a road between Hle-Seik and Kyun Ngu villages; after some villages failed to 
appear, the authorities sent a letter to village ward leaders threatening to fine them if 
they failed to contribute labor the next day. In May authorities in Rangoon Division 
ordered villagers to work on a road from Insein to Nyaung Don or pay a fine of about $1 
(300 kyat) per household; police threatened residents with beatings or detention if they 
refused and arrested those who did not comply. 
1999 COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 224, at 1003. 
228. Convention Concerning the Abolition of Forced Labor (No.l05), supra note 113; 
Convention Concerning Forced or Compulsory Labor, supra note 113; DOL REPORT, supra note 
214, at 20 & n.59; 
229. DoL REPORT, supra note 214, at 23. 
230. Military portering is distinct from forced labor in that forced laborers usually return to 
their homes at the end of the day, while porters are forced to accompany soldiers on the move for 
days or weeks at a time. AMNESTY INT'L REPORT, supra note 216, at 7-13. 
168 
231. The U.S. State Department found that 
[m]any detailed credible reports indicate that in recent years, especially in areas 
inhabited chiefly by members of the Chin, Karen, Karenni, and Shan ethnic groups, 
army units have greatly increased their use of forced labor for logistical support 
purposes, including to build, repair, or maintain army camps and roads, as well as to 
plant crops, cut or gather wood or bamboo, cook, clean, launder, weave baskets, fetch 
water for army units-and, in the case of young women, to provide sexual services to 
soldiers. The number of reports of this practice has increased since 1997, when the 
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numerous cases, portering has involved "the destruction of villages, 
torture, rape, maiming and killing of exhausted, sick or wounded 
porters, the killing of a non-cooperative village head, and the use 
of civilians, including women and children, as mine sweepers and 
human shields."232 
All of this evidence of human rights violations by the government 
of Burma is no longer relevant to the validity of a secondary boycott 
of all companies doing business in Burma; the Court has concluded 
that promotion of democracy in Burma through a secondary boycott 
is preempted by the federal Burma law. However, as discussed in 
Part III above, the Court arguably left room for a "primary" ap-
proach that is neutral with respect to doing business in Burma. It is 
even more likely that the Court left room for non-procurement 
policies such as divestment or support for shareholder resolutions. 
There is no shortage of meaningful targets for such investment 
policies. 
In September of 2000, the Investor Responsibility Research Center 
("IRRC") reported that there are still 329 foreign companies doing 
business in Burma, 233 73 of them are likely to have a significant number 
of shares held by U.S. investors.234 Of these, fifty-one U.S. parent 
companies do business in Burma, including seven with equity ties and 
forty-four with non-equity ties.235 
One of the more interesting aspects of the IRRC research is that 
many U.S. firms feel a need to report minimal contacts with Burma, 
even though their subsidiary engagement in Burma can be very exten-
sive. For example: 
junta required regional military commanders to become more self-sufficient logisti-
cally. 
1999 CouNTRY REPoRT, supra note 224, at 1003; NCGUB Report, supra note 224, at 99 ("Porters are 
also exposed to dangerous combat situations. These can include exposure to mines, booby-traps 
and ambushes. Soldiers sometimes force the porters to walk ahead of them in areas where mines 
or ambushes are suspected in order to minimize the exposure of troops to such dangers."). 
232. DOL UPDATE, supra note 214, §IV. 
233. INVESTOR REsPONSIBIUIY REsEARCH CTR., MULTINATIONAL BUSINESS IN BURMA (MYANMAR) 6 
(Sept. 2000) [hereinafter IRRC REPORT 2000]. 
234. The count of 73 companies is based on the number of companies that sell their stock on 
the New York, American, or Nasdaq stock exchanges. See id. 
235. /d. 
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• Emerson Electric reported to IRRC that it has a representative trading 
agreement with a Rangoon company. 236 Emerson also owns a 
100% interest in 176 subsidiaries that do business in Burma.237 
• American Express reported to IRRC that it "maintains no direct 
presence in Burma."238 American Express also owns a 100% inter-
est in 143 subsidiaries, more than a 50% interest in 12 subsidiaries, 
and less than a 50% interest in 19 subsidiaries, all of which do 
business in Burma. 239 
• Caterpillar reported to IRRC that it has two formal sales channels in 
Burma, one of which is an Indian company, and one of which is a 
Caterpillar subsidiary.24° Caterpillar also owns a 100% interest in 
30 other subsidiaries, more than a 50% interest in 6 subsidiaries, 
and less than a 50% interest in 27 subsidiaries, all of which do 
business in Burma.241 
• Black & Decker reported to IRRC that it has "no assets, property, 
equity or employees in Burma." The company reported that its 
sales through a local distributor were on an "exceedingly small 
scale."242 Black & Decker also owns a 100% interest in 31 subsidiar-
ies that do business in Burma. 243 
This information should remind policy makers that corporate struc-
tures are designed to limit liability, and they can obscure visibility and 
accountability as well. Any policy that must look through the corporate 
veil of parent companies to examine whether they have simply assigned 
their unsavory business relationships to a subsidiary. 
2. Complicity in Violation of Human Rights by Private Companies 
A "primary" procurement measure would avoid doing business with 
companies that violate human rights themselves or directly benefit 
from the violation of human rights. While this narrower approach 
might escape obstacle preemption, it also constricts a law's utility as a 
tool to promote human rights. Thus, a second review of the human 
rights abuses in Burma is necessary in order to explore the extent to 
which private companies are more directly connected to the violation 
236. I d. at AII-3. 
237. I d. at app. B. 
238. Id.atAII-1. 
239. I d. at app. B. 
240. ld. at AII-2. 
241. I d. at app. B. 
242. Id. at AII-I. 
243. I d. at app. B. 
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of human rights. For example, private companies might be involved in 
handling Burmese exports that were produced under conditions that 
violate human rights. 
The paragraphs that follow summarize evidence of the connections 
between human rights violations and foreign corporations on two 
levels. The first level identifies specific sectors of the Burmese economy 
in which corporations are most likely to benefit from violation of 
human rights. The second level identifies three types of corporate 
connections: (1) U.S. companies still active in those sectors; (2) U.S. 
companies that have withdrawn from Burma, but which could return in 
the future; and (3) the foreign firms in those sectors that are most likely 
to sell stock to U.S. investors or sell goods or services to U.S. consum-
ers.244 
• Oil and gas pipelines. Forced labor was used in construction of the 
Yadana gas pipeline, which is a joint venture between the military 
government's oil and gas enterprise, MOGE, Total S.A., a French 
corporation, and Unocal, a U.S. corporation. The ILO has cited 
evidence that forced labor was used by the military government to 
clear the jungle by hand, grade the pipeline route and build a 
service road, build the parallel Ye-Dawei railroad, construct land-
ing pads for helicopters, construct barracks, and provide porters 
for troops guarding the pipeline.245 Mter all this work was done, 
Unocal and Total paid workers to lay the pipeline. They sought to 
distance their paid work "by the Project" from the vast amount of 
forced labor commandeered by the government "on behalf of' the 
Project, ofwhich they were aware.246 
• The corporate connection. A group of fourteen villagers 
from the Tenasserim region of Burma sued Unocal in 
the United States under the federal Alien Tort Claims 
Act247 for acts of the military for the benefit of the 
pipeline project with Unocal's knowledge and con-
sent. These acts included violation of international 
244. Each company is cited with its home country and stock exchange noted in parenthesis. 
The stock exchanges counted as most likely to sell to U.S. investors are NYSE, Nasdaq and OTC. 
However, U.S. institutions also invest in foreign stock exchanges, particularly larger institutional 
investors such as endowments and mutual funds. 
245. ILO REPORT, supra note I 10, at§§ 505-509. 
246. Order Granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, John Doe I v. Unocal 
Corp. (C.D. Cal. 2000) (No. CV96-96-6959,John Roe III v. Unocal Corp. (C. D. Cal. 2000) (No. CV 
96-6112). 
247. 28 U.S.C. § I350 (1994); see William Branigin, Rights Victims in Burma Want a U.S. 
Company to Pay, Suit Alleges Army Abuses While Pipeline Was Built, WASH. PoST, Apr. 13, 1999, at Al3. 
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human rights including forced labor, forced reloca-
tion and other violent acts.248 The federal trial judge 
dismissed the tort claim on grounds that the villagers 
had to prove that Unocal "controlled" the military's 
abuses or that it "sought" the use of forced labor.249 
However, the court did find that "Unocal knew that 
forced labor was being utilized and that the joint 
venturers participants benefitted from the prac-
tice."2so 
Unocal has divested its petroleum sales business in the 
United States, which takes it out of the procurement 
market. In terms of investment policy, Unocal and its 
contractors present visible targets for shareholder 
initiatives and, therefore, a potential subject of local 
divestment or shareholder accountability measures. 
Another important target is Totalfina, Unocal'sjoint-
venture partner in Burma. When Total S.A. acquired 
Fina, it became the fourth-largest petroleum company 
in the world, controlling 2,400 gas stations in the 
United States. 251 Subsidiaries of Halliburton built the 
offshore portion of the Yadana gas pipeline,252 and 
248. Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, John Doe I (No. CV96-96-
6959),JohnR.oe III (No. CV 96-6112) at 2. 
249. Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at 30, 37, john Doe I (No. 
cv 96-6959). 
250. !d. at 38. Without deciding the specific claims before a trial, the trial court summarized 
the evidence against Unocal as demonstrating that 
Unocal knew that the military had a record of committing human rights abuses; that the 
project hired the military to provide security for the Project, a military that forced 
villagers to work and entire villages to relocate for the benefit of the Project; that the 
military, while forcing villagers to work and relocate, committed numerous acts of 
violence; and that Unocal knew or should have known that the military did commit, was 
committing, and would continue to commit these tortuous acts. 
Id. at 27-28; see Daniel Zwerdling, Bwod and Oil in Burma, AMERICAN RADio WoRKS, trans., (June 12, 
2000) at http:/ /www.americanradio-works.org/features/burma/index.html; William Branigin, 
Unocal 'Smoking Gun' Alleged, WASH. PoST, May2, 2000, atEl. 
251. See Edmund L. Andrews, A French Concoction; Totalfina s Acquisition of Elf May Be Only a 
Prelude, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 1999, at C1; Takeover Bid Helps Spark. Ro.lly in Europe; TotalFina Targets 
Riva~ CHI. TRIB.,July 6, 1999, at C3. 
252. A division of Halliburton's Energy Services Group, European Marine Contractors 
(EMC), built the 365-kilometer offshore portion of the Yadana pipeline after Halliburton 
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have signed an agreement to build a pipeline from 
Burma to India.253 The other U.S. pipeline firms 
active in Burma include BJ Services and Smith Interna-
tional, both of which are publicly traded. 254 At least 
ten U.S. petroleum firms have withdrawn from Burma 
including eight that are publicly traded and two that 
sell petroleum products to the public.255 Including 
Totalfina, at least seventeen foreign petroleum-sector 
firms are still active in Burma, eight of which are 
traded in the United States.256 At least six foreign 
Geophysical Services provided pre-construction services for the pipeline. KENNY BRUNO & JIM 
VALLETIE, HALLIBURTON'S DESTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT 9 (EarthRights Int'l Report), Oct. 2000, at 
http:/ /www.earthrights.org/Haliburton.pdf [hereinafter EARTIIRIGHTS HALLIBURTON REPORT); 
Peter Waldman, A Pipeline Project In Myanmar Puts Cheney in Spotlight, Halliburton's Contract Came as 
U.S. Officials Sought to Isolate a Brutal junta, WALL ST.j., Oct. 27, 2000, atAl. 
253. /d. at 11; see Wayne Madsen, Cheney at the Helm, THE PROGRESSIVE, Sept. 1, 2000, at 21; 
Matthew Campbell, Deputy Dick's Posse of Women join Fight, SUNDAY TIMES, July 30, 2000, at 
http:/ /www.sunday-t .. pages/sti/2000/07 /30/stifgnusa02005.html; Simon Pia, Oiling the Wheels, 
THE SCOTSMAN, Sept. 15, 2000, at 16; Public Information Network, Corporate Profiles Compiled by 
George Dufan, available at http:/ /www.endgame.org/dtc/h.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2000). 
Halliburton is a corporate board member of the National Foreign Trade Council, and Dick 
Cheney, Halliburton's recently departed CEO, has been a leading critic of sanctions. See 
Christopher Marquis, Over the Years, Cheney Opposed U.S. Sanctions, N.Y. TIMES, July 27, 2000, at 
A2l. 
254. BJ Services Co. (formerly a wholly-owned Baker Hughes subsidiary) and Smith Interna-
tional are both traded on the NYSE. IRRC REPORT 2000, supra note 19, at A-I-1 and A-II-6. 
255. The 10 U.S. firms that have withdrawn from Burma include: Baker Hughes (USA/ 
NYSE), ExxonMobil (USA/NYSE), Grant Geophysical (USA/OTC), Marine Drilling (USA/ 
Nasdaq), McDermott International (USA/NYSE), Murphy Oil (USA/NYSE), Pacific Architects & 
Engineers (USA/privately held), Parker Drilling (USA/NYSE), Santa Fe Snyder Corp. (USA/ 
NYSE), and Texaco (USA/NYSE). SOROS Foundation Network, The Burma Project, at http: 
www.soros.org/burma/burmainvestors.html (last modified July 17, 2000) [hereinafter OS/ Capo-
rate List]; seeiRRC REPORT 2000, supra note 19, at app. C; Press Release: Free Burma Coalition, Free 
Burma Coalition to Dick Cheney: Get Out ~f Burma (July 31, 2000) (on file with author) 
(hereinafter FBC Press Release). 
256. The 17 foreign firms that are active in Burma include: Daewoo Corp. (Korea/SEO), 
Dominion Bridge Corp. (Canada/Nasdaq), Export Import Bank of Thailand, Hyundai Pipe- a 
Hyundai subsidiary (Korea/SEO), Itochu Corp. (Japan/OTC), Kailis Holding (Australia/ 
unknown), Longreach Gold Oil (Australia/ ASX), Mercantile International Petroleum (Bahamas/ 
OTC), Mitsubishi (Japan/OTC), Mitsui & Co. Ltd. (Japan/Tokyo), Mitsui Construction Co., Ltd. 
(Japan/Tokyo), Nippon Mitsubishi Oil Corp. (Japan/OTC), Petroliam Nasional- Petronas 
(Malaysia), PTT Exploration & Production (Thailand/OTC), Pacrim Energy (Australia/ 
unknown), Premier (UK/OTC) and Totalfina (France/NYSE). EARTIIRIGHTS HALLIBURTON RE-
PORT, supra note 252, at 11; IRRC REPORT 2000, supra note 19, at app. C; OS/ Carporate List, supra 
note 255. 
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petroleum firms have withdrawn from Burma, four of 
which sell stock in the United States, and two of which 
sell products in the United States.257 
• Dams for hydro-power. The military government is "wiping out 
the population of areas to be flooded by the Salween dam 
project," which is planned for Southern Shan state. Most of this 
forced relocation, which destroyed several hundred villages 
in twenty-three townships, has already occurred.258 The govern-
ment cannot build a project of this size (a dam 188 meters 
high and costing three billion dollars) without foreign invest-
ment and foreign financial, engineering, and construction ser-
VIces. 
• The corporate connection. To date, the companies 
providing these services are reported to include 
Japanese, Thai, and German corporations.259 Any 
company involved in the project is aware of the 
forced relocation of over 300,000 people in the 
Shan state and the reliance of Burmese authorities 
on forced labor for clearing jungles, building roads 
and portering for security forces. There are already 
500 troops "protecting" the companies involved in 
preparations to build the dam. 260 According to 
human rights groups monitoring the project, the 
foreign companies avoid contact with local Shan 
people, much in the way that Unocal avoided con-
tact with forced labor that paved the way for its 
257. The six foreign petroleum-sector firms that have withdrawn from Burma include: 
Empire Oil (Australia/privately owned), BP Amoco (UK/NYSE), Petro-Canada (Canada/ 
CDNX), Royal Dutch Petroleum-Shell (Netherlands/NYSE), Shell Transport & Trading (UK/ 
NYSE), and Yukong Ltd. (S. Korea/NYSE). IRRC REPORT 2000, supra note 19, at app. C. 
258. Government Repurtedly Moving Villagers to Make Way for Dam Project, BBC Summary of 
World Broadcasts, Sept. 11, 2000, at Part 3 
259. "For years potential builders and funders have eyed the Salween the same way hungry 
wolves might gaze upon a stray Iamb." Richard Humphries, Contruversy Dogs Burma s Salween Dam, 
MAINICHI DAILY NEWS, Aug. 3, 2000, at 9. According to Ham Yawnghwe of Brussels-based 
Euro-Burma, a program funded by the EU, the Japanese government is implicated because it owns 
67% of Electric Power and Development Corporation, which has completed a feasibility study for 
the dam. Id. 
260. Id. 
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pipeline construction. 261 At least three U.S. construc-
tion firms have withdrawn from Burma (none of 
which are publicly traded), and none are reported 
as active there now outside of the oil and gas 
pipeline sector.262 At least three foreign construc-
tion or construction equipment firms are active in 
Burma, two of which sell stock in the United 
States.263 
• Transpmtation. Forced labor is commonly used to build transporta-
tion infrastructure including roads,264 airports,265 and railroads, 
which are often large-scale projects involving thousands of forced 
laborers. 266 
• The cmporate connection. The U.S. Embassy reports that 
U.S. firms provide transportation services in Burma. 267 
Caterpillar sells and services locomotives for Burma's 
railroads.268 One U.S. delivery company remains in 
261. /d. (citing reports from non-governmental monitoring groups, including Salween 
Watch, the Shan Herald Agency for News, and Towards Ecological Recovery and Regional 
Alliance, a Thai environmental organization). 
262. The three U.S. firms that have withdrawn from Burma include: Black & Veatch 
(USA/privately held), KD Engineering Co. Inc. (USA/privately held), and Pacific Architects & 
Engineers Inc. (USA/privately held). IRRC REPORT 2000, supra note 19, at app. C. 
263. The three foreign companies involved with dams and hydro-po~er construction in-
clude: Hitachi Construction Machinery Co. Uapan/Tokyo), Hitachi Ltd. Uapan/NYSE) and 
Kajima Corp Uapan/OTC). /d. at BI-13, BI-16. 
264. Forced labor on roads includes DOL UPDATE, supra note 217, at 5-7. 
265. Forced labor was used to construct access roads to the Mandalay international airport 
and to extend runways at other airports. 1999 CoUNTRY REPoRT, supra note 224, at 7; DOL REPoRT, 
supra note 214, at 36-37. 
266. Forced labor on railroads includes the following: "3000-4000 people (men, women, 
minors, and the elderly) were forced to work without compensation to rebuild an embank-
ment along the Ye-Tavoy railway road. Almost all of the villagers in Yebyu, Longlon, Thayet 
Chaung, and Tavoy townships had to work at the construction sites about 10-15 days every 
month from june 1998 until the end of the year." DOL UPDATE, supra note 217, at 8. "[I]n 
Saigaing Division over 1000 persons were herded into a 'volunteer labor camp' and forced to 
work to build a railroad; at least 17 reportedly died from malaria." 1999 CoUNTRY REPORT, 
supra note 224, at 1003. 
267. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, CoUNTRY CoMMERCIAL GUIDES FY 1999: BURMA ch. I (1998), at 
http:/ /www.state.gov/www/about_sta . .ides/1999/eastasia/burma99_01.html [hereinafter CoM-
MERCIAL GUIDE]. 
268. Myanmar Railways reports that it uses a number of Caterpillar locomotives, and the 
military government's rail ministry has sent representatives to several Caterpillar plants in the 
United States for training. IRRC REPoRT 2000, supra note 19, at AII-2. 
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Burma,269 and two have withdrawn.270 DHL Interna-
tional, a Belgian parent company that operates a 
subsidiary in Burma, does a very large business in the 
United States, the most prominent aspect of which is a 
venture to create an "international strategic alliance" 
with the U.S. Postal Service. 271 Including DHL, at least 
ten foreign firms provide transportation services in 
Burma,272 two of which sell stock in the United States. 
At least one foreign transportation firm has with-
drawn from Burma. 273 A less direct connection is 
presented at Yangon Port. There, the government has 
licensed one of the world's largest heroin traffickers, 
to own and operate port facilities. 274 This comes at a 
time when Burma already supplies 60 percent of 
heroin seized in the United States, and the amount of 
Burmese heroin sold in New York City tripled between 
1989 and 1996.275 
• AppareL The military government supports the Burmese apparel 
industry by using forced labor to build industrial parks where the 
newest factories are located.276 As noted above, the government 
269. The U.S. firm that remains is Indo-China Express (USA/privately held). !d. atAI-1. 
270. The two U.S. delivery firms that withdrew from Burma include: Federal Express 
(USA/NYSE) and United Parcel SeiVice (USA/NYSE). !d. at app. C; OS! Corpvrate List, supra note 
255. 
271. IRRC REPORT 2000, supra note 19, at BI-6; U.S. Postal SeiVice, Introducing . .. Global 
Express Guaranteed, available at http://gxg.smi.com/gxg/index.html (last visited on Nov. 30, 
2000). 
272. The 10 foreign transportation firms that are active in Burma include: Boustead 
Holdings (Malaysia/OTC), C&P Holdings (Singapore/unknown), DHL International (Belgium/ 
privately held), Export Import Bank of Thailand (Thailand), Malayan Banking (Malaysia/Kuala 
Lumpur), F.A Voight (Netherlands/privately held), Hutchinson Whampoa (Hong Kong/OTC), 
Italian-Thai Development (Thailand/Thailand), Kelang Port Management (Malaysia/unknown), 
and Yusen Air & Sea SeiVice (Japan/unknown). IRRC REPORT 2000, supra note 19, at BI-4-16, 
Bll-14. 
273. The foreign transportation firm that withdrew from Burma is Transurb Consultants 
(Belgium/unknown). /d. at app. C. 
274. Dennis Bernstein & Leslie Kean, People of the opiate: Burma's Dictatorship of Drugs, THE 
NATION, Dec. 16, 1996, at 11. 
275. ld. 
276. 1999 CoUNTRY REPORT, supra note 224, at 1004; U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, U.S. IMPORTS 
FORCoNSUMPTIONATCuSfOMSVALUEFROM BURMA (MYANMAR) (1999), at http:/ /dataweb.usitc.gov/ 
scripts/cy_m3.asp (indicating that the two highest-ranked categories account for 80% oftotal U.S. 
176 [Vol. 32 
LOCAL OPTIONS AFTER CROSBY v. NFTC 
threatens to arrest and imprison workers who complain or attempt 
to organize in joint-venture factories owned by foreign investors 
and state-owned trading companies. The Economist Intelligence 
Unit reports that textile workers in Burma now earn some of the 
world's lowest wages, approximately five U.S. cents per hour.277 
• The corporate connection. Apparel trade accounts for 
eighty percent of U.S. imports from Burma,278 notwith-
standing the fact that several U.S. apparel companies 
pulled out of Burma since the early 1990s.279 How-
ever, since the U.S. sanctions on "new investment" 
were implemented in 1996, U.S. apparel imports from 
Burma have grown dramatically, up 272% between 
1995 and 1999 to a level of $340 million per year in 
2000.280 "Made in Myanmar" labels have begun appear-
ing on university-licensed logo apparel in campus 
stores, prompting immediate boycotts and removal of 
goods.281 At least thirty apparel companies are report-
imports from Burma). One foreign firm known to operate a garment factory is Daewoo Corp. 
(Daewoo's now bankrupt/inreceivership-they might not have the factory anymore). IRRC 
REPoRT 2000, supra note 19, at Bl-6. 
277. Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Report-Myanmar, Emplcyment, Wa~ & Prices, May 
11, 2000, subscription service available at http:db.eiu.com (on file with author). 
278. U.S. INT'L TRADE CoMM'N, supra note 276. 
279. For example, the Levi Strauss Company stated that "It is not possible to do business in 
Myanmar without directly supporting the military government and its pervasive violations of 
human rights. This is not consistent with our own sourcing guidelines." Letter from Sabrina 
Johnson, supra note 210. Other apparel companies to leave Burma include Eddie Bauer,]. Crew, 
Liz Claiborne, London Fog/Pacific Trails, Macy's, Oshkosh B'Gosh, Ralph Lauren, and Reebok. 
IRRC REPORT 2000, supra note 19, at app. C; OS/ Corporate List, supra note 255. 
280. The brand names found with "Made in Myanmar" labels in early 2000 include Adidas, 
ASL, Bugle Boy, Burlington Coat Factory Conway, Dress Bam, Filene's, Jordache, Karl Kani, 
Kasper, Kohls, Macy's, Montgomery Ward, Nautica, Perry Ellis, Sports Authority, Warner Bros., 
and Williams-Sonoma. NAT'L LABoR COMM., U.S. RETAILERS INCREASE USE OF SWEATSHOPS IN BURMA 
AS IMPORTS SoAR 1-2 (June 22, 2000, New York, N.Y.). As of july 20, 2000, the following companies 
responded to the National Labor Committee report by announcing that they would cease future 
production in Burma: Adidas, Nautica and Warner Brothers. Correspondence from the respective 
companies to Charles Kernaghan, Executive Director of the National Labor Committee (July 
2000) (on file with author). 
281. Logo apparel made in Burn1a was on sale under theJanSport label at the University of 
California - Berkeley. The University of California is on of many schools to join the Worker's 
Rights Consortium, which acts as a watchdog to assure that universities to not license their logos 
for sale on apparel that is made under sweatshop conditions. See Andrea O'Brien, Activists Angry at 
Cal Student Store, THE DAILY CALIFORNIAN,. Sept. 21, 2000, at http/ /www.dailycal.org/arti-
cle.asp?id + 3258. Jansport responded to these reports by authorizing retailers to return Burmese-
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edly sourcing their goods in Burma, 282 at least fifteen 
of which are U.S. firms that are publicly traded on 
U.S. stock exchanges. At least fourteen apparel firms 
have withdrawn from Burma, thirteen of which based 
in the United States (and eight of which are publicly 
traded) 283 and one of which is a foreign firm. 284 
• Manufacturing. Like apparel, manufacturing in Burma most di-
rectly benefits from violation of human rights because of the 
repression of labor rights. Some firms also benefited from the 
in-kind subsidy of cheap land in industrial parks that were cleared 
by forced relocation and developed with forced labor.285 The 
Karen Human Rights Group estimates that the national figures on 
forced relocation would more than double when urban displace-
ment connected with foreign-owned factories is taken into ac-
count.286 
• The corporate connection. U.S. exports ha,ve been de-
clining, although the trade in industrial machinery 
still accounts for fifty-four percent of U.S. exports to 
made apparel to the company, freight-free. Free Burma Coalition, No Sweat Money for the Burmese 
&gime! (Oct. 25, 2000), at http:www.freeburmacoalition.org/frames/campaigns/sweatshops/ 
sweatshops.html. 
282. Including the 17 companies identified by the National Labor Committee, the compa-
nies reported to source their goods in Burma are Adidas, Bugle Boy, Bradlee's, Burlington Coat 
Factory (USA/NYSE), Capital Mercury Shirt Co. (USA/privately held), Cluett Peabody & Co., 
Consolidated Stores (USA/NYSE), Conway, Dress Barn (USA/Nasdaq), Filene's, Gaeltaryn Ltd. 
(USA/privately held), Jordache, Karl Kani (USA/privately held), Kasper ASL (USA/Nasdaq), 
Kohl's (USA/NYSE), Leslie Fay Companies, Macy's-Federated Department Stores (USA/NYSE), 
Montgomery Ward (USA/NYSE), Mothers Work (USA/Nasdaq), Nautica,J.C. Penny, Perry Ellis, 
Salmor Import Export Corp. (privately held), Sears (USA/NYSE), Sports Authority (USA/NYSE), 
Warner Bros. (USA/NYSE), and Williams-Sonoma (USA/NYSE). IRRC Report 2000, supra note 
19, at Ali-2-6; NAT'L LABoR Co MM., supra note 280, at 1-2; OS/ Curporate List, supra note 255. 
283. The 13 U.S. apparel firms that withdrew from Burma are Braun's Fashions (USA/ 
Nasdaq), Columbia Sportswear (USA/Nasdaq),]. Crew (USA/privately held), Kmart (USA/ 
NYSE), Kellwood (USA/NYSE), Levi Strauss (USA/privately held), Liz Claiborne (USA/NYSE, 
London Fog (USA/privately held), Mamiye Brothers (USA/privately held), OshKosh B'Gosh 
(USA/NYSE), Polo Ralph Lauren (USA/unknown), Target (USA/NYSE), and Venture Stores 
(USA/NYSE). IRRC REPoRT 2000, supra note 19, at app. C. 
284. The Burton Group (UK/unknown) is the foreign apparel firm that withdrew from 
Burma. /d. 
285. DOL SUMMARY, supra note 221, §II; DOL UPDATE, supra note 217, §VI. 
286. See KHRG REPORT, supra note 216, part IV (estimating a total of 2-4 million internally 
displaced persons including uncompensated urban displacees connected with factory construc-
tion). 
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Burma.287 Probably the most visible importer to the 
United States that operates manufacturing opera-
tions in Burma is the Suzuki Motor Corporation, 
which opened a Rangoon car and motorcycle plant 
in 1998 as a joint venture with the military govern-
ment.288 At that time General Motors held a 10% 
share of Suzuki stock, and in September 2000, GM 
doubled its stake when it purchased an additional 
$600 million of new Suzuki stock. 289 While Suzuki is 
currently the target of a consumer boycott because 
of its partnership with the military government, 290 
Toyota has withdrawn from Burma.291 Including 
Suzuki, seven foreign manufacturing firms are ac-
tive in Burma, of which at least three (Daewoo, 
Hitachi and Suzuki) sell goods or services in the 
United States, and three (Hitachi, Mitsui and Su-
zuki) sell stock in the United States. 292 
• Agriculture. Apart from opium, the U.S. Embassy identifies the 
primary agricultural exports from Burma as rubber, aquaculture 
shrimp and cash crops.293 Forced labor, including forced child 
labor, has been widely used since 1998 to drain virgin wetlands 
287. U.S. INT't. TRADE CoMM'N, U.S. DOMESTIC EXPORTS AT FAS VALUE TO BURMA (MYANMAR) 
(1999), at http:/ /dataweb.usitc.gov/scripts/c .. TS2&cc=5460&cn=Burma+%28Myanmar% 
29.asp (estimating the two highest-ranked categories at 54% oftotal exports to Burma). 
288. See]ames B. Treece, Suzuki Sets joint Venture in Myanmar, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS, Oct. 19, 
1998, at 17. Suzuki is based in japan (OTC). IRRC Report 2000, supra note 19, at BI-31. 
289. Edwina Gibbs, GM to Double Stake in Suzuki, Cement Asia Footing, REUTERS NEWSWIRE, Sept. 
14, 2000; Trece, supra note 288, at 17. General Motors is based in Detroit, Michigan (NYSE). IRRC 
REPORT 2000, supra note 19, at AII-4. 
290. See Free Burma Coalition, Protest-Free Burma Coalition, DC Burma Activist Netwurk, and the 
Burmese Women's Union, FNS DAYBOOK, Aug. 27, 1999; Free Burma Coalition, Free Burma Coalition 
Launches SuzukiBaycott, Japanese Company Prt11Jing Up Narco-Dictatorship in Burma', PR NEWSWIRE, 
May 4, 1999, at 12; Steven Greenhouse, A Weapon for Customers; The Baycott Returns, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 
26, 2000. § 4. 4. 
291. Toyota recently announced its withdrawal from Burma. FBC press release, supra note 
246. However, Toyota continues to operate a sezvice center through a subsidiary. IRRC REPoRT 
2000, supra note 19, at BI-34. 
292. The seven foreign manufacturing firms that are active in Burma include: Ban Hock Hin 
Engineering (Singapore/unknown), Daewoo (Korea/SEO), Hitachi Ltd. Gapan/NYSE), Mamee-
Double Decker (Malaysia/Kuala Lumpur), Mitsui & Co. Ltd. Gapan/OTC), Parekh Platinum 
(/India) and Suzuki Gapan/OTC). !d. at BI-3-31. 
293. CoMMERCIAL GUIDE, supra note 267, ch. I. 
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for crops that the government of Burma describes as export 
commodities in its economic plans. 294 For purposes of the U.S. 
government procurement ban on products made with forced 
labor, the U.S. Department of Labor reports that crops grown in 
Burma with forced child labor include beans, chilies, corn, 
pineapples, rice and sugarcane.295 Forced labor is also used to 
construct dams and ditches for agricultural irrigation, 296 pro-
duce rubber, and raise shrimp in commercial ponds built on the 
coast. 297 
-• The corporate connection. By far, the fastest growing 
category of Burmese imports to the United States is 
fish and crustaceans, including shrimp. The rate of 
increase in the past year is over 500%.298 The U.S. 
importers of Burmese food products have not been 
identified; one U.S. food processor (not publicly 
traded) has withdrawn from Burma.299 At least two 
foreign firms are known to have withdrawn from 
Burma, one of which sells stock in the United 
States.300 
• Logging. Tropical hardwoods including teak are one of Burma's 
primary exports, 301 and they are harvested extensively with forced 
labor. 302 Because of rapid deforestation in China, India and Thai-
land, Burma now holds half of the remaining hardwood forest in 
mainland SoutheastAsia,303 including eighty percent of the remain-
294. 1999 COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 224, at 1005. 
295. Forced Labor Notice, supra note 146, at 54,109. 
296. 1999 CoUNTRY REPORT, supra note 224, at 1003. 
297. Forced Labor Notice, supra note 146, at 54,109; ILO REPORT, supra note IIO, at§ 504. 
298. U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N, supra note 276 (ranking fish and crustacean as the sixth-
ranking U.S. import from Burma). 
299. The U.S. food processor that has withdrawn from Burma is Zin International (USA/ 
privately held). IRRC REPORT 2000, supra note 19, at app. C. 
300. The foreign food processors that have withdrawn from Burma include: Ajinomoto Co. 
Qapan/OTC) and Nickerson Group (UK/ privately held). /d. 
301. Forced Labor Notice, supra note 146, at 54109; COMMERCIAL GUIDE, supra note 267, at 
ch. I. 
302. ILO REPORT, supra note 11 o; at § 504. 
303. World Resources Institute: Forest Frontiers Initiative, Logging Burma's Frontier Forests: 
Resources and the Regime, at http:/ /www.wri.org/wri/ffi/burma/findings.htm (last visited Sept. 23, 
2000). 
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ing natural teak. 304 Logging in Burma increased dramatically after 
1988 (the year that the military government killed thousands of 
students to suppress the democracy movement) after the Thai 
government stopped issuing logging concessions in order to pre-
serve its remaining forests. 305 By 1991, Burma had the third highest 
rate of deforestation in the world at 8,000 square kilometers per 
year. 306 Military units conduct large-scale logging, milling, and 
related road construction with tens of thousands of forced labor-
ers. For example, one local report explained how people from 
several villages were ordered to clear-cut a forest without pay. The 
logs were sold commercially, the proceeds shared between two 
brigade commanders, and "those who complained got punished 
and torture[d)."307 To indicate the scale of military logging, an-
other report describes two logging projects. For each project, 
military forces commandeered 5,000 laborers to work for ten to 
fourteen days without providing food or pay.308 
. • The corporate connection. One U.S. furniture manufac-
turer imports Burmese teak,309 while three U.S. manu-
facturers or importers report that they have recently 
withdrawn from Burma; two of these are publicly 
traded. 310 At least seven foreign firms export or im-
port Burmese teak, and a large number of retailers 
sell Scandinavian furniture that is made with Burmese 
teak. 311 Since the teak market is increasingly depen-
304. Tim Keating, Farced· Labar Logging in Burma (May 1997), at http:/ /www.enviroweb.org/ 
rainrelief/reports/teak_tort.html. 
305. /d. 
306. /d. The extensive deforestation in Burma has become an environmental issue of 
international importance because of the resulting soil erosion, sedimentation of rivers, increased 
flooding, water shortages during dry season and loss of habitat to many plants and animals. World 
Resources Institute: Forest Frontiers Initiative, supra note 303. 
307. Keating, supra note 304. 
308. /d. 
309. The firm is Dean Hardwoods of Wilmington, N.C. (privately held). See IRRC REPORT 
2000, supra note 19, atAII-3; OS/ Corpvrate List, supra note 255. 
310. The three U.S. firms that withdrew from Burma include: Angelina Hardwood (USA/ 
privately held), Pier I Imports (USA/NYSE), and Williams Sonoma (USA/NYSE). See IRRC 
REPoRT 2000, supra note 19, at All-7, app. C. 
· 311. The seven active exporters or importers of Burmese timber include: Bollinger Fumiere 
(Switzerland/unknown); Dalhoff Larsen & Hronemann (Denmark/Copenhagen); Det Ostasi-
atiske Kompagni (Denmark/Copenhagen); Earth Industrial (Thailand/unknown); Karl Danzer 
Fumeirwerke (Germany/unknown); and Sun (which is supplied by the Sunti Forestry Group of 
Thailand/unknown). See id. at BI-4-16. The Scandinavian outlets that sell furniture made with 
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dent upon Burmese imports, this sector will remain 
the subject of investor initiatives and to a lesser extent, 
an issue for government procurement of furniture. 
• Tourism travel services. The government of Burma uses forced labor 
to develop hotels and rehabilitate tourist attractions such as reli-
gious shrines and archeological sites. 312 Considerably more forced 
labor has been commandeered to build transportation links specifi-
cally to support tourism including the work of 2.3 million workers 
for a ring road and restoration projects in Mandalay, 30,000 
workers for runway extensions at Bassein airport, a 50-mile road 
from Rangoon to Pegu, a highway from Pangoon to Mandalay, and 
the clearing oflnlay Lake.313 
• The corporate connection. The government tourism min-
istry has expanded its marketing strategy from a focus 
on Europe to include North America. The ministry 
has contracted with Aeroground Group Services, a 
San Francisco-based firm, to handle marketing, expo-
sitions, trips for tourism operators and writers, and 
ticketing services.314 At least two U.S. transportation 
or hotel firms (Marriott International and Silversea 
Cruises) are reportedly active in Burma,315 while two 
U.S. companies have withdrawn.316 At least two for-
eign cruise companies remain active in Burma.317 At 
least eighteen foreign hotel or resort companies re-
main active in Burma, three of which sell stock in the 
Burmese teak include Dania, Happy Viking, Scan Design, and Scandinavian Design. Rainforest 
Relief, Protecting the Continuing oppression of the Burmese People and the Destruction of their Rainforests by 
the SLORC, INTERNATIONAL TEAK WEEK OF ACTION, at http:/ /www.enviroweb.org/rainrelief/. 
newsnotes/teakweek.htm (last modified Feb. 18, 1998). 
312. Forced labor on tourist attractions includes work on Buddhist temples near Rangoon 
and the ancientDanoke Pagoda. 1999 COUNTRY REPORT, supra note 224, at 1004. 
313. DOL REPORT, supra note 214, at 3~37. 
314. Myan'flUlr Hires Aeroground to Bring in North Americ~n Tourists, MYANMAR TIMES & Bus. REv., 
Aug. 14, 2000, at http:www.myanmar.com/myanmartimes/no24/ global_touch.htm. 
315. The two U.S. tourism-sector firms that are active in Burma include: Marriott Interna-
tional (USA/NYSE) and Silversea Cruises, Ltd. (USA/privately held). IRRC REPORT 2000, supra 
note 19, atAII-5-6. 
316. The two U.S. tourism firms that withdrew from Burma are Best Western (USA/privately 
held) and Northwest Airlines (USA/Nasdaq). Id. at app. C; OS! Cmporate List, supra note 255. 
317. The two foreign cruise companies that are active in Burma include: Ocean Cruises Une 
(a subsidiary of the Italian finn Costa Crociere/unknown), and Sea Containers, Ltd. (Bermuda/ 
NYSE). IRRC REPORT 2000, supra note 19, at Bl-29, BII-3. 
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United States.318 Japan Air Lines ('jAL") not only flies 
to Burma, it also trains the crews of Myanmar Airways 
International and owns a hotel subsidiary in Burma. 319 
Including JAL, there are a total of eight foreign 
airlines that serve Burma, three of which sell stock in 
the United States. 320 
To summarize, the degree of corporate complicity in violation of 
human rights is not likely to involve perpetration of crimes, but rather, 
direct economic benefit from those crimes, which frequently function 
as a type of subsidy. These benefits are knowingly realized through 
cheap land, cheap labor, cheap commodities, and market opportuni-
ties that open up because many potential competitors have disassoci-
ated themselves from participating in such a repressive market. Presum-
ably, most of the approximately 329 parent companies doing business 
in Burma do not directly benefit from an illicit in-kind subsidy.321 
However, as the brief survey above indicates, a few score companies are 
nonetheless complicit in violations in that they receive the economic 
benefits made possible only by abuses of human rights. 
The recent upsurge in imports indicates that the adoption of pri-
mary procurement or investment standards could be just as important 
in discouraging firm's re-entry into Burma as they are in disassociating 
from firms that have remained in Burma. The most relevant U.S. 
import sectors include apparel, hardwoods, and seafood, while the 
export sectors include petroleum services, electronic equipment, con-
struction equipment, engineering and construction services. 
318. The 18 foreign hotel firms that are active in Burma include: Accor (France/OTC), 
Adman Club Co. (Thailand/unknown), Amara Holdings (Singapore/Singapore), Baiyoke Group 
(Thailand/unknown), Bangkok Bank (Thailand/Thailand), Exe Design Qapan/privately held), 
Exe Sakura Qapan/privately held) Fidelio Software (Thailand/privately held), Hazama Corp. 
Qapan/Tokyo), Hotel Properties (Singapore/Singapore), Idris Hydraulic (Malaysia/Kuala Lum-
pur), Keppel Corp. (Singapore/OTC), L.P. Holding (Thailand/unknown), Mandarin Oriental 
International (Hong Kong/OTC), Myanmar Hotels International (Hong Kong/unknown), Myan-
mar Swan Investment (Singapore/unknown), Nikken Rentacom Qapan/unknown), and Nikko 
Shoji -JAL Trading Qapan/unknown). Id. at BI-1-23. 
319. Jd. at BI-15. 
320. The eight foreign airlines that serve Burma include: British Airways (UK/NYSE), 
Deutsche Lufthanse (Germany/OTC),Japan Airlines Qapan/Nasdaq), M.O. Air System Qapan/ 
unknown), Malaysian Airlines System (Malaysia/Kuala Lumpur), Pakistan International Airlines 
(Pakistan/unknown), Royal Brunei Airlines (Brunei/government-<>wned) and Thai Airways 
International (Thailand/Thailand). ld. at BI-4-27, B-11-1-13. 
321. See IRRC REPORT 2000, supra note 19, at 6. For further analysis of the levels of corporate 
complicity, see irifra Part IV-B-1. 
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Potential Reach of Primary 
Investment & Procurement Measures 
i\lcthod of "Primary" Disassociation 
15 active firms unknown 
Apparel 8 departed firms 
8 active firms 2 firm active firms 
Oil & gas/pipeline const. 17 departed firms 4 departed firms 
3 active firms 3 active firms 
Manufacturing l departed firm 1 departed firm 
3 active firms unknown 
Travel services l departed firm 2 departed firms 
2 active firms unknown 
Hydropower/const. & equip. 2 departed firms 
2 active firms unknown 
Transportation services/equip. 2 departed firms 2 departed firms 
not known not known 
Furniture/logging 2 departed firms 
not known not known 
Agriculture 1 departed firm 
Approx. - active firms 23 active firms 6 active firms 
Approx. total- departed frrms 34 departed firms 9 departed firms 
The inquiry does not end, however, with the fact of corporate 
complicity. A company must participate in either a U.S. public procure-
ment market or stock market for procurement or investment policies 
to have any real significance for that company. The following chart 
indicates the broader reach of investment policies discussed above. 
The chart also indicates that both investment and procurement 
policies could affect companies that have previously withdrawn from 
Burma, but which could choose to return there if the investment 
climate changed. Most but not all of the companies that would be 
affected by procurement policies would also be affected by investment 
policies (some of them are privately held companies). 
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A total of approximately fifty-seven companies could be affected by 
primary investment policies. Twenty-three of these are active in Burma; 
thirty-four are departed. A secondary investment policy could reach a 
much larger number of the 329 parent companies that do business in 
Burma, approximately 73 of which trade their stock on the New York or 
Nasdaq stock exchanges. The political visibility of the narrower policies 
is reduced only if there are no meaningful targets, of which there is no 
shortage, except perhaps in the logging sector, where consumer boy-
cotts are still active. 
With respect to procurement, there are approximately fifteen compa-
nies that could be affected in the sectors of petroleum and manufactur-
ing, six of which are active and nine of which have departed. 
C. Building a Constituency for Human Rights 
Human rights advocates value public procurement and investment 
policies because their adoption and implementation helps to build a 
broader constituency for human rights. The policies make local and 
concrete that which is otherwise global and abstract-they help build a 
national constituency. Campaigns to adopt and implement public 
procurement and investment standards achieve the following goals: 
• Educating the public. By a large margin, the U.S. public favors 
liberalization of trade,322 but at the same time, they favor a value-
based approach to trade that includes standards for protecting the 
environment and human rights.323 Specifically, seventy-seven per-
cent of Americans favor economic measures to limit trade with 
Burma.324 Much of the public's education about human rights in 
Burma has been generated by the debate over policies at the state 
and local level. 
• Engaging consumers. Public standards have inspired purchasing and 
investment decisions by U.S. consumers since 1763.325 As Professor 
Amar has observed,· procurement advances public values not as 
322. See, e.g., PROGRAM ON INT'L POUCY AnnuDES, AMERICANS ON GLOBALIZATION: A STUDY OF 
U.S. Pusuc ATITIUDES (Mar. 28, 2000), at http:/ /www.pipa.org/onlinereports/globalization/ 
contents.html. 
323. ld. § 1D, Trade Sanctions. 
324. Id. 
325. See, e.g., Brief of Massachusetts at 29-30, Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 120 
S. Ct. 2288 (2000) (No. 99-474); CHARLES MCLEAN ANDREWS, THE BOSTON MERCHANTS AND THE 
NON-IMPORTATION MOVEMENT 17,33-34,40-41,43,55 (1968);James G. Pope, Republican Moments: 
The Role of Direct Popular Power in the American Constitutional Order, 129 PA. L. REv. 287, 330-335 
(1990); Porterfield, supra note 7, at 28 n.l82. 
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regulation, but as part of commerce itself.326 Procurement policies 
can provide leadership by example for non-government institu-
tions, and vice-vcrsa.327 For example, when the first college towns 
were joining the Burma Boycott in 199&-1997, thousands of stu-
dents were engaged in the successful boycott that led Pepsi to 
withdraw from direct sales in Burma.328 Consumer boycotts speak 
loudly to companies in retail sectors, and as the Burma campaign 
illustrates, consumer boycotts can be a catalyst for public-sector 
boycotts in "heavier" sectors such as investment banking and 
construction. 329 
• Engaging investors. & of 1999, the U.S. citizens shifted over one-
tenth of their investment assets (2.16 trillion dollars out of a total of 
16.3 trillion dollars) to "socially responsible" investment funds that 
avoid companies with adverse human rights or environmental 
records. 330 Among the institutional investors to divest from compa-
nies doing business in Burma are the University of Wisconsin,331 
the University of Minnesota332 and Kommunemes Pensionsfor-
sikring, the leading Danish pension fund, both of which sold their 
stock in Total, S.A.333 
The prospect of recruiting public pension funds to divest their 
holdings in the most morally challenged corporations is significant 
for at least three reasons. First, a divestment decision by such a large 
shareholder makes news. Second, a divestment decision by a pension 
fund or a mutual fund can add value to a corporation's "good will" 
assets in the investment community. Third, the globalization of 
326. Amar, supra note 9. 
327. See, e.g., Free Burma Coalition, American University Statement of Principles on Burma (july 
25, 1997), at http:/ /www.freeburmacoalition.org/ old/au-resolution.html. 
. 328. FREE BURMA CoALITION, THE FREE BuRMA CoAIJTION MANuAL 3643 (1997) [hereinafter 
FBC MANuAL] .Jeff Faux, executive director of the Economic Policy Institute, recently stated: 
The times may be ripe for more consumer boycotts. We have more of a consumer 
culture, and people see themselves more as consumers today. While people are 
participating less in the political process, as consumers they see that one way they can 
exercise political power is by where they spend their money and where they don't. 
Greenhouse, supra note 290. 
329. See Rodman, supra note 14, at 33-34. 
330. See Social Investment Forum, SociaUy Responsible Investing in U.S. Tops Two TriUion Dollar 
Mark (Nov. 4, 1999), at http:/ /www.socialinvest.org/areas/news/1999-trends.htm. 
331. IRRC REPoRT 1998, supra note 19, at app. G, 6 (showing the sale ofTexaco stock). 
332. I d. at v-vi and app G, 6 (showing the sale of Total stock). 
333. I d. at app. G, 3. 
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investment portfolios and corporate subsidiary structures means that 
divestment decisions can focus public attention on corporations 
based in Europe, Japan and elsewhere. 
In November 2000, the nation's largest public pension fund, the 
California Public Employees Retirement Fund, announced what 
could be a breakthrough in pension fund leadership. In the words of 
Phil Angelides, the California State Treasurer, the new policy "recog-
nizes the correlation between political stability and human rights 
and the long-term stability and profitability of our investments."334 
The elements of this policy include shifting to active management of 
investments in emerging markets (rather than broadly inclusive 
index funds) and screening those investments for compliance with 
the Global Sullivan Principles, which include human rights, environ-
mental and labor standards.335 
One of the most innovative investment/ divestment campaigns is now 
targeting the few oil companies that have invested in Southern 
Sudan. The principal target to date has been Talisman Energy of 
Toronto. Professor Eric Reeves of Smith College, a leader of this 
campaign, estimates that the campaign has effectively frozen the 
capital value of Talisman stock when it would have otherwise risen 
over 20% percent on the strength of 400% profit gains and a highly 
favorable price/earnings ratio.336 On the strength of this result, 
Professor Reeves argues that when divestment campaigns are tar-
geted at individual companies with the worst human rights records, 
divestment can create significant economic leverage. Thus, targeted 
divestment can have a greater impact than the symbolic statement 
that is made by divesting from many companies just because they do 
business in a repressive country.337 
In addition to seeking to constrain the capital value of a company, 
the Sudan campaign has also employed a number of equity-related 
policy initiatives, which could be models for use in other situations. 
These include: 
• Disclosure of risk. Sudan advocates have petitioned the SEC to 
investigate whether oil companies have misled investors by failing 
334. Robert Collier, Pension Fund Tightens Foreign Stock Rules, CalPERS Board Gives Weight to 
Human Rights, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 14,2000, at AS. 
335. Id. 
336. Letters from Prof. Eric Reeves to the author and Robert Dennis (Nov. 3 & 8, 2000) (on 
file with author). 
337. ld. 
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to disclose their Sudan investment in the company's prospectus for 
an initial public offering ("IPO"). A recent target has been the 
China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation ("Sinopec") .338 Previ-
ous Sudan-related advocacy- aimed at the IPO PetroChina, Ltd., a 
subsidiary of the China National Petroleum Corporation-is cred-
ited with limiting the firm to half of the capital it expected to raise 
from its IP0.339 
• Capital sanctions. In October 2000, the U.S. House of Representa-
tives approved a provision within the Sudan Peace Act that, if 
enacted, would effectively de-list from the New York Stock 
Exchange companies that do business with the government of 
Sudan. The bill would limit "the sale of stocks in the United 
States or to any U.S. person ... in support of a ... project in or 
within Sudan."340 Supporters of the bill favor this approach 
because it can target only companies at fault and minimize 
collateral damage to other companies that would result from 
broader sanctions. 341 
Shareholder resolutions can serve the same visibility goals as 
divestment campaigns, but they go a step further. For example, 
shareholder resolutions have sought disclosure of company opera-
tions in Burma (Unocal 1994), as well as outright withdrawal 
(Texaco 1996).342 Other resolutions have sought more generic 
human rights policies such as sourcing guidelines (Atlantic Rich-
field, Caterpillar, and Mobil) that would apply to operations in 
Burma.343 Mter opposing such shareholder resolutions, a number 
of companies including Texaco and Atlantic Richfield later with-
drew from Burma. 344 
338. Letter from Elliott Abrams, Chairman, U.S. Commission on International Religious 
Freedom, to David B.H. Martin, Director, Division of Corporation Finance, Securities and 
Exchange Commission (Oct. 20, 2000) (on file with author). 
339. Peter Wonacolt, Chinese Oil Firm Cut Sudan Links Before /PO, WALL ST.]., Oct. 11, 2000, at 
A23. 
340. 146 Cong. Rec. Hl0,641 (dailyed. Oct. 24, 2000). 
341. Edward Allen, U.S. Legislators Want Markets to Sway Sudan, FIN. TIMES (LoNDON), Nov. 2, 
2000, at § 6; Steven Edwards, U.S. BiU May Hit Calgary s Talisman, NAT't. PoST, Nov. 8, 2000, at C6. 
342. Id. at v-vi (sale of Total stock). Some Burma-specific resolutions have never been 
presented to shareholders because the company invoked the SEC shareholder proposal rule, 
which allows companies to omit proposals that affect less than five percent of a company's net 
assets and gross sales and are not otherwise significantly related to those activities. Id. at app. G, 3. 
343. !d. at app. G, 4. 
344. !d. at app. C; OS! Cmporate List, supra note 255. 
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During both the anti-Apartheid campaign and the free-Burma 
campaign, there has been a synergy between divestment and 
shareholder initiatives. When pressured to divest, many universi-
ties chose the less complicated option of supporting shareholder 
resolutions. 345 Shareholder initiatives have longer staying power 
and the potential to influence company behavior as compared to 
a divestment campaign. A successful divestment campaign re-
moves an institutional investor from the public debate over that 
corporation's conduct. On the other hand, the divestment deci-
sions of a few leading institutions can spur other much larger 
institutional investors to either divest or vote in favor of share-
holder resolutions.346 At some universities, students have pursued 
both divestment and shareholder initiatives simultaneously in 
order to take advantage of the synergy between the two. 347 
• Engaging significant political actors. Human rights advocates who 
seek to build a public constituency to oppose repression in places 
like Burma, Tibet or East Timor have few political resources to 
draw on in terms of U.S. citizens whose families .descend from 
those foreign cultures. Their hope is that their human rights cause 
will be seen as universal and reflect the priorities of significant 
domestic constituencies. For example, the AFL-CIO has acted 
against the repression of labor rights and use of forced labor in 
Burma. John Sweeney, the AFL-CIO president, has called for local 
labor councils and state federations to ask state and local govern-
ments to "ban procurement of goods produced in conditions that 
violate fundamental workers rights."348 Human rights advocates 
cannot be dismissed as marginal if they can effectively reach and 
affect the AFL-CIO. 
• Creating a laboratory for national policy. The First Circuit acknowl-
edged that "it may be that the Massachusetts law was a catalyst for 
federal sanctions."349 So it was that the state and local laws demon-
345. FBC MANUAL, supra note 328, at 48-51; Simon Billenness, supra note 175. 
346. Simon Billenness, supra note 175. 
347. /d.; FBC MANuAL, supra note 328, at 48-49. 
348. John Sweeney, President of the AFlrCIO, Making the Global Economy Work for 
Working Families: Beyond the WTO, Address Before the National Press Club (Nov. 19, 1999), at 
http:/ /www.aflcio.org/publ/speech11999/sp1119.htm. 
349. Natsios v. National Foreign Trade Council, 181 F.3d 38,77 (1st Cir. 1999) ("The passage 
of the Massachusetts Burma Law has resulted in significant attention being brought to the 
Burmese government's human rights record. Indeed, it may be that the Massachusetts law was a 
catalyst for federal sanctions. Massachusetts also played a role, through its representatives in the 
House and the Senate, in Congress's decision to impose sanctions on Burma."). 
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strated broad public support before Congress first passed and then 
overrode President Reagan's veto of the Comprehensive Anti-
Apartheid Act in 1986.350 The engagement of geographically diverse 
state and local governments can establish the political viability of a 
policy that is otherwise certain to face business opposition. 351 
D. Influencing Foreign Affairs 
State and local procurement and divestment laws during the anti-
Apartheid boycott are credited with having a significant impact on both 
the political climate and investment banks, which proved to be the 
Achilles heel of the Pretoria government.352 Burma may be an eco-
nomic "basket case," but it has no particular vulnerability such as South 
Mrica's reliance on international financial investment networks. 
However, Burma has demonstrated that it cannot build large-scale 
revenue-generating projects without foreign investment and develop-
mental services. If procurement and investment policies can dampen 
foreign direct investment, they can stunt the economic staying power of 
the junta. In addition to the modest economic constraints that procure-
ment and investment policies could present to the military govern-
ment, they may also serve to restrain that government's claim of 
political legitimacy. Conversely, the prospect of free-flowing invest-
ment and trade in a democratic Burma could be a powerful carrot, just 
as its withholding works as a stick. 
The point of reviewing this political context is that when considering 
"what works," human rights advocates evaluate investment and purchas-
ing options from a very different perspective than the corporations that 
challenge them. The NFTC condemns procurement and investment 
policies as "sanctions" that fail to accomplish the goal of forcing 
dictators out of office. However, from a human rights perspective, 
these economic measures have a different purpose and value. As 
standards for doing business with public funds, their first function is to 
disassociate state and local governments from corporate behavior that 
350. Pub. L. 99-440, 100 Stat 1086 (Oct. 2, 1986); see Rodman, supra note 14, at 22. 
351. For example, long after the end of the anti-Apartheid campaign, The Africa Fund 
continues to nurture and engage the network of state and local officials who have a political, 
cultural or economic interest in Africa. Recently, The Mrica Fund announced that 14 state and 
local officials were calling for debt-relief for impoverished Mrican nations, referring to the debts 
to the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund as the "chains of slavery in the 21st 
Century." Press Release, The Africa Fund, State and Municipal Officials Call for Cancellation of 
Mrica's Debt (Sept. 20, 2000) (on file with author). 
352. See Rodman, supra note 14, at 23-26. 
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knowingly supports violation of human rights, either indirectly or 
indirectly. By setting a visible public standard, they make it much easier 
for advocates to target corporate complicity in violation of human 
rights. 
V. CoNCLUSION 
Conventional wisdom now holds that globalization limits the ca-
pacity of sovereign nations to project their values through regulation 
of economic transactions, particularly when a regulation has an ex-
traterritorial effect. However, globalization also brings economic in-
terdependence, which begets greater political inter-connection. Both 
governments and individual citizens can more readily see and feel the 
consequences of each other's economic behavior.353 
When the first human rights agreements were negotiated decades 
ago, the relative isolation of national economies made it easy for 
countries to sign on, even those that violated human rights. There 
were, after all, no foreseeable consequences for those who benefited 
from violation of the agreements. But now, consumers and investors 
can learn which companies benefit from violation of human rights. As 
consumers and investors, rather than regulators, governments actually 
enjoy greater power, not less, because of globalization. 
The Supreme Court's decision to strike down Massachusetts' Burma 
law has implications beyond Burma. In the future, a congressional 
response to foreign governments that systemically repress human 
rights is likely to repeat the elements of federal sanctions against South 
Mrica and Burma. However, these "delicately balanced" sanctions are 
not designed to have a real economic impact. They merely convey a 
symbolic statement that will not upset corporate interests. 
The post-Crosby options for market participation have a dramatically 
narrower purpose and effect than a secondary boycott. These options 
for procurement, disclosure, divestment, shareholder resolutions, and 
political speech are summarized in the chart and options menu in the 
annex following this conclusion. Because their impact on foreign 
353. This realization arose in oral arguments on the Massachusetts Burma law when one of 
the justices asked Thomas Barnico, Assistant Attorney General of Massachusetts, why state 
governments had not participated in economic boycotts between American revolution and the 
anti-Apartheid campaign. Mr. Bamico replied that it "has to do with the fact that there was very 
limited global trade for those years. There.was limited information available to state governments 
about other activities in foreign states. ft Oral Argument Transcript at 11, Crosb-y (No. 99-474). 
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governments is indirect and incidental, they should escape the reach of 
federal preemption 
Is such an incidental impact worth the effort? The answer is "yes" to 
the extent that the post-Cros{Jy options still fulfill the functions of 
economic advocacy. They establish market participation standards 
based on human rights; they target violations of human rights; they 
build a constituency for human rights; and they enable that constitu-
ency to call on the federal government for more direct foreign affairs 
action to promote human rights. 
As market participants, state and local governments dwarf the federal 
presence. At $730 billion, state and local procurement accounts for 
three quarters of public-sector purchasing in the United States. Public 
pension funds stand among the leading institutional investors. Their 
purchasing power, their visibility as investors, and their public account-
ability make state and local governments a prime constituency for 
human rights in the global economy. The Supreme Court cannot alter 
that fact; nor has it accepted the corporate invitation to commandeer 
every aspect of market participation from the federal bench. Rather, 
the Court left room for another round of policy innovation at the state 
and local level. 
For state and local governmentS that see the moral consequences of 
their market participation, the logical course is to use the same powers 
that private market participants enjoy unless Congress or the Supreme 
Court says otherwise. The post-Crosby options are the middle ground 
between using "coercive" boycotts and merely writing letters to Con-
gress. For the sake of a humane global economy, one that is shaped 
more by market participation than government regulation, it is ground 
well worth claiming and defending. 
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LOCAL OPTIONS TO REPLACE BURMA BOYCOTT LAWS 
Summary of Options & Risk of Preemption 
Each option in the chart is defined in the menu that follows. 
A. Secondary Boycott - Option is preempted; the alternatives are to: 
1. Suspend.the existing law. 
a. Suspend indefinitely. 
b. Suspend 3 years, then repeal. 
2. the law 
B. Primary Boycott 
1 H 1. Goods made in Burma - Option is not available; high risk of 
preemption. 
2. Companies connected to human rights violations. 
a. General sector of violations. 
2 H 1. Avoid all business from that sector. 
3 H 2. Avoid a product or service from that sector. 
b. SpecifiC project or product with human rights violations. 
1. Avoid all business with that company. 
Avoid of that can1oar1v. 
A. General Sector with Human Rights VlolaUons. Triggared by: 
6 M 1. General - any procurementfrom company in sector. 
7 M 2. within an affected sector. 
B. Specific Project with Human Rights VIolations. Triggered by: 
8 M 1. General - any procurement from company that makes/sells the 
product. 
9 M 2. Specific - procurement of that specific product. 
Ill. Divestment 
A. Indirect Connection. Sell stock of a company that 
10 L 1. Does business in Burma. 
11 L ~--~2.~~~~==~~~~~~~~~~~------------i 
B. 
12 L 
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Menu of Options to Replace Burma Boycott Laws 
I. Procurement 
194 
A. Secondary Boycott 
This is the option that the Supreme Court preempted in Crosby v. NFTC. 
Like the Massachusetts Burma law that was struck down by the 
Court, these laws require that state or local agencies avoid 
purchasing goods or services from companies that either do 
business in Burma or, more directly, do business with the 
government of Burma. In order to comply with the Court's 
decision, the options are to: 
1. Suspend the existing law until such time as Congress may 
remove the preemption of the law under federal Burma 
sanctions. 
a. Suspend indefinitely. 
b. Suspend for a period of three years, after which time the 
law is repealed. 
2. &peal the existing law. 
B. Primary Boycott 
1. Goods made in Burma. This option is not available as it carries a 
high risk of preemption. 
2. Companies connected to human rights violations. Avoid do-
ing business with companies that are themselves connected 
to violation of human rights. 
a. General sector. Do not purchase goods made in sectors 
where violation of human rights is often part of the 
production or development process. 
(1) Avoid aU business. Do not purchase any goods or 
services from such a company. 
(2) Avoid product or seroice from that sector. Do not purchase 
from such a company the particular product or ser-
vice from the economic sector that benefits from 
violation of human rights. 
b. Specific product or project. Do not purchase from companies 
that benefit from a production or development process 
that violates human rights. 
(1) Avoid aU business. Do not purchase any goods or 
services from such a company. . 
(2) Avoid specific product or seroice. Do not purchase from 
such a company the particular product or service that 
benefits from violation of human rights. 
[Vol. 32 
LOCAL OPTIONS AFTER CROSBY v. NFFC 
II. Disclosure as an Alternative to a Primary Boycott 
& an alternative to a primary boycott, do not impose any limit on 
eligibility to bid for procurement contracts except the following: 
Before a contract can be awarded, certain companies must first 
disclose the nature of their business in Burma and whether or not 
it is connected with violation of human rights. Once a company 
discloses the information, the state or local government must sign 
the contract. The scope could be sector-specific or company-
specific as follows: 
A. General Sector 
Require disclosure by companies that invest or trade within a 
general sector that benefits from violation of human rights or 
where violation of human rights is often part of the production 
or development process. Disclosure would be triggered by: 
1. General. Any procurement from a company that invests or 
trades in such a sector. 
2. Sector-specific. Procurement only in the same sector that ben-
efits from violation of human rights. 
B. Specific Project 
Require disclosure by companies that directly participate in or 
benefit from a project or product that has been developed or 
produced with violation of human rights. Disclosure would be 
triggered by: 
1. General. Any procurement from a company that makes or 
sells the product. 
2. Sector-specific. Procurement only of that specific product. 
Ill. Divestment 
A. Indirect Connection 
Sell the stock of companies that: 
1. Do business in Burma. 
2. Do business with the military government of Burma. 
B. Direct Connection 
2000] 
Sell the stock of companies that benefit from violation of 
human rights: 
1. General sector. Because that company trades in a sector where 
violation of human rights is often part of the production or 
development process. Examples: 
a. Oil and gas pipeline construction and operation. 
b. Hydroelectric dam construction and operation. 
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c. Logging of tropical hardwoods. 
d. Shrimp farming. 
2. Specific product or project. Because that company participates in 
a project or specific product that has been developed or 
produced with violation ofhuman rights. 
IV. Shareholder Resolutions 
Require [or authorize] the managers of public pension funds to 
vote [and cosponsor] shareholder resolutions that require the 
company to: 
A. Adopt human rights standards, for purposes of avoiding business 
relationships in countries where all commerce indirectly sup-
ports repression of human rights or with particular partners, 
contractors or suppliers that benefit from violation of human 
rights or participate in projects or products that were developed 
or produced with violation of human rights. 
B. Evaluate business in Burma, which weighs the benefits against the 
costs of risking consumer boycotts, lobbying expenses to op-
pose federal, state or local policies on doing business in Burma, 
and damage to the company's reputation and good will. 
C. Evaluate executive leadership, which raises the company's business 
in Burma in the context of executive compensation and evalua-
tion of mangers' performance. 
V. Political Speech 
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A. Publication of the names of companies doing business in Burma, 
with which the state or local government must now do business. 
B. Adoption of a legislative resolution that condemns human rights 
violations by the government of Burma and the complicity of 
corporations that support the military government. 
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